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Performing the National Security State:
Civil-Military Relations as a Cause of International Conflict

by

Aaron Charles Belkin

B.A. Brown University 1988
M.A. University of California, Berkeley 1992

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

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Spring, 1998

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

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

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

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Abstract

Performing the National Security State:

Civil-Military Relations as a Cause of International Conflict

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Aaron Charles Belkin

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Professor Steven Weber, Chair

This dissertation explores the link between civil-military relations and international conflict. In particular, I ask whether strategies that leaders invoke to protect themselves from their own militaries might under some conditions increase the risk of war. Even though civil-military relations is fundamental to state-building, and despite the sizable literature on domestic causes of international conflict, there is very little work on the international implications of regimes' efforts to protect themselves from their own militaries.

My argument is that when coups are possible, usually leaders divide their armed forces into rival organizations that they intend to check and balance each other and protect the regime as a by-product of mutual suspicion. (I label this strategy counterbalancing). Counterbalancing depends on leaders' ability to keep their own armed forces apart by promoting conflict among them. But military elites may rebel if they come to understand how leaders profit from inter-organizational hostility. Hence, counterbalancing requires leaders to conceal control benefits they accrue when they induce their own forces to compete. Because international conflict conceals these benefits, leaders may invent enemies, prepare for war, and engage in low-level

international disputes when their foundational objective is to use counterbalancing to subordinate their own militaries.

Contrary to the sizable literature on scapegoating, my argument is that in the realm of civil-military relations regimes may use provocative foreign policy to reinforce institutional divisions rather than to achieve cohesion. The argument is tested via a multi-method strategy that includes a pooled, time-series analysis of almost every country in the world over the last two decades of the Cold War as well as historical case studies of civil-military relations in Syria in the early 1970's and Georgia in the mid-1990's.

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Acknowledgements

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Chapter one: Regime vulnerability and international conflict

Ten years ago, Robert Keohane encouraged scholars to seek "better theories of domestic politics...so that the gap between the external and internal environments can be bridged in a systematic way..." (1986 p. 191). In a recent review of three studies on domestic sources of international conflict, Russett noted that none of the books under consideration "develops a serious theory of how domestic political process affects foreign policy choice" (1995 p. 280). According to Jack Levy, who has compiled the most comprehensive reviews of the literature to date, scholarship on domestic sources of international conflict is under-theorized. Better theories, he says, require "additional analysis of the causal mechanism through which aggressive foreign behavior advances the domestic political interests of decisionmakers" (1989b p. 283; Jackman, 1995 p. 520).

Still, despite calls for a more engaged, systematic conversation between comparativists and international relations theorists, there is little scholarship that links *generalizable* theories of domestic political process to international outcomes. This dissertation seeks to address the gap by focusing on possible connections between international politics and one particular domestic arena, civil-military relations. Specifically, I ask whether leadership efforts to protect themselves from their own armed forces might influence the likelihood of international conflict.

In ancient Rome, the Emperor Augustus was so concerned about the loyalty of the Praetorian Guard that he assembled another corps of body guards, the German custodes, who were "recruited from extreme points of the frontier so that they had no possible political or personal connections with

anyone in Rome" (Webster, 1985 p. 101). In Iran, despite generous patronage, terrifying purges, and other control mechanisms designed to secure officers' loyalty, the Shah was sufficiently worried about the possibility of military insubordination that no general deployed outside Tehran was permitted to visit the capital city without his permission (Zabih, 1988 p. 5). And in post-communist Poland, the threat of military conspiracy prompted Solidarity elite to make a "conscious effort to raise the social standing of the military in society" (Busza, forthcoming p. 17). The new government ended negative media coverage of the armed forces, revived pre-1939 military ceremonies, removed Defense Minister Jan Parys when his purging campaign gave rise to resentment in the officer corps, and provided generous salaries and pensions despite considerable fiscal pressures (Busza, forthcoming).

These examples are intended to illustrate that in some political circumstances, the loyalty of the military cannot be taken for granted, and that reducing the risk of coups d'état may require leaders to expend time-consuming, ongoing and costly effort. As Frazer notes, "multiple mechanisms of control [may] operate each day to keep military personnel in check" (1994 p. 197). When leaders take steps to protect themselves from their own armed forces, do international consequences follow?

The importance of the question

The question is important for two reasons. First, scholarship on the relationship between subordination of the armed forces and international conflict is one-sided. Two distinct perspectives emerge in the literature, but neither assesses whether or not leaders' efforts to protect themselves from their own militaries might produce international outcomes. On one hand,

some scholars argue that international conflicts enhance leadership efforts to eliminate the possibility of a coup d'état (Frazer, 1994; Andreski, 1968; Desch, 1996l; Janowitz, 1964). Frazer, for example, shows that involvement in anti-colonial war may lower the risk of conspiracy in newly independent states by familiarizing political leaders with the management of the military (1994). On the other hand, some scholars like Bueno de Mesquita et. al. (1992) advance the opposite claim. They argue that war waging increases the likelihood of coups because military elites punish political leaders for failing to settle their international disputes peacefully (1992; Lasswell, 1941). These studies reach divergent conclusions and they focus on international conflict as independent variable and regimes' relations with the armed forces as dependent variable. Certainly it is important to know whether and how international conflict might influence civil-military relations, but until scholars determine if causal arrows flow in the opposite direction, knowledge of the relationship between these two variables will remain one-sided and incomplete.

Second, the question is important because subordination of the armed forces is a critical domestic process that all new states must confront. Kier notes that "the creation of every state requires that a bargain be struck about the control of the military within the state and society" (1993, p. 24). In Zaire, soldiers mutinied just five days after the country achieved independence, and Zaire is not an isolated example (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; see Frazer, 1994 p. 196 on Kenya). According to data I present in chapter four, young regimes are nine times more likely to experience a coup or coup attempt than older regimes. At the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787, Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry worried that "if there were no

restriction on a standing army...the representatives of a few states in Congress 'may establish a military government'" (Collier, 1986 p. 242). Indeed, only four years prior to Gerry's speech, Continental Army conspirators in Newburgh, New York threatened to march on Congress to demand their pay at gun point. (Collier, 1986 p. 34; Kohn, 1975, pp. 17-39). In Israel on June 20, 1948, the SS Altalena approached Tel Aviv to unload rifles and machine guns earmarked for right-wing Irgun units of the Israel Defense Forces. When Prime Minister David Ben Gurion insisted that Irgun commanders hand the weapons over to the army's central command, gun fights ensued and over twenty soldiers died. According to some, widespread violence between rival Israeli army factions was only narrowly averted (Rothenberg, 1979 p. 62). These examples suggest that even legitimate, democratically elected leaders may be displaced by the military. According to Huntington (1995), since the end of the Cold War "there have been more than 20 coups attempts against new democracies".

Certainly it is true that in some political contexts, subordination of the armed forces may be achieved quickly if leaders institutionalize stable arrangements that vitiate the possibility of a military takeover. In chapter two, below, I articulate conditions that determine when leaders are vulnerable to their own armed forces and when they are not vulnerable. In the (very common) situation of high vulnerability, however, subordination of the armed forces is prerequisite for the consolidation of political authority. Before leaders can turn to the multiple tasks of governance including extraction, institutional development, and pursuit of economic growth, they must implement strategies to protect themselves from their own militaries. If protective strategies lead to international outcomes, then states may be

predisposed to certain patterns of international behavior by the imperatives of civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations and international conflict

Subordination of the armed forces is a critical domestic process that should lead to international outcomes. Of all domestic political processes that might be expected to entail international consequences, civil-military relations constitute a most-likely candidate because of the military's external orientation. However, even though scholars have studied the international consequences of numerous other forms of domestic conflict including riots, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, assassinations, government crises, purges, revolutions, antigovernmental demonstrations, and people killed in domestic violence (Stohl, 1980 pp. 300-301), there has been almost no systematic attention to possible external implications of subordination of the armed forces. With very few exceptions, potentially relevant literatures are silent on this question. Scholars who study civil-military relations tend not to address the causes of international conflict and scholars who study the origins of international conflict usually do not focus on civil-military relations as a possible source of interstate hostility.

First consider scholarship on civil-military relations. Sociologists who dominate the largest academic society in the field are not trained in international relations theory and they tend to conceptualize civil-military relations as a dependent variable. With some important exceptions, many of the political scientists who study civil-military relations are area specialists who focus on the developing world, where interstate wars occur rarely (Finer 1988 pp. 315-329). Like the sociologists, comparativists tend to treat civil-

military relations as a dependent variable and to ask organizational and domestic political questions about the class origins of the officer corps and the determinants of unit cohesion. As Kasza notes in a recent review, "comparativists rarely analyze the politics of the military in the context of its war-making mission or when the country under study is at war" (1996 pp. 355-6).

While some scholars do incorporate various aspects of civil-military relations as an independent variable, usually their aim is to account for domestic consequences of civil-military relations. For example, a subset of the literature explores the political role of the military, in particular whether service in the armed forces undermines ethnic affiliations.[1] A few scholars do use civil-military relations as an independent or mediating variable to explain international outcomes (Kier, 1983; Van Evera, 1984; Posen, 1984; Snyder, 1984; Schumpeter, 1951; Biddle and Zirkle, 1993). Van Evera, for example, argues that militaries cause war as an unintended side effect of efforts to protect their own organizational interests when they purvey myths that exaggerate the necessity and utility of force (1984). Posen argues that the degree of international threat influences whether or not civilians allow military preferences for offensive doctrines to prevail (1984). Although this literature sheds light on important issues such as the origins of doctrine and the influence of military culture (Kier, 1993), scholars in this subfield tend to base their accounts on great powers, for whom the risk of coups d'état usually is low. As a result, their analyses tend to ignore the risk of coups. Thus, the majority of scholarship on civil-military relations does not seek to account for

[1]See Johnson (1962) and Janowitz (1964), and for a review, see Bienen (1983).

the causes of international conflict. And those scholars who do use civil-military relations to explain international outcomes tend not to address the particular aspect of civil-military relations that is central to this project, leadership efforts to protect themselves from their own militaries.

While scholarship on civil-military relations tends not to address my question, literature on the causes of international conflict is equally silent. The first waves of scholarship in this large literature were grounded in the diplomatic history of the great powers, for whom the risk of coups has almost always been low (Walt, 1991).

A smaller, more recent literature examines the origins of war in the developing world. But this literature tends to remain curiously silent on the military (Holsti, 1993; Azar and Moon, 1988; Midlarsky, 1992; Buzan, 1983; Job, 1992; Ayoob, 1991). According to these studies, competing ethnic and religious groups contest the central authority of regimes that rest on narrow social bases, and the administrative capacities of state agencies fail to keep pace with the demands of growing populations. As a result, war in the underdeveloped world occurs when domestic violence "spills over" into interstate conflict, as was arguably the case in the India-Pakistan war of 1970 (Holsti, 1993). State weakness, then, is identified as a cause of war. But its operationalization almost never includes vulnerability to the armed forces, depending instead on limited coercive capacity, scarcity of resources, institutional and administrative incompetence, and lack of national cohesion (Job, 1992: 22).

In the section above, I referred briefly to four different literatures: (1) civil-military relations as dependent variable; (2) civil-military relations as independent variable / domestic politics as dependent variable; (3) civil-

military relations as independent variable / international relations as dependent variable; (4) developing-world security. My claims about these four literatures were: (1) For the most part, analysis of the origins of international conflict does not incorporate civil-military relations as a potential causal factor; (2) When scholarship in these four literatures does bring civil-military relations into the account of international conflict, it focuses on aspects of the civil-military relationship that have little if anything to do with the process of diminishing the risk of coups; (3) Scholarship on civil-military relations tends to remain silent on causes of international conflict; (4) When scholarship on civil-military relations does address international hostility, it tends to incorporate war as an independent variable that influences the likelihood of coups. As a result, these four literatures do not tell us if subordination of the armed forces leads to international conflict, and our knowledge of the relationship between this essential domestic political process and international conflict remains one-sided.

Regime vulnerability and international conflict

There is a fifth literature, however, that hews closer to the question at hand. In particular, the literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict may provide insights into the relationship between leadership efforts to protect themselves from their own armed forces and interstate hostility. According to the diversionary or scapegoat hypotheses, leaders wage war to increase national unity and to divert public and elite attention away from domestic problems (Levy, 1989b; Brody, 1991). Domestically vulnerable leaders or elite factions may use aggressive foreign policies to distract popular attention from internal discontent, fend off domestic enemies, consolidate

their own support, buttress their position at home through success abroad, and appear to be the strongest defender of the national interest through a hard-line foreign policy (Levy, 1989b). According to one of many possible examples, Huth and Russet argue that when there is "dispute among high-level government elites...political leadership is more likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy in the expectation that rally-round-the-flag effects will help to stymie elites who may have been considering a coup" (1993, p. 66).

The vast literature on regime vulnerability, sometimes also known as "rally-around-the-flag", "scapegoating", or "diversionary action", has been surveyed and critiqued elsewhere (Levi, 1989b; Stohl, 1980; Stein, 1976; Bueno de Mesquita, 1980; Russett, 1990). Rather than rehashing reviews that are already available, I articulate four dimensions that distinguish different strains in the literature and then I provide examples to illustrate alternative ways of combining the dimensions. My purpose is to show that (1) most scholarship on regime vulnerability and international conflict remains silent on the military as a source of regime insecurity; and (2) most of the literature depends on the flawed assumption that leaders seek to use external aggression to unify domestic challengers.

Sub-literatures within the broader literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict can be distinguished according to the following dimensions: (1) Which domestic actors are politically vulnerable: leaders, organizations, or elite factions? (2) Which domestic actors pose the threat: the public, rival organizations, rival elites, or some combination of these actors? (3) What type of threat is posed: electoral defeat, noncompliance, riots and protests, or conspiracy. (4) What do threatened actors do to reduce their

vulnerability: hostile foreign policy rhetoric, limited military strikes, all-out war? Taken together, I argue that these four dimensions capture most of the variety of scholarship on regime vulnerability and international conflict. Consider the following examples, and notice each study's reliance on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis:

Walt argues that revolutions cause war. Of the ten uncontroversial cases of revolution he identifies in the past two hundred years, eight revolutionary governments fought wars within five years after taking power (Walt, 1992 p. 324). Walt's careful analysis incorporates numerous domestic and international factors that interact to cause war. For example, he claims that domestically insecure revolutionary governments may purvey ideologies that complicate other states' efforts to assess their intentions (1992 p. 333). One important driving force in Walt's theory is that revolutionary governments may "exaggerate...a foreign threat in order to improve [their] internal position, that is, by rallying nationalist support for the new leaders or to justify harsh measures against internal opponents" (1992 p. 343).

In his explanation of brinkmanship crises, Lebow identifies several causal factors that may lead initiators to challenge to important commitments of other states. These factors include weakness of the initiator's political system, political vulnerability of a leader of the initiator's government, and an intraelite competition for power (1981, pp. 66; 69; 70). Lebow links regime vulnerability to brinkmanship via a series of compelling mechanisms that draw on psychological, organizational, domestic and international considerations (1981, p. 304). Central to his argument is the claim that in many of the crises he studies, "domestic political instability or the frangibility of the state itself was instrumental in convincing leaders to provoke a

confrontation. They resorted to the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad" (1981, p. 66).

The literature on war and state making identifies war as critical factor that may allow leaders to consolidate domestic political institutions, enhance their extractive capacities, and promote nationalist sentiments that unify the public and cement its affiliation with the nation (Tilly, 1990; Herbst, 1990). According to Tilly, "extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central organizational structures of states" (1990 p. 15). Most scholarship on war and state making specifies international conflict as independent variable (Kasza, 1996) but one implication of the literature is that leaders might engage in war to consolidate the institutional foundation of the state as well as their own grasp on power. Herbst, for example, suggests that war may allow "a highly extractive state...[to] cloak demands for greater resources in appeals for national unity" and that "the presence of a palpable external threat may be the strongest way to generate a common association between the state and the population" (1990 pp. 121; 122).

According to Desch, high external threats facilitate leadership efforts to control the armed forces. For example, Desch suggests that in the United States, tensions between the armed forces and the Clinton administration may have been a partial result of the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a perceived external threat. His logic is that "an external threat will actually produce better civil-military relations...[and] will tend to unify the various potential and actual factions in a military, but orient them outward." (1996 pp. 6; 8). Although Desch treats international threat as an exogenous variable, one implication of his argument is that regimes that are vulnerable to their

own armed forces might provoke external threats to unify their own armed forces.

These studies depict just a tiny sample of the vast literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict, and they can be classified accurately in terms of multiple points along the four dimensions mentioned above. For example, Lebow's (1981) theory of brinkmanship applies to politically vulnerable leaders as well as elite factions. Walt's domestically insecure revolutionary governments may be vulnerable to counterrevolutionary elites as well as noncompliant publics (1992). Still, the examples represent the central story lines of the literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict.

Two points should be mentioned before proceeding. First, with the exception of Desch's *Soldiers, States and Structure* as well as a few other studies (Levi and Vakili, 1992 p. 122; Biddle and Zirkle, 1993), the literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict does not acknowledge the military as a source of regime insecurity. Two reviews of the literature on regime vulnerability and international conflict survey over 100 studies, but they mention the military as a source of regime vulnerability only once (Levy, 1989b p. 264; Stohl, 1980).[2] A search through the two-decade publication history of *Armed Forces and Society*, a journal of military sociology, reveals that scholars have paid very little systematic attention to international implications of regime insecurity that is caused by the military. Hence, I believe that it is not an overgeneralization to claim that with just a few exceptions, the literature on regime vulnerability and international

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[2]A portion of the literature on state building and war addresses the impact of war or preparation for war on the structure of the military (Hintze, 1975; Finer, 1975; Barnett, 1992).

conflict does not analyze or even acknowledge the military as a possible source of regime insecurity.

Second, notice that each of the studies mentioned above depends at least in part on the assumption that external conflict generates internal group cohesion (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956; Stein, 1976, Levy, 1989b). According to Bodin, "the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to...find an enemy against whom [the subjects] can make common cause" (1955, cited in Waltz, 1959 p. 81). Shakespeare advised statesmen that "Be it thy course to busy giddy minds/With foreign quarrels" (1845, cited in Levy, 1989b p. 259).

The ingroup-outgroup hypothesis is consistent with several distinct sociological and psychological mechanisms (see Brown, 1988 for review). For example, Simmel's conflict-cohesion hypothesis maintains that conflict with another group increases internal group cohesion if the group already perceives itself as a pre-existing entity, if the outside threat is recognized as a menace to the entire group, and if group members believe that coordinated action can overcome the threat (Stein, 1976 p. 145; Levy, 1989b p. 261). A corollary of this hypothesis is that "groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate purpose or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and internal cohesion" (Coser, 1956 p. 104 cited in Levy, 1989b p. 261). To take another example, social identity theory claims that "people seek a positive self-identity that they gain by identifying with a group and by favorable comparison of the in-group with out-groups" (Mercer, 1995 p. 241; Brown, 1988). Regardless of which mechanism is invoked to sustain the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, external conflict is said to (1) divert group members' attention away from internal dissent and (2) to promote unity or ingroup

favoritism. Notice both ideas at work in the following passage: "The pursuit of a belligerent foreign policy by political elites in order to deflect popular attention away from internal socioeconomic and political problems, unify the nation against an external threat, and thereby increase their own domestic political support is an old theme in the literature on international relations" (Levy, 1989b p. 118).

The ingroup-outgroup hypothesis does much of the explanatory work in theories of regime vulnerability and international conflict and it is an important driving force in each of the four studies that I described (Walt, 1992; Lebow, 1981; Herbst, 1990; Desch, 1996). The hypothesis has been confirmed in numerous experimental settings (Brown, 1988; Stein, 1976; Levy, 1989b) and it is so well accepted that one scholar claimed it "to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence" (Dahrendorf, 1964 p. 58 cited in Levy, 1989b p. 261). But the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis is ill-suited for sustaining the link between regime vulnerability and international outcomes, especially when regime insecurity stems from the threat of military conspiracy. Consider the following points.

First, as Bueno de Mesquita (1980) notes, external conflict does not always lead to domestic cohesion. Stein reports that "once a war has begun...the process of waging it *always* decreases cohesion" (1978 p. 88, emphasis added). The argument does not necessarily invalidate the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis because many wars may fail to satisfy preconditions that are necessary for enhancing internal cohesion: the group must already perceive itself as a pre-existing entity; the external threat must be recognized as a menace to the entire group; and group members must believe that

coordinated action can overcome the threat (Stein, 1976 p. 145). Still, if a sizable percentage of international conflicts undermine domestic cohesion because they do not satisfy the antecedent conditions of the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, then surely the literature on regime vulnerability errs by placing so much explanatory load on the hypothesis.

Second, even if it were true that external conflict promoted ingroup cohesion within the armed forces, leaders would not try to protect themselves from the risk of coups d'état by unifying the military. Cohesion is not equivalent to loyalty, and even if the armed forces were internally cohesive, officers would not necessarily show allegiance to the regime or to the leadership. Positive feelings about the group, in other words, should not be confused with positive feelings about the group leader. There are many instances in which the armed forces have unified around their common dislike of political authorities (Nordlinger, 1977; Perlmutter, 1977; Finer, 1988).

Third, unified militaries pose a considerable threat to leaders when the risk of coup is high. Compared to other nonmilitary domestic agencies, the armed forces are likely to be marked by "superiority in organization, highly emotionalized symbolic status, and monopoly of arms" (Finer, 1988 p. 5). Because nonmilitary agencies are unlikely to rival the armed forces' capacity to subvert and take control of the political process, unified militaries are dangerous when the risk of coup is high. Even in the United States, one observer worried that

> ...virtually unreported in the media, the United States recently formed a supercommand: U.S. Atlantic Command. In the early fall of 1993 over 1.2 million troops -- nearly all the military forces based in the continental United States -- were reorganized under the control of

> USACOM, a joint military organization answerable to a single uniformed officer. USACOM not only is America's largest military command; it also is the organization primarily responsible for the new array of domestic assignments. For example, USACOM responds to civil disorders. Thus, a military leader whose control over the United States military is second only to the president must study and plan operations to take control of American cities in crises (Dunlap, 1994 p. 362).

For reasons that I articulate in chapter two, there is virtually no risk of coup in the United States. As a result, even a highly unified military would not threaten to displace the American government. When the risk of coup is high, however, I argue in chapter two that leaders must divide the military and pit rival branches against one another to protect themselves from their own armed forces (Migdal, 1988). Vulnerable leaders often fragment the structure of the armed forces as soon as they assume power. Yasir Arafat, for example, split the Palestinian security forces into nine organizations soon after achieving limited autonomy from Israel. According to data I present in chapter four, approximately ninety two percent of regimes that are vulnerable to the risk of coups maintain highly divided military forces. When regimes are vulnerable to the risk of coups, leaders do not seek to unify their armed forces because unified militaries are dangerous.

Of course, some theories that link regime vulnerability to international conflict do not depend on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis. According to Rosecrance, for example, "there tends to be a correlation between international instability and the domestic insecurity of elites" (1963 pp. 304; 306). But Rosecrance's elites do not challenge international harmony to distract popular attention or overcome inner antagonisms, but rather to reshape other states' ideologies and political structures according to their own

preferences (1963 pp. 225-227). Similarly, Brody (1991) shows that the public rallies in support of the president not because foreign policy adventurism increases domestic cohesion, but because opinion leaders sometimes refrain from criticizing the chief executive after limited uses of military force.

Still, these theories are exceptions. Most of the scholarship on regime vulnerability and international conflict ignores the military and most depends at least partially on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis as an important driving force for linking domestic causes to international outcomes (Levy, 1989b; Stohl, 1980). The ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, however, is ill-suited for sustaining the link. International conflict seems as likely to lead to dissent as cohesion. And even if external conflict were a cause of internal cohesion, leaders who feared of their own armed forces would not try to unify the military. In order to determine if and how leadership efforts to protect themselves from their own militaries might lead to international conflict, a different causal mechanism must be identified.

Conclusion

In recent years, discussion of the liberal peace hypothesis has dominated scholarship on domestic sources of international conflict. Scholars have tested the democratic peace hypothesis in numerous domains including Greek city-states and pre-industrial societies, and sophisticated responses and counter-responses have produced considerable knowledge about the relationship between regime type and international violence. While the conversation has been healthy, it has squeezed out discussion of other domestic causes of international conflict. A brief scan through recent issues of *World Politics, International Organization, and International*

Security indicates that of 13 articles on domestic politics and international conflict published in the last three years, 9 (69 percent) focus on the liberal peace hypothesis.

In this dissertation, I explore whether or not strategies that leaders use to protect themselves from their own armed forces might inflate or decrease the likelihood of international conflict. In addition to attempting to add to the portion of the literature on domestic sources of international conflict that does not focus on regime type and the liberal peace, the "value-added" of this study may rest in the following considerations:

First, I attempt to develop a generalizable theory of domestic politics and to link that theory to international outcomes. Second, I attempt to correct for the failure of the literature to acknowledge the military as an important source of regime insecurity and to address potential international implications of that insecurity. Even though subordination of the armed forces is a critical domestic process that all new states and many old ones face, and even though civil-military relations are a "most-likely candidate" among domestic political processes that might be expected to entail international consequences, at present our knowledge of the relationship between international conflict and civil-military relations is one-sided. Finally, third, I aim to correct for the literature's over-reliance on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis, which is not suited for sustaining the link between subordination of the armed forces and international outcomes.

In the second section of this dissertation (chapters two through four) I develop a domestic theory of civil-military relations and test that theory in case study of Syrian politics in the early 1970's as well as a pooled, time-series analysis of almost every country in the world during the second half of the

Cold War. In section three (chapters five through seven), I explore the international consequences of the domestic theory of civil-military relations developed in section two. Then I test my hypotheses about the relationship between domestic and international politics in a case study of Georgian civil-military relations in the mid-1990's as well as a pooled, time-series analysis.

Chapter Two: A theory of regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing

What strategies do leaders use to protect themselves from their own armed forces? In Machiavelli's time, "many more princes...lost their lives and their states by conspiracies than by open war" (Machiavelli, 1950 p. 410). An observer of the Brazilian armed forces assumes that "at all times there are some military officers anxious to overthrow the government for personal reasons, either selfish or ideological..." (Stepan, 1971 p. 80). And Finer wonders not "why [the military] rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them" (1988 p. 5). In this chapter, I attempt to develop a theory that predicts which strategies leaders are likely to select in their attempt to reduce vulnerability to their own armed forces.

My argument is that when coups are possible, leaders usually create rival military organizations that are intended to check and balance each other and protect the regime as a byproduct of independent coercive capacity. (I label this strategy counterbalancing). Vulnerable regimes divide their armed forces into rival organizations because the possibility of a coup is too important a problem to ignore, because other survival strategies tend to rely on manipulating officers' attitudes, and because counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits forces against force. I do not claim that the possibility of a coup is a necessary or sufficient cause of counterbalancing. Rather, I argue that the possiblity of a coup is a facilitative or probabilistic cause that makes counterbalancing highly likely (Skyrms 1975; 1988; Humphreys 1989; Cartwright 1979; 1983).

The dependent variable: counterbalancing

Counterbalancing refers to division of the military into rival forces, a strategy is common in coup-risk states. In Ecuador between 1981 and 1984, for example, the personal animosity between two rival Generals, Gribaldo Mino Tapia and Rene Vargas Pazzos, "was such that, if either seemed bent upon overthrowing the government, the other would automatically declare himself the loyal supporter of the government" (Farcau, 1994 p. 191). In 1837 in Chile, Diego Portales created a civilian militia of 25,000 men to serve as a counterweight against the regular army (Rouquie, 1987 p. 52). In Brazil in 196 4, just a few months after taking power via coup, the new regime created the Serviço Nacional de Informaçõ̃es and then "tried to use the resources of the SNI to gain control over the army..." (Stepan, 1986 p. 41). In India, "a proliferation of state security and military agencies has...represented a tangible counterweight to the regular military forces" (Migdal, 1988 p. 212). Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta cultivated an eclectic mix of rival paramilitaries, militias, police units, and service branches after Kenya achieved independence in January, 1964, and the consequent system of checks and balances deterred potential coup-plotters in any single organization (Frazer, 1994). In Bolivia in the early 1980s, the Calama Armored Regiment was created to balance the Tarapaca Armored Cavalry Regiment, which had been responsible for several coups. (Farcau, 1994 p. 59). In Syria, President Asad cultivated many different armies including the regular army, the Special Forces, the Presidential Guard, the Struggle Companies, the Popular Army and the Defense Units, a heavily armed palace guard of at least 25,000 men that he charged with the defense of Damascus. Syria experienced 21 regime changes via coups d'état between 1946 and 1970, but as I argue in chapter four,

Asad's use of the counterbalancing strategy put an end to this tradition and protected the regime for the past 25 years (Batatu, 1981; Dawisha, 1978; Drysdale, 1979; Hinnebusch, 1989; Michaud, 1982). And in Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnadze developed five ground forces and embedded them in a network of security organizations between 1992 and 1996. When he came to power in March, 1992, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni were the only major forces in Georgia. Over the next several years, Shevardnadze destroyed these two organizations and built up the following ground forces: the Army, Border Guard, Government Guard, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Special Units of the Ministry of State Security. As discussed in chapter six, the possibility of a coup was the critica, driving force that caused Shevardnadze to establish multiple, armed organizations that checked and balanced each other. Indeed, counterbalancing has been a key to the regime's survival.

Two dimensions distinguish alternative variants of counterbalancing strategies. The first dimension refers to the type of organization that leaders establish to balance existing threats. On the one hand, they may create military, paramilitary or police forces that check potential conspirators through the threat of violent force. On the other hand, they may create non-military institutions such as intelligence agencies or networks of political watchdogs that monitor and infiltrate the chain of command. The second dimension refers to the location of the balancing force. Leaders can create new service branches or paramilitary forces outside the established chain of command or they can cultivate power centers within existing organizations. In this dissertation I focus on the most common form of counterbalancing, the creation of new militarized forces. I do not address

the establishment of political or intelligence organizations or power centers within existing forces.

The independent variable: vulnerable versus invulnerable regimes

Which factors determine and indicate whether or not regimes are vulnerable to a coup? The literature on the causes of coups d'état is vast and one comprehensive review lists sixteen variables that may cause a coup (Zimmerman, 1983 p. 284; Farcau, 1994; Finer, 1988; Nordlinger, 1977; Putnam, 1967; Huntington, 1968). It is possible to refine the list of determinants by distinguishing between immediate causes that trigger a coup and background causes that make coups possible: an example of an immediate cause is military grievances that result from a salary cut and an example of a background cause is weak civil society. The distinction can be fuzzy because many determinants such as internal and external wars can both trigger a coup and provide long-term, background opportunities that make coups possible. But I preserve the distinction in this dissertation and focus on background causes that make coups possible because I am interested in deep, structural attributes of political systems that might prompt leaders to implement domestic survival strategies to reduce their vulnerability to the armed forces.

My intent here is not to provide a precise definition or a comprehensive list of all factors that distinguish vulnerable from invulnerable regimes. (I address this issue in chapter four when I operationalize the concept of regime vulnerability to the armed forces).

Rather, my purposes are to underscore the point that such a distinction exists and to offer some guidelines for recognizing the difference.

In some regimes, such as the United States, there is no possibility of a coup. Regardless of officers' preferences or the degree to which officers might be alienated from the President, there is no possibility of a military conspiracy to replace the regime. Such regimes are structurally invulnerable to the armed forces and their leaders need not implement survival strategies to protect themselves from their own militaries. It is possible and even likely that leaders of structurally invulnerable regimes may face a variety of challenges in the realm of civil-military relations. But reducing the risk of a coup is not one of those challenges.

In structurally vulnerable regimes, on the other hand, coups are possible. Luttwak identifies three background factors that make coups possible (1979 pp. 28-56). First, only a small fraction of the population can participate in the political life of the target state. Second, the target state must be independent of the influence of foreign powers that could thwart attempted conspiracies. And third, the institutions of state must be concentrated in a political center. Finer also specifies three factors that make it possible for the military to intervene in politics including (1) civilian dependence on the armed forces during wartime; (2) domestic crises such as civil wars or power vacuums; and (3) military popularity (1988 pp. 64-76).

In chapter four I operationalize the concept of regime vulnerability to the armed forces and identify two background factors (strength of civil society and legitimacy) that appear to do a good job of indicating when leaders are vulnerable to a coup when they are not vulnerable. In one of several

specifications of regime vulnerability developed in chapter four, for example, there was only one coup attempt in 703 regime-years coded as not-at-risk while there were 173 coup attempts in 1,941 regime-years coded as at-risk. While strength of civil society and legitimacy might serve as useful indicators of the degree of regime vulnerability, however, I do not intend to argue that they are the only or even the most important background causes of coups. Rather, I offer three broad guidelines for recognizing the difference between regimes that are vulnerable to coups and regimes that are invulnerable.

First, in vulnerable regimes the background causes of coups are present. These causes are factors that are linked through theoretical mechanisms as well as statistical correlation to the incidence of military conspiracies. Hence, weak political institutions constitute a background cause of coups because they are highly correlated with military conspiracy (Hibbs, 1973) and because scholars have developed theoretical mechanisms that link weak institutions to coups (Huntington, 1968).

Second, I conceptualize regime vulnerability as a deep, structural attribute of the government, of society, of political culture, or of state-society relations rather than a characteristic of specific military organizations. Hence, while absence of the rule of law or weak civil societies are background causes of coups that indicate regime vulnerability, I do not conceptualize officers' grievances, the size of the military, or military factionalism as background causes. Rather, these factors are triggering or immediate causes of coups. In addition, I do not conceptualize particular events such as specific wars as background causes of regime vulnerability.

Finally, third, background causes are intended to refer to macro-variables that are "too big" to respond to short-term political solutions. This criterion provides additional grounds for coding "smaller" micro-variables such as military grievances as a triggering cause rather than a background cause.

Several additional points about the independent variable are necessary. It is important to distinguish between two distinct contexts in which coups do not take place. On the one hand, a regime may not experience military conspiracies during a long period of time because it is structurally invulnerable to a coup. Such is the case in the United States. On the other hand, a regime may not experience coups during a long period of time because regime leaders have implemented domestic survival strategies successfully. Such is the case in Iraq and Syria, at least as of the writing of this dissertation. In these cases, the absence of coups is not an indication that the background causes of coups have disappeared. Rather, the absence of coups in Syria and Iraq is derivative of successful implementation survival strategies. These regimes remain structurally vulnerable as failure to continue to implement survival strategies probably would lead to subsequent conspiracies.

A final point is that civilian and military regimes both may be vulnerable to the possibility of a coup d'état. While it is commonly understood that most "democratic regimes are immediately faced with the major problem as to how to control and redirect the military and intelligence systems they inherit" (Stepan, 1988 p. x), it is perhaps less typical to acknowledge that military regimes face the same problem. Finer notes that

"the arts the ex-military dictator used to attain his pre-eminence are available to those left behind in active command positions" (1988 p. 177; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982 p. 32). Indeed, approximately half of all coups are launched against civilian regimes and the other half are launched against military regimes (Finer, 1983 p. 82).

Because both civilian and military regimes may find it necessary to emancipate themselves from the potential insubordination of the armed forces, I refer to civilian and military rulers as the regime while referring to the military-as-institution as the military (Stepan, 1988 p. 30). For the sake of terminological familiarity, however, I refer to civil-military relations rather than regime-military relations.

The mechanism: the possibility of a coup d'état as a cause of counterbalancing

When a coup is possible, leaders usually create rival military organizations to check and balance each other and protect the regime as a byproduct of their independent coercive capacity. Luttwak notes that "[i]n the newly-independent countries the para-military element of the police can be a very serious obstacle to the coup" (1968 p. 90). Snyder suggests that the risk of coups d'état depends in part on "whether the dictator has a paramilitary force which functions as a counterbalance to the regular armed forces and whose members infiltrate and spy upon the military" (1992 p. 381).

Not all fragmented military structures result from efforts to minimize the risk of a coup d'état and I discuss these possibilities below in the section on alternative explanations. At this point, however, I focus on regimes' use of counterbalancing to protect themselves from their own armed forces.

A problem that is too important to ignore

When a coup is possible, leaders may be willing to take costly steps to protect themselves because vulnerability to the military can entail serious personal consequences, because the problem is so important that other issues including war may be less consequential in comparison, because the possibility of a coup may increase the likelihood of popular protest or revolution, and because leaders cannot eliminate the problem by disbanding the armed forces. Consider the following arguments.

First, coups may entail serious personal consequences for displaced leaders. In Iraq, on July 14, 1958, General Abdul Karim Qassem and a group of about 100 fellow officers overthrew the monarchy and assassinated King Faisal II and members of his family and staff. Five years later Qassem himself was deposed:

> Night after night, they made their gruesome point. [Qassem's] body was propped up on a chair in the studio. A soldier sauntered around, handling its parts. The camera would cut to scenes of devastation at the Ministry of Defence where Qassem had made his last stand. There, on location, it lingered on the mutilated corpses of Qassem's entourage...Back to the studio, and close-ups now of the entry and exit points of each bullet hole. The whole macabre sequence closes with a scene that must forever remain etched on the memory of all those who saw it: the soldier grabbed the lolling head by the hair, came right up close, and spat full face into it (al-Khalil, 1990 p. 59).

As noted in chapter one, during the 1950s and 1960s a coup or attempted coup occurred every 4 months in Latin America, every 7 months in Asia, every 3 months in the Middle East and every 55 days in Africa (Bertsch, Clark & Wood, 1978), and since the end of the Cold War there have been a handful of coups or coup attempts each year (Facts on File, annual reports). Although

the numbers vary slightly depending on counting methods, there were approximately 357 attempted coups in the underdeveloped world from 1945 to 1985, and about half of all Third World states experienced a coup during this period. Of these attempts, 183 coups (or 51%) were successful (David, 1985; David, 1987; Finer, 1983). While many coups and attempted coups do not entail bloodshed, between one-fifth and one-third of them involve substantial violence including execution of members of the displaced old guard (Zimmerman, 1983 p. 241).

While military officers orchestrate most conspiracies, even the police can initiate a coup d'état, as occurred in Argentina, Panama, and the Seychelles (Luttwak, 1968, pp. 198, 202, 204). On numerous occasions extremely small armed factions have taken control of the state: 150 paratroopers overthrew President M'Ba of Gabon in 1963, 60 paratroopers ousted General Soglo in Dahome, 500 troops from an army of 10,000 in Ghana "toppled supposedly one of the most formidable systems of political mobilization on the continent" and 3,600 troops out of an army of 600,000 overthrew the South Korean government in 1961 (Finer, 1988; First, 1970 p. 4; cited in Zimmermann, 1983). In Zaire soldiers mutinied just five days after the country achieved independence (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982; also see Frazer, 1994 p. 196 on Kenya). Finally, even legitimate, democratically elected leaders such as Haiti's Aristide may be displaced by the military. According to Huntington (1995), in the first few years after the Cold War "there have been more than 20 coups attempts against new democracies".

Many politically fragile regimes survive for decades, but the prospects of a coup d'état may lurk behind a veil of domestic stability. And as a result,

the leadership may be forced to remain on constant vigil against the risk of overthrow. Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad, for example, has remained in power since 1970. Yet when he fell ill in November, 1983 his younger brother Rif'at took advantage of the occasion to attempt to displace the regime. Rif'at deployed his private army of 55,000 troops armed with artillery, tanks, air defense, and helicopters in downtown Damascus and engaged in tank battles with other paramilitary forces (Seale, 1988, p. 430). Although President Asad defused the crisis when he regained his health in early 1984, the case provides anecdotal evidence that even long-standing regimes may rest on extremely fragile foundations and that the risk of coups d'état may persist even after decades of regime survival.

Second, leaders may have more to fear from their own armed forces than from international war. While this point often is under-appreciated by scholars of international politics, violent interstate conflict in the developing world rarely leads to border changes, regime transition, or absolute surrender. Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait constitutes an exception that confirms this rule. Although the Kuwaiti royal family was deposed for a short time, its reign was re-established quickly and it remains in power. As Herbst notes, there was not a single involuntary border change in Africa between the 1950s and 1990. He suggests that "the vast majority of Third World states most of the time do not face significant external threats. States like Israel, South Korea, or Taiwan, where national survival has been a real consideration in national politics, are exceptional and even these countries have survived intact" (Herbst, 1990 p. 123).

Third, the possibility of a coup may increase the likelihood of popular protest or even revolutions. Only a handful of regimes have been toppled through revolution (Walt, 1992 p. 325) and a comprehensive review concludes that "attempts at revolutionary overthrow do not succeed in the face of a strong, loyal, and readily available army" (Zimmermann, 1983 p. 314). Skocpol and others concur that as long as the regime is able to retain the loyalty of the military, revolutionary opposition is not able to displace the government (Chorley, 1943; Gurr, 1967; Gurr, 1970 p. 251; Russell, 1974; Skocpol, 1979).[1]

While there is a limited amount of evidence to the contrary, most studies confirm that popular protest does not cause coups d'état (Zimmermann, 1983 p. 280). Most coups take place absent popular disorder (Thompson, 1972) and most disorder does not lead to coups (Hibbs, 1973). Indeed, to the extent that coups and domestic instability are related, it is probably the case that military disloyalty causes domestic instability by opening a window of opportunity for popular protest. Sanders notes that in 7 out of 9 African countries, "coups generally tend[ed] to precede internal war...rather than follow it" (1978 p. 125; cited in Zimmermann, 1983 p. 533). Leaders pursue numerous goals at any given time but when coups are possible, the key to survival may have more to do with diminishing the regime's vulnerability to the armed forces than with avoiding war, revolution or popular protest.

Fourth, even if there were no external threats, regimes would require armed forces to maintain their authority. At the constitutional convention

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[1]For an opposing view, see Snyder (1992).

in Philadelphia in 1787, delegates worried that in the absence of a standing army, the country would be vulnerable to internal, violent dissent from numerous "disaffected groups capable of rebellion" such as Shays' rebels (Collier and Collier, 1986 p. 235). As Giddens notes, the "capacity to back up taxation demands through the use of forces remained the single most essential element of state power" (1985, cited in Barnett, 1992). And Tilly argues that "the armed forces have historically played a large part in subordinating other authorities and the general population for the state. They backed up collection of taxes, put down rebellions, seized and disposed of enemies of the crown, literally enforced national policy" (1973 p. 446; Barnett, 1992 pp. 292-293). While it is typically assumed that dismantling the army would leave the state open to external threats, when Bolivia attempted to pursue this strategy in 1952 "the broad coalition of parties and labor groups which effected the Revolution soon fell out, and the government found the need of an army to oblige rebellious groups to comply with its directives" (Farcau, 1994 196). Although the Costa Rican army has been dismantled since 1948, there are 8,000 men in the police force and some police units have been militarized to contain labor disputes and other social tensions (Rouquie, 1987 pp. 189-194). Even if there were no foreign threats, regimes could not eliminate the risk of coup by disbanding all armed forces because they would still require coercive capacity to maintain domestic authority. But those same forces place the regime itself at risk. Hence, the leadership must cope with a dilemma, which Feaver labels the civil-military problematique: there is both "the need to have protection by the military and the need to have protection from the military" (1995 p. 4).

Limitations of alternative survival strategies

The possibility of a coup may be too important a problem to ignore. But why do leaders turn to counterbalancing strategies to reduce their vulnerability? Below I use a process of elimination to suggest that other survival strategies tend to be ineffective and to focus on manipulating attitudes while counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits force against force.

Promote corporate spirit

Corporate spirit refers to the military's capacity for self-determination inside its sphere (Pion-Berlin, 1992 p. 86). In particular, corporate spirit includes (a) the extent to which the military "gets its way" on issues such as promotion, recruitment, arms production and procurement, the military budget, military doctrine, and the organization of the defense establishment; and (b) whether criteria for deciding personnel issues are institutionalized on a nonpersonalistic basis. The essence of corporate spirit, then, involves both the military's right to settle issues within its own sphere without regime interference and the degree to which such issues are resolved according to merit-based, institutionalized, nonpersonalistic criteria. This closely parallels aspects of Stepan's "new professionalism" and Pion-Berlin's "autonomy" (Pion-Berlin, 1992; Snyder, 1992; Stepan, 1986 p. 135).

When coups are not possible or when they are highly unlikely, the regime's respect for military corporate spirit may enhance the armed forces' sense of their own status. However, I argue that this is not an effective

strategy when coups are possible. In the absence of alternative institutional restraints, promotion of corporate spirit may encourage a sense of self-importance among the senior officer corps that inflates regime vulnerability to a coup (Perlmutter, 1977). In addition, the usefulness of this strategy is limited by the regime's need to diminish opportunities for conspiracy. By respecting the military's right to determine personnel issues according to its own criteria, regimes forgo a critical opportunity to establish networks of political loyalists within the armed forces. Hence, I suggest that this strategy is not effective when coups are possible and it is not necessary when coups are not possible. Rather than conceptualizing promotion of corporate spirit as a strategy for lowering the risk of coups d'état, then, I claim that it is better conceived of as a blueprint for improving the armed forces' fighting capacity.

Indoctrinate

A second strategy consists of leaders' efforts to inculcate military personnel with the legitimacy of the state's or the regime's authority over the armed forces. Under this strategy I include indoctrination designed to infuse the armed forces with the particular political values of the regime as well as indoctrination designed to inculcate military personnel with the principle of civilian supremacy regardless of the political values of the particular regime. The key to both variants of indoctrination is education that seeks to persuade the armed forces to abstain from political conspiracy either because the regime and military share the same political values or because officers and soldiers internalize the principle of civilian supremacy and adhere to a politically neutral standard of civilian control. The aim of indoctrination strategies is

not always to depoliticize the military, but rather to use persuasion to convince the armed forces to remain subservient to the regime. In Ghana in 1961, for example, President Nkrumah told the cadets at the Ghana Military Academy that "You must have confidence that the government is doing what is best for the country and support it without question or criticism. It is not the duty of a soldier to criticize or endeavor to interfere in any way with the political affairs of the country" (Nordlinger, 1977 pp. 12-13).

Indoctrination strategies may be particularly effective in the few cases in which the regime can credibly appeal to revolutionary credentials. And, even in nonrevolutionary cases such as Jordan, whose borders were carved artificially out of the remnants of the defunct Ottoman empire, observers have commented on the importance of the manipulation of religious and nationalist symbols in the Hashemite regime's efforts to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces (Jureidini & McLaurin, 1984 pp. 37-39; Satloff, 1986 p. 60). At the same time, however, the usefulness of indoctrination strategies is limited by the fact that internalization of political ideas and ideologies requires consistent, long-term education (Janowitz, 1974 p. 128). When coups are possible, however, the regime may lack the time and institutional capacity to deliver and benefit from coherent persuasion and indoctrination. While indoctrination may supplement other strategies over time, it is difficult to imagine it as the foundation of any regime's effort to protect itself from its own armed forces, especially if the state's right to make and enforce rules is contested. Even in the Soviet Union, which could credibly appeal to revolutionary symbols and which devoted considerable resources to an institutional apparatus dedicated primarily to military indoctrination, Colton

argued that "even if we assume that Soviet state ideology is internalized by most officers and taken seriously as a guide to action...it is not hard to imagine an army coup being rationalized as merely another change in form of party leadership" (1979 p. 229). Indoctrination may have facilitated the quiescence of the military in the former Soviet Union, but its contribution probably was less important than often assumed (for a review, see Busza, 1995).

Professionalize

Professionalization as articulated by Huntington (1957a; 1957b) entails regime efforts to focus military attention on functional specialization and the strategic and technical demands of warfare. According to Huntington, preoccupation with military matters drains officers' desire to participate in the political realm and requires time and energy that might otherwise be available for conspiratorial activity. Huntington suggests that civilian control is achieved not because the military and the society share values and ideology, but because the military is indifferent to societal values and ideology (1957a p. 381; Stepan, 1986). Busy hands, in other words, are happy hands.

Although Huntington might disagree, I argue that professionalization does not constitute a distinct strategy for reducing the risk of coups d'état. When the notion of professionalization is disaggregated, it becomes clear that the concept reflects a fusion of two approaches discussed above, indoctrination and promotion of corporate spirit. Consider Huntington's recipe for professionalizing the armed forces. He claims that minimizing military involvement in politics is achieved by confining the armed forces to

a restricted sphere and rendering it politically sterile (Huntington, 1957b p. 84). How exactly is the military's political involvement to be minimized and objective civilian control to be maximized? On the one hand, the regime must furnish "a single concrete standard of civilian control which is politically neutral and which all social groups can recognize" (Huntington, 1957b p. 84). On the other hand, the regime must focus the attention of the armed forces on military matters by recognizing a sphere of autonomous military concern (Huntington, 1957b p. 83). I suggest that the former step is indoctrination based on the principle of civilian control and the latter step is promotion of the military's corporate spirit. By disaggregating Huntington's formula for professionalization, then, it becomes clear that the process by which the regime encourages the military to become more professional consists of a combination of two strategies discussed above. Hence, there is little or nothing about professionalization, per se, that reduces the risk of coups d'état and it should not be conceptualized as a distinct domestic survival strategy.

In addition, as Finer and others have observed, Huntington's professionalization thesis is empirically unsatisfying because even highly professionalized militaries launch coups d'état.[2] Perlmutter argues that professionalization can lead to an increased tendency to intervene politically (1977) and Barros and Coelho note that "[i]t is not difficult to find examples of interventions in politics on the part of the armed forces in different states of the process of professionalization..." (1986 p. 439). Hurewitz confirms that

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[2]There have been many critiques of Huntington's professionalization thesis. For reviews of other critiques, see Zimmermann (1983), Feaver (1995) and Taylor (1995).

"[i]n a nonindustrial region such as the Middle East there were a few armies whose officers might be accurately described as professional -- those of Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey. Yet Pakistani and Turkish officers seized political power" (1969 p. 103).

Remunerate

Fourth, regimes may be able to protect themselves by increasing military pay or pensions or by tolerating bribery and other forms of corruption that enhance soldiers' and officers' standard of living (Harries-Jenkins, 1978). In Mexico after 1920, "it became government policy to corrupt the Army. Senior officers were encouraged to enrich themselves with assorted business opportunities, sinecures...favors, and even illicit activities..." The Nigerian army has been referred to as "the largest outdoor welfare organization in the world" (Kaufman, 1978; Riding, 1985; cited in Ball, 1988). A study of 274 coups in 59 states between 1946 and 1970 determined that 36 percent of the cases were motivated by resource-related grievances including dissatisfaction over pay (Thompson, 1973). And Spanish, French, Turkish, and South Korean officers staged coups d'état when their salaries lagged behind the cost of living or when they experienced sharp declines in their relative wages (Colton, 1979 p. 262).

In the aftermath of most successful coups the salaries and living conditions of the armed forces are increased, at least temporarily (Ball, 1988 p. 65). And above-average pay may have been essential for the quiescence of numerous armed forces. In Nicaragua, for example, Antonio Somoza Garcia and his son Anastasi maintained military subservience by personally

financing a patronage network that ensured senior officer's dependence on the dictator's personal goodwill. The Somoza family's holdings were so vast -- $500 million dollars by one count -- that it was possible for many years to purchase the loyalty of senior military personnel (Snyder, 1992).

At the same time, however, there may be significant constraints on the regime's ability to use remuneration to purchase the loyalty of its armed forces. Weak states, even rentier states, rarely have sufficient control of commodity prices, exchange rates, and other economic levers to protect the system from exogenous shocks and ensure the continuous revenue flow necessary to sustain military loyalty (Ball, 1988 p. 179; Chaudry, 1989; O'Kane, 1987). This is not to suggest that regimes' reliance on remuneration strategies is always constrained by lack of resources. South Korea, for example, simply absorbed cutbacks in U.S. military assistance and increased its military expenditures from 4 up to 6 percent GDP in the 1970s. In Africa, one study found a negative relationship between military expenditures and GNP (Ball, 1988). However, under unstable economic conditions a system based on the use of financial rewards could exacerbate regime vulnerability by exposing military pay scales to the vagaries of international economic developments (O'Kane, 1987). In addition, as Farcau notes, "if an officer's loyalty can be bought for money, it can be sold to another for a higher price" (1994). This is not to say that salary increases or outright bribery can never be used to purchase military loyalty. Rather, my argument is that weak states may not be able to depend exclusively on remuneration strategies as the principal basis of their efforts to protect themselves from their own militaries.

Patrimonialize

According to the logic of a patrimonial strategy, regimes may attempt to wrest control over personnel issues from the military and to supplant merit-based standards for promotion and recruitment with personalistic criteria. Leaders may randomly shuffle, purge, and rehabilitate senior officers on a periodic basis, invoke personal loyalty, kinship ties, ethnicity, or group membership as standards for appointment and career advancement, and stack the officer corps with insiders who have a high stake in the regime's survival (Dreisziger, 1990; Enloe, 1980; Janowitz, 1964). Under a patrimonial strategy, leaders attempt to control officers' career paths, head off potentially threatening concentrations of power, and replace merit with personal allegiance as the key to career advancement (Migdal, 1988). Before João Goulart's ascent to the Brazilian Presidency in 1961, for example, 46.5 percent of the line officers promoted to General graduated first in their class at military academy. But during Goulart's tenure the number dropped to 17.2 percent (Stepan, 1971 p. 165).

The effectiveness of patrimonial survival strategies depends on leaders' ability to bind crucial elements of the officer corps to the regime and to prevent concentrations of power through frequent and random shuffles. In Zaire "Mobutu's frequent rotation of officers, periodic purges of the officer corps, and exploitation of ethnoregional tensions to divide the military have limited the armed forces' autonomy and, consequently, have reduced its capacity to turn against him" (Snyder, 1991 p. 381). In Chile after 1973, "all assignments in the Army, no matter how junior, were formally made by Pinochet himself, and it was difficult, if not impossible for other senior

officers to lay a claim on the loyalty of subordinates in gratitude for promotion or job assignment" (Farcau, 1994 p. 190).

While patrimonial strategies are used widely and while they are essential for regime longevity in some cases, their dependability is constrained by several factors. First, loyalty is often fickle and family members, longtime friends and other trusted subordinates may turn against the regime as a result of the constant shuffling, purging and rotation that are cornerstones of patrimonial strategies. A courageous stand against the Brazilian army's use of torture, for example, earned Sylvio Frota a reputation as a liberal who would support President Ernesto Geisel's reform program. After Geisel recruited him to serve as Army Minister, however, Frota attempted to stage a coup against his former political ally (Stepan, 1988 p. 42). Second, given the size of the military community and the fact that a very small number of conspirators may be sufficient to topple the regime, the effectiveness of patrimonial strategies may depend on the availability of precise information about which officers are contemplating a coup. In some cases such information may be common knowledge or the regime may get lucky and protect itself simply by purging and shuffling on a frequent and random basis. But in most cases, the sheer number of potential conspirators cripples the effectiveness of patrimonial strategies in the absence of reliable, precise information that weak states may find difficult to obtain. Related to this point, patrimonial strategies may decrease the quality of information available to leaders. In Brazil in 1964, President Goulart's "tactic of appointing new service chiefs when the old ones did not agree with him...cut him off from accurate feedback about military feeling" (Stepan, 1971 p. 193).

Third, shuffling and purging creates enemies. Ousted military elites can be rehabilitated but even rehabilitation may be insufficient for overcoming resentment that can result when officers are forcibly removed from posts they may have worked hard to obtain (Stepan, 1971 p. 193). Fourth, purging may depend on prior, successful counterbalancing. When leaders issue arrest warrants they may depend on officers or troops from rival forces to arrest and detain the accused. Without members from alternative forces to make such arrests, it may be difficult to pursue patrimonial strategies.

Sell Autonomy

Leaders may sacrifice policy autonomy to powerful, foreign states who promise to offer protection in the event of a coup. In post-colonial Africa in the 1960's, for example, many regimes maintained and even strengthened their relations with France in order to obtain French military backing against potential military challengers. France maintained an army of 6,000 troops in Africa to deter military conspiracies on the continent and the French were able to reverse the results of a successful coup in Gabon in 1964 simply by threatening the use of force (Luttwak, 1979 p. 41).

While selling autonomy may constitute an important element in leaders' attempts to protect themselves from their own armed forces, the strategy can be quite unreliable. First, foreign powers may fail to provide support during political crises. In the summer and fall of 1963, for example, the Kennedy administration abandoned the Diem regime in Vietnam and failed to keep Diem informed about a brewing conspiracy of generals who subsequently assassinated him. Tilly notes that between 1946 and 1984,

foreign powers intervened to deter only four percent of all coup attempts in the developing world (1990 p. 213). Second, foreign powers who ostensibly support status quo regimes may switch sides and come to the aid of political opposition. After Eduard Shevardnadze permitted Georgia to join the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993 in exchange for Russian support against Abkhaz separatists and followers of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, evidence suggests that Russian forces may have helped plan an assassination attempt against Shevardnadze in the fall of 1995. Finally, selling autonomy can undermine leaders' legitimacy when they come to be identified among their own public as pawns or surrogates of foreign nations.

Strengthen civilian oversight

When coups are possible, leaders may strengthen governmental and non-governmental civilian oversight mechanisms such as courts, legislatures and the media. These institutions can play a crucial role in the development of political control over the armed forces through their capacity to monitor, apply sanctions, and reinforce government legitimacy and a large subset of the literature underscores their importance for limiting opportunities for the armed forces to displace and supplant the government. Finer, for example, refers to mature political culture in which "the complex of civil procedures and organs which jointly constitute the political system are recognized as authoritative" and "public involvement in and attachment to these civil institutions is strong and widespread" (1988 p. 78). According to Finer, the armed forces may influence or even blackmail regime leaders in mature and developed political cultures, but they will not have an opportunity to displace

the government (1988 p. 75). Other scholars such as Feaver (1995; 1996), Huntington (1957b; 1968) and Luttwak (1979) agree that strong civilian oversight mechanisms are integral to limiting opportunities for the armed forces to foment conspiracies.

While even authoritarian and military regimes may attempt to develop strong governmental and non-governmental institutions to subordinate the armed forces, few vulnerable leaders depend heavily on this strategy. First, the evolution of strong oversight mechanisms may require more time and resources than vulnerable leaders can afford. Second, institutional development may prove difficult or impossible for the same reasons that give rise to the possibility of military conspiracy in the first place. In particular, if political life is not based on the rule of law, if leaders are not personally popular, and if the system of government is not grounded in widespread legitimacy, leaders may be unable to cultivate strong institutions without simultaneously unleashing forces that would undermine their hold on power (Migdal, 1988). My intent here is not to contribute to the rich literature on democratization and transitions from neopatrimonial rule. Rather, my point is that while some leaders who are vulnerable to their own armed forces may cultivate strong civilian institutions for myriad reasons including reducing the risk of a coup, many vulnerable leaders tend to avoid relying on this strategy for the same reasons that make coups possible in the first place.

Counterbalancing

All seven strategies described above depend heavily for their effectiveness on persuasion and the manipulation of ideational factors such as preferences, attitudes, loyalty, and morale. The key to indoctrination, for example, is to persuade officers to align their preferences with the ideology of the regime or the standard of civil control. The goal of professionalization is to neutralize officers' political preoccupations by rendering them indifferent to political developments. Remuneration and patrimonialization depend on influencing personal loyalty that is cemented through money, family ties, religion, or friendship. Promotion of corporate spirit involves bolstering organizational morale, and strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms requires convincing politicians, officers, and the public to follow the rule of law and forego corrupt behavior. Finally, selling autonomy depends on securing the loyalty of foreign powers through the alignment of local policy and ideology with the politics of the patron.

Part of the reason that strategies described above tend to be unreliable is that loyalties and attitudes are difficult to instill and to secure (For obstacles that loyalty-promoting organizations face, see Hirschman, 1970 pp. 92-98). Above I provided several examples of officers who switched sides even when their allegiances appeared cemented by money, ideology, or blood. And, any military historian can attest to the fact that loyalties can be fickle. In the midst of heavy fighting in Abkhazia in August, 1993, for example, the head of the Sukhumi brigade and the Gali battalion, both previously loyal to the government of Eduard Shevardnadze, switched sides and joined Shevardnadze's enemy Zviad Gamsakhurdia (The Georgian Chronicle,

August, 1993 p. 6). Recall Rif'at Asad's attempt to seize Damascus in November, 1983 while his brother was in the hospital, as well as Colton's claim that "it is not hard to imagine an army coup being rationalized as merely another change in form of party leadership" (1979 p. 229). As Frazer notes, loyalty is an important element of civilian control but "attitudes are subject to change and can go either way" (1996 p. 8). Strategies that depend on manipulating fickle loyalties and attitudes may not be reliable as the principal basis of protection when coups are possible.

Like all of the strategies described above, counterbalancing includes an ideational component (as I discuss in chapter five). Unlike the other strategies, however, the ideas that leaders must instill to implement counterbalancing successfully tend to be easier to secure. In particular, I argue in chapter five that the success of counterbalancing depends on leaders' ability to manipulate officers' perceptions of the regime's rationale for dividing the armed forces. When officers believe that inter-service rivalries are intended to promote regimes' self-serving interests, they may be likely to rebel. Hence, leaders must conceal control benefits they accrue from inter-sevice rivalries and make inter-organizational antagonism appear to be something they disdain.

Counterbalancing is the only strategy that depends on persuasion to lock in a system of checks and balances. It is the only approach that is built on deterrence and the pitting of force against force. If all the state's military and police agencies were unified into a single organization, there would be little or nothing to prevent conspirators within that organization from staging a coup. I do not claim that counterbalancing is always sufficient for eliminating

the risk of coups d'état, as many regimes that pursued this strategy have been toppled by their own militaries. Like the other strategies described above, counterbalancing can fail and can increase the likelihood of a conspiracy. Nor do I argue that regimes rely on counterbalancing exclusively. Rather, my claim is that although regimes may draw on many different combinations of the alternative approaches listed above, the possibility of a coup is very likely to cause them to include counterbalancing among the domestic survival strategies that they pursue.

Alternative causes of counterbalancing

Interservice rivalry often occurs among military organizations that were not divided to reduce the risk of a coup. Among American forces that fought in the Pacific theater during the Second World War, for example, "the individual and collective identity of soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen stressed their distinctiveness from one another -- especially where two services performed identical functions" (Cameron, 1994 p. 135). Even though interservice rivalry is a constant feature of American military life, this does not indicate that American service branches were created as distinct organizations to reduce the risk of conspiracy. Consider the following possibilities, all of which can cause regimes to divide their armed forces into multiple organizations: (1) domestic unrest: in domestically unstable situations, leaders may create distinct paramilitary forces for internal-use missions including suppression of domestic dissent; (2) international threat: when leaders anticipate involvement in war, they may enhance fighting effectiveness by creating new military forces to focus on specialized missions; (3) symbolism and institutional legacy: regimes may create new armed forces to mimic

institutional structures or patterns that prevail in other states; (4) social compartmentalization: leaders may create separate organizations to keep distinct religious, ethnic, or kinship groups apart from one another (Rosen, 1996).

Domestic unrest can cause regimes to counterbalance if leaders create separate forces to manage internal violence (Stepan, 1986; Rouquie, 1987). Regimes may prefer not to rely on the regular army to suppress domestic opposition if they fear undermining the regular military's morale or diluting its mission. Hence, riots and other forms of popular domestic strife may cause regimes to create new armed organizations to avoid reliance on the regular military at home. Even when internal-use missions do not entail suppression of organized violent challengers, leaders may encounter resistance if they attempt to involve the regular armed forces in domestic affairs. In the United States, for example, the Pentagon resisted Bush and Clinton administration plans to involve the army in urban crime prevention (Dunlap, 1994). Such resistance creates incentives for leaders to avoid relying on the regular armed forces for internal-use missions. If such alternative forces do not exist, leaders may create them for domestic purposes.

International threat may cause counterbalancing if regimes anticipate involvement in a war or international dispute. Regimes may create new armed organizations that enhance fighting effectiveness by specializing in distinct aspects of war-waging. Perhaps the most straightforward example of this phenomenon occurs when organizations are created to specialize in the management of new military technologies such as air combat, strategic nuclear weapons, and air defense.

Symbolic factors can cause regimes to counterbalance. Regimes may create praetorian guards to enhance domestic legitimacy and serve as symbolic reminders of the leader's power. In 1771 French officials organized a palace guard for Louis XV's grandson to "characterize the respect and honour due" to the royal family (Mansel, 1984 p. 157). In addition, regimes may create new military forces to reflect institutional structures that prevail in neighboring states. This may be especially likely when regimes seek to acquire the trappings of the modern state by mimicking institutional patterns they associate with legitimate governance (Wendt and Barnett, 1993; Meyer, 1983). Eyre and Suchman claim that "modern militaries emerge as part of the...world-level cultural processes that have given rise to the modern nation-state" (1996 p. 82).

Social structures can cause regimes to counterbalance. According to Rosen (1996), regimes may create distinct units, divisions, or armed organizations to compartmentalize rival social groups and to isolate them from one another. Regimes "transfer...[society's] ambient social structures into the military...that then "reflect[s] the divisions of the societies from which they come" when (Rosen, 1996 p. 257; 8). Social groupings might refer to religious, tribal, ethnic, kinship, geographic, or class affiliations. For example, the Indian army after independence created single-class as well as ethnically-based battalions (Rosen, 1996 p. 211). Hence, regimes may create distinct armed forces if they seek to compartmentalize social groups in separate organizations.

While all of the factors mentioned above are important causes of military fragmentation, I focus in this chapter on a different cause of

counterbalancing, namely regime vulnerability to the possibility of a coup d'état.

Other theories of civil-military relations

What are the differences between this theory and other theories of civil-military relations? There are three differences.

First, much of the literature assumes (incorrectly, I believe) that different types of regimes use different strategies to subordinate their militaries. As a result, scholars tend to cluster strategies into models and then match these models with particular regime-types. However, the aggregation of strategies into models and the matching of models with regime-types tends to create more confusion than clarity. For example, it is difficult to discern the critical difference between Stepan's liberal and professional models of civil-military relations (1971 p. 57-66). In the liberal model, "the political elite are intensely aware of the potential conflict between themselves and the military, and deliberately seek to ensure that the military has no legitimacy to act in the political sphere" (Stepan, 1971 p. 58). In the professional model, "civilian control is ensured...by civilian toleration of the autonomous development of military influence within the military sphere" (Stepan, 1971 p. 60). There is little if any difference between these two characterizations. To take another example, both Nordlinger's traditional model and his penetration model depend on regimes' attempts to convince soldiers to internalize "a set of strongly held beliefs and values" (1977 p. 13). In this dissertation I assume that kings, presidents, dictators, generals, and prime

ministers all may draw on the same strategies to subordinate their armed forces.

Second, the handful of studies that do present comprehensive lists of strategies (rather than models) tend to focus on the question of civilian control rather than avoiding coups (Farcau, 1994 pp. 188-198; Pion-Berlin, 1992; Zagorski, 1992 pp. 75-83; Welch, 1976 pp. 313-327; Feaver, 1995; 1996 pp. 24-33). There is nothing wrong with focusing on civilian control rather than the avoidance of coups. And, if theorists seek to offer normative recommendations for what leaders should do then civilian control may be an appropriate concern. At the same time, however, if the scholar's focus is explaining how leaders avoid coups, then it is important not to conflate this issue with civilian control because even military regimes must protect themselves from their own forces.

By presenting more fully elaborated lists of control mechanisms, the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph tend to avoid the pitfall of packaging strategies into incoherent models. But by focusing on civilian control rather than avoiding coups, these scholars emphasize tactics they expect civilians to use. In turn, this emphasis obscures the importance of counterbalancing. Indeed, studies mentioned above do not specify counterbalancing as a likely strategy that almost all vulnerable leaders should be expected to pursue. Welch, for example, says that "Mounting a successful seizure of power becomes more complicated in a structurally differentiated military, due to the problems of building a coup coalition" (1976 p. 320). The point is embedded, however, as one of four different recommendations for limiting the political strength of the military. And Welch dismisses the

importance of counterbalancing by noting that it "may backfire on civilian leaders" and by implying that consolidating military organizations may be a more useful strategy than fragmenting them (1976 p. 320). Other typologies of control mechanisms either ignore counterbalancing (Zagorski, 1992) or list it as one of many different strategies that leaders may select (Feaver, 1995 p. 28).

Finally, third, the single study that I have found that underscores counterbalancing as the most important survival strategy is a small-N analysis of post-colonial politics in Africa that does not purport to advance a general theory of civil-military relations (Frazer, 1996). Frazer identifies three methods of civilian control: (1) establishing counterweights to balance the military; (2) encouraging officers' loyalty; and (3) using rewards and sanctions to promote civilian authority. She argues that "All three methods are important for maintaining civilian control over the long-run. However, the most critical is the utilization of balancing institutions since attitudes are subject to change or can go either way, and rewards and sanctions can be misread" (1996 p. 8). My purpose is not to criticize Frazer, but rather to note that her study is not a general theory. To my knowledge there is not a single general study of civil-military relations that identifies counterbalancing as the most crucial or most likely strategy. Indeed, many studies that address counterbalancing underscore its riskiness. As Feaver notes, "countries which face an external threat may deploy sizable armed forces but keep them divided...Of course, even this effort may erode the ability of the military to execute its primary function of defending society against external threats" (1996 p. 25).

Because we lack compelling theory for explaining how and why various types of regimes might select particular strategies or combinations of strategies, I have (1) listed various strategies that all different types of leaders may draw on to protect themselves from their own militaries; (2) avoided deterministic models that match particular regime-types with particular strategies; (3) argued that the combination of strategies that leaders select is indeterminate, with the exception that I expect almost all vulnerable leaders to include counterbalancing in the portfolio of strategies they pursue to protect themselves from their own militaries when coups are possible.

Chapter three: Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's

When Hafiz al-Asad became Syrian President in February, 1971, Syria's ground forces consisted of just a single army and a few lightly-equipped militias. By 1976, five years later, Syrian ground forces included six fully-equipped armies. However, Asad did not integrate Syria's new armies into a joint command structure and he required them to report directly to the President's office rather than a centralized ministry. Coordination among Syrian military organizations was so poor that often they failed to fulfill their domestic and foreign policy missions. In the 1973 war, for example, Syrian combat troops filled an anti-tank ditch with shovels while under heavy Israeli fire because bridging tanks had been left behind (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990 p. 44). Why did Asad build so many military forces, and why did he prevent them from coordinating their efforts?

In this chapter, I argue that the possibility of a coup d'état prompted Asad to establish rival armed forces that checked and balanced each other and protected the regime as a byproduct of their reciprocal monitoring. The case is a somewhat difficult test for my theory because the possibility of a coup need not have been an important cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's. If the possibility of a coup turns out to have been an important cause of counterbalancing in such a case, then we might gain more confidence in the theory presented in this dissertation than aggregate data can provide alone (Eckstein, 1975).

The chapter is divided into four sections. After this brief introduction, I present a short political history of modern Syria. Second, I argue that Syria in the early 1970's constitutes a somewhat difficult test for my argument.

Third, I suggest that a coup was possible, that the Asad regime pursued a counterbalancing strategy, and that the possibility of a coup was an important driving force behind the establishment of a fragmented military structure in Syria in the early 1970's. Finally, fourth, I argue that other possible explanations of Syrian counterbalancing in the early 1970's do not seem plausible.

Historical context

Modern Syria emerged from the remnants of the defunct Ottoman Empire during the First World War, when French and British diplomats carved Ottoman territories into distinct spheres of great power influence. According to the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, France recognized British influence over Iraq, Transjordan, and the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf while London acceded to French control of Syria and Lebanon.

In a letter of October, 1915, British High Commissioner in Egypt Sir Henry MacMahon had suggested to Husayn, Sharif of Mecca, that Britain would support the creation of an independent Arab state if Husayn launched a region-wide revolt against the Ottomans (Antonius, 1946). Husayn's troops seized Damascus in October, 1918 and his son Faysal declared himself King of the new state. But the British soon reneged on MacMahon's promise (Tibawi, 1969). At the San Remo conference in April, 1920, London and Paris agreed to place Syria and Lebanon under French control and Iraq and Palestine under British control as Mandates of the League of Nations. On July 14, 1920, the commander of the French Army of the Levant ordered Faysal to disarm his troops, dismiss the nationalist cabinet, and acknowledge the political

legitimacy of the French Mandate in Syria. French troops occupied Damascus on July 25 and sent Faysal into exile, thus ending by force a two-year period of self-rule (Lapidus, 1988).

Because they were unwilling to rule Syria via an army of occupation, the French attempted to govern through local, Syrian notables who served as intermediaries between Paris and the Syrian public. The French strategy reinforced a powerful elite constituency whose interests depended on collaboration with Mandate authorities and who were drawn from an older generation of conservative merchants, religious leaders, and landowners. These notables emphasized parliamentary democracy and constitutionalism as vehicles for balancing imperial authority with nationalist demands for more autonomy from Paris (Khoury, 1983 p. 627).

At the same time, however, a younger, opposition coalition became increasingly attached to a more revolutionary variant of nationalism as a way of expressing disenchantment with French authority and its indigenous collaborators. This younger generation consisted of middle-class army officers and secular, Western-educated intellectuals, lawyers, teachers, students, and technocrats. Their form of nationalism, reflected in particular by the Arab Ba'th party, "placed more emphasis on social and economic justice for the masses [and] on pan-Arab unity..." (Khoury, 1983 p. 627). As French Mandate authorities confronted increasingly organized and broad-based resistance, they responded with a divide-and-conquer approach by fragmenting Syria into independent administrative units that isolated minority communities and took advantage of religious and tribal tensions.

Two decades of nationalist resistance and the French defeat in World War II forced Paris to withdraw from Syria 1946. Although representatives of

the old merchant and landlord classes who controlled the new government appeared committed to democratic institutions, political stability proved elusive. In 1949, after just three years of democratic rule, army chief of staff Husni al-Za'im launched the first Syrian coup d'état. The coup was backed by the American Central Intelligence Agency and American, French, British, Egyptian and Iraqi intelligence services all subsidized Syrian newspapers and political parties in the late 1940's (Middle East Watch, 1991). Two additional coups followed within nine months and marked the beginning of a two-decade process of political instability that "progressively transferred power from the old generation to the new" (Lapidus, 1988 p. 648; Be'eri, 1970).

The transfer of power from the old guard to the new that occurred in Syria between 1949 and 1970 must be interpreted in the context of two related themes: the rise of the 'Alawi community and the rise of Ba'th party (Pipes, 1989; Seale, 1965). For centuries, most 'Alawis lived in the Latakia region in northwest Syria as impoverished, food-producing peasants accountable to absentee, Sunni Muslim landlords. Although they make up only about ten percent of Syria's total population, the 'Alawis were over-represented in the Troupes Spéciales under the French and they came to dominate the Syrian armed forces by 1970.

The French encouraged minority communities to enter the Troupes Spéciales because Mandate authorities believed that minority soldiers would willingly oppress the Sunni Arab majority in Syria. Of eight infantry battalions of the Troupes Spéciales, three consisted entirely or primarily of 'Alawis (Batatu, 1981 p. 341). After independence the 'Alawi presence in the Syrian armed forces continued to grow as a result of depressed economic conditions in rural Latakia, the disdain with which many members of the

Sunni Arab majority held the military, and the ability to purchase service exemptions that few 'Alawi peasants could afford (Batatu, 1981 pp. 342 - 343). Throughout the 1940's and 1950's, 'Alawi soldiers rose quickly through the lower ranks as coups decimated the Sunni-dominated, upper echelons of officer corps. By the early 1960's the 'Alawis had "a plurality among the common soldiers and a clear preponderance among the non-commissioned officers" (Batatu, 1981 p. 341). While Sunni officers were divided by class, politics, and geography, "the 'Alawi officers were overwhelmingly of rural origins, peasant extraction, common regional provenance, and after 1955, Ba'thi in persuasion..." (Batatu, 1981 p. 343). Hence, two decades of coups staged by Sunni officer factions exhausted the senior ranks of the armed forces and cleared the way for the rise of the 'Alawis and of the Ba'th party.

The Ba'th party was founded in Syria in 1940 by two French-educated intellectuals, Salah Bitar and Michel Aflaq. Their doctrine of "Arab unity, social justice, democracy, and freedom...[was] anti-colonialist in international orientation and socialist in domestic programs. They espoused not only a political doctrine but a mystical feeling for the rejuvenation of the Arab nation" (Lapidus, 1988 p. 647; Dawisha, 1978 p. 342; Dawisha, 1974; Kaylani, 1972). The party's secular, pan-Arab, and socialist doctrine was attractive to members of Syria's rural, peasant minority communities and the party recruited heavily among 'Alawi military officers.

Indeed, the parallel rise of the Ba'th party and the 'Alawis can be traced to the Ba'thist Military Committee, organized in Cairo in 1960. The Committee formed in response to chaos that plagued the Syrian armed forces during the 1950's and consisted of five Syrian officers, three of whom were 'Alawi: Hafez al-Asad, Salah Jadid, and Muhammed Umran. They "realized

that absolute trust among politically active officers was a *sine qua non* to prolonged political survival" (Drysdale, 1979 p. 366). After returning to Syria, Committee members planned and executed the coup of March 10, 1963 that brought the Ba'th party to power.

According to Drysdale, the goal of the new regime was "to destroy the largely reactionary traditional landowning and mercantile ruling class of Damascus and Aleppo and to create a secular, socialist Syria. Most of its leading figures were young officers, teachers, lawyers and physicians with peasant or petit bourgeois family backgrounds" (1982 p. 3). Despite the populist appeal of its agenda, the regime lacked political experience, a well-defined policy program, and an organized popular following and it was divided into civilian and military wings. As Defense Minister, Hafez al-Asad consolidated Ba'thist and 'Alawi hold over the Syrian armed forces by assuming control of officer assignments, purging Sunni and conservative officers and troops, and promoting hundreds of loyal 'Alawi Ba'thists through the ranks (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 93).

On February 23, 1966, Jadid and Asad staged a coup. Over the next four years the Ba'th regime destroyed or exiled small property owners and merchants, formed armed militias of workers and peasants, created mass-based popular organizations, and purged trade unions of unsympathetic followers (Middle East Watch, 1991). As a result of policy disputes over the regime's radical agenda as well as a personal rivalry between Jadid and Asad, two wings of the Ba'th party vied for power throughout 1969 and 1970. Jadid's radical faction advocated drastic land-reform and income redistribution while Asad's moderate approach endorsed a more gradual socialist program.

In February, 1969 Asad seized key organs of the Syrian media and in October, 1970 he forced the resignation of Jadid's ally, President and Prime Minister Dr. Nur al-Din Attasi. Jadid's radical faction convened an emergency party congress and stripped Asad of his post. But Asad "immediately ordered army units to occupy the offices of the party and proceeded to arrest its top civilian leaders...He ousted all sixteen members of the Regional Command, installing himself as Premier and Secretary General..." (Dawisha, 1978 p. 351). After formally assuming the Syrian Presidency in February, 1971, Asad sponsored elections, formed a parliament, and drafted a new constitution. He replaced Jadid's socialist programs by easing tight restrictions on private investment and trade.

Since its inception, the Asad regime has featured classic attributes of a weak, authoritarian state. All manifestations of dissent have been suppressed violently and personal political freedoms never have been tolerated (Middle East Watch, 1991). The regime has depended on control over the police and armed forces and the Ba'th party has provided an institutional facade for one-man rule (Migdal, 1988; Lawson, 1990; Hinnebusch, 1989; Hinnebusch, 1993b). Asad has relied on patronage by using oil rents, foreign aid and drug money to finance a sizable public sector and by forcing "societal sectors [to] compete...for largess through clientalism partly organized along sectarian lines. This enabled the regime to play off a society fragmented along class, regional, and ethnic-sectarian lines" (Hinnebusch, 1993a p. 246). Despite unmistakable evidence of the regime's ongoing willingness to use brutality to suppress dissent, Middle East Watch notes that "The atmosphere is one of chaos mixed with petty corruption and the exercise of bureaucratic power, not of a ruthlessly efficient police state" (1991 p. 46).

In the early 1970's, Syria's population of eight million was divided by religion, ethnicity, language, region, tribe, and class. Eighty two and one-half percent of the population were Arabic-speaking and 68.7 percent were Sunni Muslims. Religious minorities included 'Alawis (11.5 percent); Druzes (3 percent); Isma'ilis (1.5 percent); and Greek Orthodox Christians (4.7 percent). Ethnic minorities included Kurds (8.5 percent); Armenians (4 percent), Turkomans (3 percent), and Circassians (van Dam, 1979 p. 15; Heller, 1983 p. 221; McLaurin, 1979).

A somewhat difficult test

If the logic advanced in chapter two is correct, then the possibility of a coup should almost always motivate leaders to attempt to protect themselves from their own armed forces. The argument is that regardless of the particular combination of strategies they pursue, usually leaders should include counterbalancing in their portfolio because counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits force against force and limits the armed forces' capacity for conspiracy.

What conditions might prompt exceptions to the expected causal relationship between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing? Presumably, leaders should select control mechanisms they expect to yield significant benefits without incurring high costs. When counterbalancing is expected to be ineffective and to incur high costs and when leaders pursue numerous alternative strategies that should be sufficient for lowering the risk of a coup, then they should be less likely to rely on counterbalancing to protect themselves from their own armed forces. Syria in the early 1970's constitutes such a case. In the Syrian case, it was not a foregone conclusion

that President Asad would attempt to lower the risk of a coup via a counterbalancing strategy in the early 1970's because (1) Asad had reason to doubt that counterbalancing would work; (2) the costs of counterbalancing were expected to be particularly high; and (3) Asad pursued numerous alternative strategies that could have been sufficient for attenuating the risk of a coup.

Based on recent Syrian history, Asad had reason to doubt that counterbalancing would work. Previous attempts at counterbalancing in Syria failed to end the cycle of coups and counter-coups that undermined political stability in the 1950's and 1960's. After the 1963 coup, for example, the Military Committee of the governing Ba'th party created a party militia of armed civilians as well as a party security force (Seale, 1965 p. 96; Foreign Area Studies Division, 1965 p. 352). Hinnebusch notes that these forces were "meant to counter the army's coercive monopoly" (1990 p. 159). After the 1966 coup, 'Abd al-Karim al-Jundi founded the Bureau of National Security of the Ba'th Party and built it into one of Syria's most feared security agencies. And Brigadier General 'Ali Haydar founded the Special Forces, an elite paramilitary, intelligence, and police unit (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 49; 51). Clearly, none of these efforts broke Syria's cycle of military instability, as they all predated Asad's coup of November, 1970. Hence, there was no precedent of effective counterbalancing in Syrian civil-military relations. It is certainly true that Asad's reaction to previous, failed efforts at counterbalancing could have been to "be sure to get it right this time". At the same time, recent national experiences during twenty five years of independence should not have lead Asad to see counterbalancing as the effective solution for achieving stable civil-military relations in Syria.

Second, Asad should have expected to pay high financial and organizational costs for counterbalancing. Although the lack of transparency into Syrian domestic politics makes it impossible to determine Asad's expectation of costs in 1971, it is possible to show ex-post that the regime paid a high price for the creation and maintenance of new, armed organizations. Exact budgetary figures are not available but sufficient data exist to estimate the strain that counterbalancing placed on the Syrian state budget.

In the early 1970's, Syria's annual national budget averaged about $1.4 billion U.S. dollars and by 1976 Syrian GDP was $5.9 billion U.S. dollars (Nyrop, 1978 p. 234). In 1970 Syria spent $1.23 billion and the figures for 1971-3 are $1.28 billion, $1.36 billion, and $1.58 billion, respectively. Of the total annual budget, Asad devoted an average of about 35 percent to military spending. In 1970 Syria spent 37.7 percent of its total budget on defense, and the figures for 1971-3 are 29.2 percent, 29.6 percent, and 44.4 percent, respectively (Nyrop, 1978 p. 234).

The paramilitaries probably made up at least one-third of the size of the regular armed forces. The regular armed forces included about 100,000 troops in the early 1970's and the paramilitary forces (the Defense Brigades, Special Forces, and Struggle Companies) probably included 35,000 troops. Hence, the Syrian paramilitary was at least one-third the size of the regular armed forces. When the intelligence agencies and Third Armored Division are included in the cost of counterbalancing, the ratio increases considerably. (By comparison, the data in chapter four indicate that the median ratio of paramilitary troops to regular armed forces for all countries in the world in 1974 was 27 percent). Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the regime devoted at least one-third of the overall military budget to counterbalancing. Asad probably spent

at least $150 million annually, or 11 percent of the total government budget and 1.5 percent of the Syrian gross domestic product on counterbalancing in the early 1970's. Given that the Syrian state's capacity for raising revenue via taxation, foreign aid, and borrowing was low (Midgal, 1988), counterbalancing put a severe strain on the national budget. In addition to financial costs, however, the cost of counterbalancing must be assessed in terms of organizational effectiveness. Below I develop the argument that division of the military into rival organizations seriously compromised the Syrian armed forces' ability to pursue various foreign and domestic missions. Hence, counterbalancing should have been expected to incur large financial and organizational costs.

The third reason why the possibility of a coup need not have caused counterbalancing is that Asad pursued numerous other strategies that could have been sufficient for attenuating the risk of conspiracy. Asad implemented so many alternative strategies that it might not have been necessary to include counterbalancing in his portfolio of control mechanisms.

First, Asad attempted to purchase the loyalty of his own armed forces through remuneration. As discussed in chapter two, the fundamental element of remuneration strategies is the provision of resources, whether legally or extra-legally, to purchase the loyalty of the troops. Regimes may use salary, benefits, bribery, or the tolerance of corruption for this purpose.

Remuneration was an important element in Asad's efforts to reduce the likelihood of a coup in the early 1970's. According to Petran officers "receive higher salaries than individuals of comparable civilian status. [They] get free medical care and generous traveling allowances. Army co-operatives provide them with every conceivable article at cost price as well as duty-free

foreign imports not available to the rest of the population...Interest-free loans enable them to buy houses and villas" (1972 p. 248 as cited in Dawisha, 1978 p. 351; Nyrop, 1978 p. 212). Asad allowed officers to ignore the 200 percent duty levied on civilians when they purchased new cars (Nyrop, 1978 p. 212). And other aspects of military benefits such as housing, leave, dependent care, income supplements and retirement benefits compared favorably with Syrian civilian conditions (Dyer, 1979 p. 692; Nyrop, 1978 p. 212; Collelo, 1988 p. 263). Officers even received an allowance to pay for household servants. By the late 1980's, Picard reported that officers received salaries from four to ten times those of civilians (1988 p. 139-144).

In addition to generous salaries and benefits packages, soldiers and officers benefited from numerous corruption schemes, most of which appear to have enjoyed the regime's blessings. Amnesty International (1987) reported that Syrian officers stationed in Lebanon approached detainees' relatives and demanded up to 50,000 Liras ($12,700 U.S.) for prison visits and 200,000 Syrian Liras ($51,000 U.S.) for releases. Officers demanded bribes for passports, import licenses, exit visas and permits (Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 41-42). One paramilitary force, the Defense Brigades, established a market in Damascus to sell goods stolen from Lebanon: "Trucks of the Defense Brigades or the Third Division often travel the route from Beirut to Damascus loaded with contraband" (Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 41-42). Hinnebusch concluded that "military officers have become patron-brokers allocating state goods and services to clients..." (1990 p. 161).

Second, Asad used patrimonialization to obtain and maintain the loyalty of the armed forces. Patrimonialization refers to purging, shuffling,, ethnic stacking and other tactics designed to pack the armed forces with

political loyalists. Regimes use patrimonial strategies to attempt to wrest control over personnel issues from the military and to supplant merit-based standards for promotion and recruitment with personalistic criteria. Patrimonialization was an essential element in Asad's survival strategy in the early 1970's. He maintained personal control over military appointments, possibly even at the middle levels of the officer corps. In addition, he used purges, shuffles, imprisonment, and assassination to prevent individual officers from consolidating their own power bases (Hinnebusch, 1990 p. 159; Z. Ma'oz, 1986 p. 28; Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 167-168). For example, on March 14, 1972, Syrian agents assassinated Mohammed 'Umran, a former senior party and military official, in Tripoli, Lebanon to thwart an attempted comeback (Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 152-3). In December, 1972 the regime arrested at least fifteen officers who were allies of the ousted Salah Jadid and charged them with attempted conspiracy (van Dam, 1979 p. 90). In the late 1970's Asad instigated "...a wave of transfers and retirements in which most of the remaining senior officers who had been associated with President Asad in the preparation of the 1970 coup were removed from sensitive military positions" (Dyer, 1979 p. 687; Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 9; 10).

In addition to using purges, shuffles, imprisonment, and assassination to prevent individual officers from consolidating their own power bases, Asad placed minority officers in command of military and paramilitary agencies. Collelo says that a "pillar of regime support was the tacit coalition of minorities that Assad has constructed" (1988, p. 207). Christians, Druzes, Ismailis, Yazidis, Kurds, and Circassians have been over-represented in the armed forces under Asad and they all "made common cause with the Alawi minority because of the shared fear that they would be persecuted under an

orthodox Sunni government" (Collelo, 1988 p. 208). In particular, Asad has sought to bind the fate of the 'Alawi community to the fate of the regime (Michaud, 1982 pp. 29-30). In the early 1970's, 'Alawi officers commanded almost all paramilitary agencies as well as units at the brigade and division levels of the regular armed forces (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 93). Over half of the senior officer corps as well as two-thirds of the students at the Military Academy have been 'Alawi (Z. Ma'oz, 1986 p. 28; Heller, 1983 p. 232; Hinnebusch, 1990, p. 160; Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 40). Examples include Rif'at al-Asad, former head of the Defense Brigades; Adnan al-Asad, commander of the Struggle Companies; 'Ali Haydar, former head of the Special Forces; Adnan Makhluf, commander of the Presidential Guard; Ibrahim al-Ali, head of the Popular Army; Muhammed al-Khuli, head of Air Force Intelligence, 'Ali Duba, head of Military Intelligence; General Shafiq Fayyad, former commander of the Third Division; General Ibrahim Safi, commander of the First Division; and 'Adnan Badr Hasan, commander of the Ninth Division (Hinnebusch, 1990 p. 160). Van Dam concludes that "The supremacy which Hafiz al-Asad's faction held after November of that year [1970] considerably reduced the chances for non-Alawis to form independent power blocs which would have any potential to endanger the position of the established regime" (1979 p. 89).

Third, Asad used indoctrination to protect himself from his own armed forces. Indoctrination strategies entail regime efforts to persuade service members to share the regime's particular political values or to inculcate them with a neutral standard of civilian control. In the case at hand, Asad strove to create an ideological army by identifying membership in the Ba'th party and loyalty to Ba'thist ideology as essential criteria for

promotion in the senior echelons of the officer corps (Collelo, 1988 p. 260). In 1971, Asad established a political directorate "to supervise political activity and indoctrination in the Syrian army. Among other things it directed a network of agents (muwajihun siasiyyun) charged with the political and ideological education of the army as well as with the raising of individual standards of discipline and devotion" (Rabinovich, 1982 pp. 269-270).[1] Syrian authorities have not released official statistics on the partisan composition of the military in the early 1970's, but in 1975 Asad claimed 80 percent of officers killed in the 1973 war were party members (Dawisha, 1978 p. 353; also Seale, 1988 pp. 89-90).

Fourth, the regime promoted the armed forces' corporate spirit. Promotion of corporate spirit refers to regime efforts to lower the risk of a coup by boosting military morale and prestige and by deferring to military preferences on issues such as promotion, recruitment, procurement, the military budget and doctrine. In addition, corporate spirit refers to whether criteria for deciding personnel issues are institutionalized on a nonpersonalistic basis. The essence of corporate spirit, then involves both the military's right to settle issues within its own sphere without regime interference and the degree to which such issues are resolved according to merit-based, institutionalized, non-personalistic criteria. Although Asad violated corporate spirit in many ways (detailed above in the discussion of patrimonialization), he promoted the military's prestige, reputation, and morale as well. Military spending almost doubled in the early 1970's, from $384 million in 1970 to $624 million in 1974 (in constant 1978 U.S. dollars), even though welfare and development spending declined as a percentage of

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[1]Collelo (1988 p. 258) says that the directorate was established in 1970.

the Syrian state budget (Ma'oz and Yaniv, 1986 p. 63; Michaud, 1982 p. 30). Asad enhanced military morale dramatically by expanding the armed forces and procuring the latest Soviet armaments in the 1970's (Rabinovich, 1982 p. 270). Collelo concludes that "Under Assad, the top army ranks have felt more secure. The ambitious rebuilding of the armed forces...increased the prestige and morale of the military" (1988 p. 263).

Finally, fifth, Asad attempted to lower the risk of coups by professionalizing pockets of the Syrian military. Professionalization, according to Huntington, entails efforts to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces by focusing their attention on military matters and by draining officers' time and energy that might otherwise be available for conspiratorial activity. According to a professionalization strategy, civilian control is achieved not because the military and the society share the same values and ideology, but because the military is indifferent to societal values and ideology. I argue in chapter two that professionalization is better conceptualized as a strategy for improving the armed forces' fighting effectiveness than as a strategy for minimizing the risk of a coup. Still, much of the literature on civil-military relations identifies professionalization as a key to reducing the risk of coups. Hence, I note briefly that Asad attempted to instill professional standards and merit-based criteria in pockets of the regular Syrian army, in particular among junior officers and enlisted personnel. Ba'thization of the army allowed Asad to establish higher standards of competence and military discipline by protecting the military from the politicized, factional infighting that had characterized civil-military relations in the 1960's (Drysdale, 1979 p. 370). Asad replaced some officers who lacked professional training by basing recruitment "on professional competence or promise rather than on the

purely political grounds of the 1960s" (Dyer, 1979 p. 685; 692). These steps improved the Syrian army's performance in the 1973 war as compared to its disastrous efforts in previous conflicts (Ma'oz and Yaniv, 1986 p. 74; Dupuy, 1978). Hinnebusch claims that in the early 1970's "In the larger army charged with external defense a new stress was put on professional competence and discipline" (Hinnebusch, 1990 p. 159; also Rabinovich, 1982 p. 269).

The argument developed in chapter two suggests that the possibility of a coup should almost always prompt regimes to pursue counterbalancing strategies. To the extent that there are exceptions to this claim, however, regime vulnerability should be less likely to cause counterbalancing if the benefits of counterbalancing are expected to be low and the costs are expected to be high. Syria in the early 1970's constitutes such a case.

The possibility of a coup

Hafez al-Asad has been President of Syria for twenty six years, but he could have been overthrown by a coup in the early 1970's. Two factors could explain why Asad was not deposed. On the one hand, Asad's survival might be attributed to the impossibility of a coup, the structural stability of the domestic political system in Syria in the early 1970's. On the other hand, Asad's survival might attest to his success in compensating for the regime's structural vulnerability by effectively implementing domestic survival strategies that blocked the military's capacity for conspiracy. In this section of the chapter, I favor the latter interpretation by arguing that a coup was possible in Syria in the early 1970's. Even though Asad was not deposed by a coup, the Syrian political system was structurally vulnerable: had Asad failed

to implement domestic survival strategies effectively, the Syrian military could have overthrown him. Consider the following points.

First, numerous attempted conspiracies launched against the Asad regime suggest ex post that a coup was possible in the early 1970's. By 1978 Nyrop concluded that "a power struggle among personal factions within the community of Alawite officers is an ever-present danger" (p. 218). Asad may have fabricated some accounts of attempted coups to justify martial law or other aspects of his heavy-handed rule. But the number of independent reports of mutinous behavior lend credibility to the notion that the possibility of a coup was high in the early 1970's. In December, 1972, for example, Asad arrested military supporters of the ousted Salah Jadid and charged them with attempted conspiracy (van Dam, 1979 p. 90). In the spring and fall of 1976, Syria's intervention in Lebanon prompted mutinies among officers and enlisted men throughout Syria (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 8). In July, 1977 the Manchester Guardian Weekly reported the discovery by Syrian officials of clandestine military organizations that had been responsible for assassinating senior 'Alawi officers (Nyrop, 1978 p. 218). Van Dam reports numerous 'Alawi-backed military conspiracies against the regime (1979 p. 42; 77; 87; 89 - 90; 160). And by 1991, a conservative estimate of Syria's prison population reported that several hundred soldiers were incarcerated as political prisoners (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 69).

Second, the Syrian political system was plagued by background factors that have been identified by the literature on civil-military relations as important determinants of coups. Numerous pre-Asad coups and attempted coups increased the risk of military conspiracy in Syria the early 1970's. As Zimmerman (1983) notes, past coups are important predictors of future

attempted conspiracies because often they reflect alternative factors that can cause coups such as military grievances or the lack of regime legitimacy. And, in addition to reflecting alternative factors that can cause conspiracies, past coups may have causal impact when officers come to believe that political disputes can be solved through direct intervention in the political process. Between its achievement of independence from France in April, 1946 and Asad's bloodless coup in November, 1970, Syria experienced 21 regime changes via coups d'état (Dawisha, 1978 p. 341). This fact alone suggests that the Syrian political system was structurally vulnerable in the early 1970's and that the military may been able to stage a successful coup against Asad.

In addition, Syrian civil society in the early 1970's was weak. As argued in the next chapter, the strength of civil society is an important determinant of the degree of regime vulnerability to the military. Strong, non-state organizations constitute a powerful safeguard against military intervention as a result of their ability to "talk back" or resist a coup by mobilizing protesters who refuse to comply with plotters' orders (Luttwak, 1968 p. 103). In Syria in the early 1970's almost all elements of civil society were penetrated and monitored by the Ba'th party or by the non-party security and intelligence apparatus (Drysdale, 1982). In the late 1960's the brutally authoritarian regime of Salah Jadid crushed civil society's vitality by using the state to penetrate social and professional organizations and by replacing indigenous, grassroots clubs and institutions with officially-sanctioned popular organizations such as the National Union of Students and the Peasants Union. Hinnebusch notes that "The state victimized some of the most developed parts of civil society, the *suq*, merchants, and industrialists" (1993a p. 246). In addition, the regime prohibited non-Ba'th parties from organizing among students,

workers, women, and peasants (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 79). The regime controlled lawyers, doctors and other professionals by requiring them to hold licenses issued by closely-monitored associations and the Ba'th party screened all candidates for association office. Meetings were permitted only under the observation of a party representative (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 80).

Finally, neither the officials who comprised the regime nor institutions of government enjoyed public legitimacy in Syria in the early 1970's. As argued in the next chapter, when citizens and elites contest the state's right to make rules and when there is common unwillingness to pursue institutionalized procedures to redress grievances, political opposition may attempt to drag the military into politics to protect its interests (Stepan, 1971 p. 63). In Syria, neither the regime nor the institutions of state enjoyed public legitimacy in the early 1970's. After a brief honeymoon sparked by hopes that Asad would put an end to the brutality of his predecessor, by the regime's initial economic performance, and by "the establishment of a pseudo-democratic facade", the Sunni Muslim majority soon came to resent the regime's brutality and its narrow social base (Dyer, 1979 p. 684). Cartoons of the President, even favorable ones, were not permitted in the Syrian press in the early 1970's and Syrian newspapers were not allowed to use the word "'Alawi" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 116). Drysdale refers to the regime's "perennial legitimacy problem" that resulted because "Those whose influence and wealth were destroyed by land reform and nationalization...dismissed the regime's secularism and socialism as a way to dress the transfer of power to the minorities and to the rural sector..." (1982 p. 3). During the 1978 and 1979 elections for professional association officers, the one occasion when Syrian

elections featured "a real opposition slate, in some cases not a single Ba'th candidate won office" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 37).

It is difficult to quantify the degree of regime vulnerability in Syria in the early 1970's. On the one hand, twenty five years of purges, coups, and counter-coups exhausted previously dominant Sunni and Druze officer factions by the time Asad became President (Batatu, 1981; van Dam, 1979). On the other hand, however, even though participants in previous military conspiracies found themselves considerably weakened by the beginning of Asad's tenure, other military challengers could have emerged. Two factors indicate the fundamental vulnerability of the Syrian political system in the early 1970's: (1) the attempted conspiracies that did take place; and (2) the presence of important background causes of coups that plagued Syrian politics including past military conspiracies, weak civil society, and low legitimacy.

Counterbalancing under Asad

According to Batatu, "At the heart of Syria's regime stands a cluster of military officers...[who] cling together and act in concert" (1981 p. 331). While elite cooperation may characterize Syrian economic policy, I argue that Asad does not permit coordination is the realm of security issues. Leaders of various Syrian military organizations report directly to the President and coordinating bodies such as the Defense Ministry retain little authority. Below I chronicle counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's, when President Asad created and strengthened five different paramilitary armies that were designed to check and balance one another and to protect the regime as a byproduct of their reciprocal monitoring. Although my focus is the creation of new military and paramilitary forces, it is also important to

note that Asad pursued a counterbalancing strategy with Syrian intelligence agencies and that he has relied on at least seven different services (mukhabarat) to provide information on regime opponents. These forces include Military Police, Bureau of National Security of the Ba'th Party, Military Intelligence, General Intelligence, Political Security, Air Force Intelligence, and Military Security. After describing the five paramilitary armies that Asad created or significantly strengthened in the early 1970's, I describe the forces that existed when Asad came to power.

Organizations created or significantly strengthened in the early 1970's

Brigades for the Defense of the Revolution. Asad established the Defense Brigades, Saraya al-Difa' 'an al-Thawra, in 1971 and placed them under the control of his brother Rif'at. Headquartered in the al-Mezze area of Damascus, the Defense Brigades consisted of more than ten thousand troops by the late 1970's. By 1981 observers estimated that the Brigades had grown to include between 12,000 to 25,000 men, more than a full army division (Batatu, 1981 p. 332; Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 180; New York Times, January 11, 1980, p. 2). Most troops were heavily armed commandos from Asad's tribe and probably even his village. The Defense Brigades were led and manned by 'Alawis and members of other minority communities including Christians, Druze, and Ismailis and they deployed the most modern weapons of any Syrian army, including the regular army. Their arsenal included Soviet T-72 tanks, surface-to-air missile batteries and advanced attack helicopters (Dyer, 1979 p. 687). The Defense Brigades included four elite brigades (one mechanized and three armored) and an intelligence branch under the

command of Rif'at's son-in-law Mu'in Nassif. They controlled all routes to the capital, surrounded Damascus, guarded the Presidential Palace, and acquired a reputation for violence and corruption that made them the most hated and feared army in Syria (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 180). After the Brigades attempted a coup in 1984, Asad replaced his brother Rif'at with Mu'in Nassif, who oversaw their reorganization as a standard armored division (Collelo, 1988 p. 269).

Struggle Companies. Asad created the Struggle Companies, Saraya al-Sira, in 1973 and placed them under the command of his cousin Adnan al-Asad. Many of its non-commissioned officers belonged to President Asad's tribe, al-Matawirah, and came from his village of Qardahah. The Struggle Companies controlled key access routes to the capital and guarded important command posts (Hinnebusch, 1990 p. 160). Batatu notes that this force of 5,000 men probably was intended to protect the regime from domestic challengers (1981 p. 331).

Presidential Guard. Asad established the Presidential Guard, al-Haras al-Jumhuri, in 1976 after Syria's invasion of Lebanon prompted a series of assassination attempts. Also known as the Republican Guard, it was charged with maintaining Asad's personal security as well as general security in Damascus. Soon after its formation, the Guard grew to include ten thousand troops, divided into paramilitary and intelligence branches, and its size increased after the demise of the Defense Brigades in the mid-1980's. Since its inception, the Guard has been under the command of Asad's wife's nephew 'Adnan Makhluf. One of its subunits, Presidential Security (al-Amn al-Riasi)

was headed by Asad's son Basil prior to his death in an automobile accident in 1994.

Third Armored Division. The Army's Third Armored Division, al-Firqa' a-Thalitha, was formally subordinate to the Army chief of staff but in practice it operated independently as a regime shield. Garrisoned just outside Damascus, the Third Armored Division was under the command of Asad's cousin Shafiq Fayyad, who replaced Mustafa Sharba in 1973 or 1974 (Aker, 1973). It was an elite armored force whose strength in the early 1970's was estimated at ten thousand men equipped with over 250 tanks and 250 armored vehicles (Dupuy, 1978 p. 441; Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 52; Seale, 1988 p. 327). The Third Armored division has carried out internal as well as foreign policy missions including the invasion of Lebanon in 1976, the occupation of Aleppo in 1980 and the suppression of the 1982 Hama revolt (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 41).

Special Forces. Special Forces, al-Wahdat al-Khassa, was formed in 1968 before Asad became President. However, the Forces were a minor organization before Asad strengthened them to their current size of between 5,000 and 15,000 heavily armed commandos and parachutists. Headquartered in Damascus, they were equipped with helicopters, tanks, and other advanced weapons and they have been described as the regime's praetorian guard (Dyer, 1979 p. 687). The Forces have carried out numerous domestic and foreign policy missions including the massacre in Hama in 1981. In addition, they have acted as an intelligence and police agency and imprisoned thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians since 1985. Commanders of the Special Forces

have included 'Ali Umran, Ali Haydar, and 'Ali Duba (Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 38-9; Batatu, 1981 p. 332).

Organizations created before Asad

Below I describe armed organizations in Syria that were formed before Asad became President in February, 1971.

Army. The regular army was the largest and most powerful of Syria's armed forces. In the mid-1970's it deployed 2,500 Soviet tanks and maintained its own air defense system including anti-aircraft guns and artillery as well as 48 surface-air missile batteries (Heller, 1983 p. 237). From 1970 to 1973 Syrian defense expenditures increased from 9.3 to 16 percent of GNP (Evron, 1986 p. 74; 76; M. Ma'oz, 1988 p. 86; Z. Ma'oz, 1986). Manpower increased from about 60,000 in 1968 to 135,000 in 1973. Out of a population of 8.1 million people, the army included 227,500 regular soldiers and 102, 500 reservists in 1978 (Dyer, 1979 p. 686). In 1977 most active duty personnel served in the army's one armored division (that included two armored and one mechanized brigade) and three mechanized divisions (each consisting of one armored and two mechanized brigades) (Nyrop, 1978 p. 208). These figures do not include the Third armored division, that I describe above as a semi-independent paramilitary force.

Navy. Syria's tiny navy included only 2,500 regular forces and 2,500 reservists in the early 1970's. Subordinate to the local army commander, its mission consisted of coastal defense. In 1977 it was commanded by General

Fadl Hussain and based in Latakia and Baniyas. The Syrian navy deployed only 25 vessels including two frigates and 12 patrol boats (Nyrop, 1978 p. 208).

Air Force. The Air Force was formed in 1948 after the first class of Syrian pilots graduated from British flight schools. The 25,000 members of the Syrian Air Force were divided into nine fighter-ground attack squadrons and eleven interceptor squadrons that included about 395 combat aircraft, almost all of which had been provided by the Soviet Union (Dyer, 1979 p. 686). Major bases located were located near twelve Syrian cities including Damascus, Hama, Aleppo (Nyrop, 1978 p. 208).

Air Defense. Air Defense consisted of 15,000 men drawn from the army and air force and organized according to the Soviet model. It was commanded by Major General Ali Salih and deployed 24 surface-to-air missile batteries that were independent of the army's SAM batteries (Dyer, 1979 p. 687).

Gendarmerie. The Gendarmerie consisted of 8,000 men in (Dyer, 1979 p. 686). Nyrop noted that it was a "single national police force under the Ministry of Interior [that] was responsible for routine police duties" (1978 p. 221).

Desert Guard. The Desert Guard, or Hajjana, consisted of 1,500 soldiers who were responsible for monitoring and controlling the bedouin communities of the eastern Syrian deserts.

Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing

Did the possibility of a coup cause President Asad to counterbalance in the early 1970's? Above I claim that a coup was possible and that Asad divided the structure of the armed forces into rival organizations. In this section of the chapter, I argue that the possibility of a coup was an important cause of counterbalancing. Consider the following points.

First, it is likely that Asad was extremely concerned about the possibility of a coup in the early 1970's. As noted above, there were 21 coups in the two decades preceding Asad's rise to power in February, 1971. Some of these were quite bloody. During the coup of August 14, 1949, for example, "Lieutenant Fadlallah Abu Mansur led a task force of six armoured cars through the silent streets to the presidential residence...Fadlallah shot his way in and confronted [President] Za'im in pyjamas in the hall. He struck him in the face and...Zai'im was bundled into an armoured car and taken to a prearranged rendezvous" (Seale, 1965 p. 75). Za'im was then sentenced to death and executed on the spot. Given the violence that characterized previous Syrian coups, it is reasonable to assume that had Asad been deposed by force, he could have been tortured or killed. Although Asad never admitted his fear of a coup to the Syrian public, on occasion Syrian officials acknowledged their concerns in the western press (Morgan, 1975 as cited in Drysdale, 1979 p. 372).

Numerous military purges that Asad initiated (van Dam, 1979) indicate the regime's concern about the possibility of a coup in the early 1970's. As Migdal argues, purging often signals fear of a conspiracy because it may reveal leadership efforts to undermine potential challengers' power bases (1988). In addition, Asad's use of rival intelligence agencies to spy on the military and

to arrest and harass military personnel suggest that the regime was concerned about the possibility of a coup. In 1984, for example, Asad ordered 'Ali Duba's Military Intelligence agents to place Rif'at and other senior leaders of the Defense Brigades under surveillance (Seale, 1988 p. 430). Regular army soldiers who expressed dissatisfaction with the regime have been subject to arrest, detention, and torture by the various intelligence services. Sulaiman Mustafa Ghaibur, for example, a soldier from the village of 'Aqarib who was stationed at the Aleppo Infantry School, probably was tortured to death in 1986 by Military Intelligence (Amnesty International, 1987 p. 10; 18). According to Middle East Watch, Asad "orders agencies to watch one another. It is a costly exercise, but the mutual suspicion and "competition" gives Asad complete control" (1991 p. 42). Dyer reports that "extensive use is made of the technique of maintaining rival and overlapping intelligence services, some of which concentrate on the armed forces... (1979 p. 690)." Syria's bloody, conspiratorial history as well as the regime's use of purging and spying indicate that Asad probably was concerned about the possibility of a coup in the early 1970's.

Second, Asad prevented rival armies from communicating or cooperating. He reinforced organizational boundaries that kept military forces apart even though foregoing coordination incurred domestic and international costs. While Asad used rival armed organizations to spy on one another, he did not allow communication or cooperation among different military, paramilitary, and intelligence forces. Nyrop claims that "...the internal security apparatus was known to consist of myriad organizations with overlapping missions...Each organization was directly responsible to the president and his closest advisers; there was no

coordination among them or knowledge of each others' activities" (1978 p. 221).

Considerable evidence suggests that Asad kept forces armies apart. All branches of the armed forces reported directly to the President in the early 1970's (Amnesty International, 1987 p. 7). The chiefs of the Air force and Navy as well as important General Staff directorates such as personnel and political administration, for example, circumvented the Ministry of Defense by reporting straight to Asad (Heller, 1983 p. 230). Even lower level military officers reported to Asad. Middle East Watch notes that "Key field commanders in the army report directly to the president rather than through a chain of command to the chief of staff and the defense minister" (1991 p. 28). As a result of this highly centralized system, coordinating bodies had little power and cooperation among different armed service branches was prevented. The Defense Ministry was unable to coordinate military activities (Collelo, 1988) and neither the General Staff nor the Defense Minister, Mustafa Tlas, retained much actual power (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 191; Seale, 1988 p. 428). Even Asad's personal staff was quite small, thus limiting the potential for any official or assistant to coordinate the activities of the various armies (Seale, 1988 p. 341). In the military realm, the Syrian regime was literally a one-man show.

The lack of coordination and cooperation among branches of the armed forces was reflected in the intelligence community as well. For example, security agencies often conducted separate searches for the same individual and one agency sometimes continued its search even after a suspect had been detained by another agency. In some attempted arrests, "two teams arrive simultaneously from different agencies. While each heatedly

disputed the other's right to make the arrest, their quarry managed to escape" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 42). To preserve the autonomy of the different intelligence agencies, Asad directed each one to establish and maintain its own courts, interrogation centers, and prisons (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 77). Hence, political prisoners typically were arrested, detained, questioned, tried, tortured and imprisoned by a single intelligence agency that also was responsible for investigating the case (Amnesty International, 1987 p. 8).

Asad kept the organizations, branches and agencies that comprised the regular armed forces, paramilitary and intelligence communities apart by requiring them to report directly to the president, by undermining coordinating bodies such as the Ministry of Defense and General Staff, and by discouraging cooperation among different organizations. Collelo concludes that "The [security] organizations operated independently and had no clear boundaries to their areas of jurisdiction and no coordination among them" (1988 p. 278; Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 40; Amnesty International, 1987 p. 7).

Third, counterbalancing worked. Division of the armed forces into rival, armed organizations enabled Asad to thwart attempted coups. It is possible that thwarting coups was an unintended consequence of counterbalancing. As Kier notes, just because something appears functional, we should not assume "that it was designed to serve that function" (1997 p. 24). At the same time, the fact that counterbalancing enabled Asad to suppress attempted coups suggests that the strategy may have served its intended effect. In the spring and fall of 1976, for example, agents from Military Intelligence arrested hundreds of mutinous officers and troops in the regular army who objected to Syria's intervention in Lebanon in support of right-wing Maronite Christian militias (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 8).

In February and March, 1984, counterbalancing enabled Asad to stifle his brother Rif'at's attempt to use the Defense Brigades to overthrow the regime. While Hafez recovered from an illness in the Syrian countryside, Rif'at ordered the Brigades' to occupy strategic points throughout Damascus. Brigade commandos were "confronted by the Special Forces, the Third Division, and the Presidential Guard -- all loyal to Hafez" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 42). Seale reports that "By 27 February 1984 Syria seemed on the verge of a bloodbath with both sides confronting each other angrily, guns at the ready...'Ali Haydar's Special Forces in maroon berets faced Rif'at's Defence Companies in cinnamon berets, while Adnan Makhluf's Presidential Guard put on a show of force in the boulevards around the palace. At night, sporadic shooting was heard but there was no decisive clash of arms" (1988 p. 430). Rif'at's attempted coup ended on March 30 after shock troops from the Special Forces and tanks from the Third Armored Division resisted his attempted seizure of downtown Damascus (Seale, 1988 p. 432).

Fourth, many observers agree that regime vulnerability to a coup was an important cause of counterbalancing. Although few scholars have engaged in systematic analysis of Syrian civil-military relations under Asad, many casual remarks in the literature suggest that the possibility of a coup was an important cause of counterbalancing. Dawisha, for example, notes that by "creating the impressively-equipped and highly-trained 'Defence Companies' to act as presidential guard, commanded by the President's own brother, Rif'at, Asad was careful to take personal measures to ensure the compliance of the military if and when the need arose" (1978 p. 353). Other similar conclusions are drawn by Middle East Watch (1991 p. 41; 52; 174);

Heller (1983 pp. 229 - 230); Nyrop (1978 p. 216); van Dam (1979 p. 90); Batatu (1981 p. 331); Drysdale (1979 p. 372); and Rabinovich (1982 p. 269).

Taken together, the points offered above suggest that the possibility of a coup caused counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's. Asad was concerned about the possibility of a coup and he used rival forces to spy on each other. He prevented Syrian military forces from cooperating with one another even though (as argued below) foregoing coordination entailed significant organizational costs. These behaviors do not make sense unless the possibility of a coup was an important driving force behind the establishment of rival military forces. In addition, counterbalancing worked. When the Defense Brigades attempted a coup in early 1984, Asad used the Special Forces, the Presidential Guard, and the Third Armored Division to send the challengers back to the barracks. Unless thwarting coups was an unintended effect of counterbalancing, then counterbalancing served its intended effect by providing rival forces to deter potential challengers and send them back to the barracks when necessary. It seems likely that the anticipation of this effect that prompted Asad to counterbalance in the early 1970's.

Having argued that the possibility of a coup was an important cause of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's, I turn to the possibility that the relationship between these two variables might have resulted from backward causation (endogeneity) or from some alternative causal factor (epiphenomenality). Below I claim that counterbalancing did not cause the possibility of a coup and that some alternative factor or factors did not cause the possibility of a coup as well as counterbalancing.

Reverse causation and alternative causal possibilities

To assess whether the possibility of a coup caused counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's, it is important to determine if the correlation between these two factors resulted from backward causation. To show that counterbalancing was not the cause of regime vulnerability, I note that coup-proneness preceded counterbalancing in Syria. The first Syrian coup, on March 30, 1949, resulted from Syrian defeat in the 1948 war and predated President Husni al-Za'im's summer, 1949 effort to "draw up plans for a private body guard of Yugoslav Muslims swearing allegiance only to himself" (Seale, 1965 p. 61). During the two-decade history of military instability that began in 1949, regime vulnerability was caused by weak institutions, military defeat in war, underdeveloped civil society, and political strife that accompanied early stages of state-building, all factors that were independent of counterbalancing (van Dam, 1979; Seale, 1965). And, these fundamental causes of regime vulnerability would have persisted whether or not Asad pursued a counterbalancing strategy. Hence, the possibility of a coup predated counterbalancing in Syria and counterbalancing did not cause the cycle of coups and counter-coups in the 1950's and 1960's. The correlation between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's was not due to backward causation.

Even if the correlation between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing was not due to backward causation, it may have been epiphenomenal: some alternative factor may have caused both regime vulnerability and counterbalancing or they may have been caused by distinct alternative factors. It is true that counterbalancing can be over-determined, that it can be caused by many factors. Consider the following possibilities: (1)

domestic unrest: in domestically unstable situations, leaders may create distinct paramilitary forces for internal-use missions including suppression of domestic dissent; (2) international threat: when leaders anticipate involvement in war, they may enhance fighting effectiveness by creating new military forces to focus on specialized missions; (3) symbolism: regimes may create new armed forces to mimic institutional structures or patterns that prevail in other states; (4) social compartmentalization: leaders may create separate organizations to keep distinct religious, ethnic, or kinship groups apart from one another (Rosen, 1996).

Above I argued that the possibility of a coup was an important cause of counterbalancing in Syria by showing that predictions generated by my theory were confirmed in the Syrian case. When the possibility of a coup causes counterbalancing, the theory developed in chapter two expects regimes to use rival forces to spy on one another, to keep rival forces apart, to undermine coordinating agencies such as general staffs and ministries, and to rely on rival organizations to suppress attempted coups. Few of these predictions make sense unless the possibility of a coup is the cause of counterbalancing. All were confirmed in the Syrian case. The same cannot be said for predictions generated by alternative explanations of counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's. While some of the four alternative factors mentioned above may have been consistent with Asad's decision to counterbalance, the theories that link each factor to counterbalancing yield predictions that are not confirmed.

Domestic unrest

It is true that Asad used paramilitary forces to suppress violent, domestic challengers on many occasions over the past two and a half decades. In 1981, for example, the Special Forces played an instrumental role in the massacre at Hama. Despite a brief honeymoon with the Syrian public in the early 1970's, Asad was aware of the regime's narrow social base and the need for reliable coercive force to deter and resist violent protest (Seale, 1988). Hence, the expectation of domestic unrest was consistent with Asad's decision to create new, armed organizations in the early 1970's.

At the same time however, the possibility of domestic unrest probably was not an important cause of counterbalancing. If the possibility of domestic unrest were a primary cause of counterbalancing, then Asad should not have used the regular military for internal-use missions and he should not have used the new paramilitaries for foreign policy missions. The domestic explanation depends on the assumption that Asad created new paramilitary forces to avoid diluting the mission of the regular army by allowing it to focus on foreign policy while the paramilitary armies focused on domestic order.

However, neither of these expectations followed: Asad has used the regular armed forces to quell domestic disturbances and he has deployed the new paramilitary armies abroad. In the suppression of the Hama revolt in January and February of 1982, for example, the 47th Armored Brigade engaged members of the Muslim Brothers in a prolonged battle: "Army sappers blew up many of the buildings that still stood, sometimes with tens of people inside...Army bulldozers arrived to flatten the smoking shells of buildings" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 20). In 1983 the regular army created and staffed a series of courts throughout Syria for trying and sentencing civilian political

prisoners (Human Rights Watch, 1996 p. 25). Between 1979 and 1982, the army participated in the summary execution of "several thousand people in Hama, Aleppo, and elsewhere" (Middle East Watch, 1991 pp. 14 - 15; 61). While the regular army has participated in domestic repression, the new paramilitary armies have participated in foreign policy missions. For example, the Special Forces, al-Wahdat al-Khassa, have arrested and imprisoned thousands of Lebanese in Tripoli since 1985 (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 52). And the Third Armored Division, al-Firqa' al-Thalitha, "led the Syrian invasion of Lebanon" (Middle East Watch, 1991 p. 52). If Asad created new paramilitary armies to maintain the integrity of the armed forces' mission by allowing the regular army to focus on foreign policy while the new paramilitaries focused on domestic order, then it is hard to explain why he used both the regular army and the new paramilitary armies for both domestic and international missions.

In addition, if the possibility of domestic unrest were an important motive for counterbalancing and if the new paramilitaries were intended to maintain domestic order, Asad should have encouraged various paramilitary and intelligence forces to specialize and then he should have coordinated their domestic efforts. As argued above, however, Syrian paramilitary and intelligence forces have had highly similar, overlapping structures and functions. They all investigate similar types of crimes and arrest, interrogate, try, torture, and imprison suspects. It is unlikely that Asad created new armed organizations to avoid diluting the mission of the regular military by allowing the regular army to focus on foreign policy while the new paramilitary armies focused on domestic order.

International threat

Strengthening Syria's fighting capacity was one of Asad's top priorities when he became President and he may have anticipated fighting either a defensive or offensive war with Israel or other neighbors (Seale, 1988 pp. 117-141; 181-182; Lebow, 1981 pp. 278; 253). As a former combat pilot, Chief of the Air Force, and Minister of Defense, Asad was aware of Syria's recent military humiliations and "From the start [his] principal preoccupation lay in foreign affairs" (1988 p. 182). In addition, as noted above, Asad deployed Syria's new paramilitary armies in Lebanon in the mid 1980's. The creation of new paramilitaries served Asad's foreign policy ends by allowing him to strengthen the regular army without increasing the risk of a coup.

Despite these points, however, anticipation of international conflict probably was not a primary determinant of Asad's decision to counterbalance. When leaders create new military forces to increase fighting effectiveness, typically they provide specialized missions to their forces and subsume them under joint command structures that coordinate organizational efforts (Huntington, 1966; Hammond, 1961; Morison, 1958; Morton, 1962). Leaders who create new armed forces in order to increase fighting capacity must assimilate these organizations under joint structures if they wish to avoid pathologies that arise from poor inter-unit coordination and multiple lines of command. Biddle and Zirkle note that "Divided lines of command make it difficult to integrate weapons with supporting systems and complementary weapons types. Yet as weapon technology advances, effectiveness increasingly depends on the close cooperation of 'systems of systems' that cover one another's weaknesses and create opportunities for another's strengths" (1993 p. 4). Cameron partially attributes the decisiveness of the

American defeat over Japan in World War II to "how the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and their semi-autonomous air forces ironed out their disagreements and...the success of various joint staffs in resolving their differences over strategic objectives and the best means for attaining them" (1994 p. 130).

In Syria in the early 1970's Asad prevented collaboration among his armed forces even when doing so entailed significant foreign policy costs. As noted above, he undermined centralized ministries and coordinating bodies by requiring military and paramilitary organizations to report directly to the President. The lack of coordination that Asad institutionalized into the structure of the Syrian military was reflected in preparations for the 1973 war. Prior to the war, Syrian "armor, infantry, and artillery were trained and organized as separate branches...[C]oordination between the branches tended to break down the moment follow-on attacks had to be organized" (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, p. 54-55). Asad took the highly unusual step of sending forces into battle "without having conducted a single significant armored exercise above the division level" (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990, p. 51). The lack of coordinated preparations jeopardized Syrian performance in the war. For example, up to one-fourth of Syria's 131 air losses in the war were caused by friendly fire while only 2 of 109 Israeli air losses resulted from fratricide. In addition, "the branch-oriented command system in Arab forces kept maneuver unit commanders from getting proper control over, or responsiveness from, their fire support (Cordesman and Wagner, 1990 pp. 67; 44; 55).

It is possible that failure to coordinate war preparations reflected a simple mistake rather than a deliberate, systematic effort on the part of the

regime to keep various branches and organizations of the military apart from one another. Friendly-fire losses, for example, can result from poor air combat maneuvering skills, bad maintenance, dated technology, and undisciplined air defense operators (Biddle and Zirkle, 1993 pp. 22-28). While these factors contributed to Syrian military failures, the number of friendly-fire losses may suggest that divided lines of command had the same effect on Syrian performance in the 1973 war that they did on Iraqi performance in the Gulf war, when "poor inter-unit coordination also contributed to the Iraqis' problems with friendly fire losses: with each element forced to operate semi-autonomously, the result was frequent confusion as to the identity of aircraft, and frequent mistaken engagement of Iraqi aircraft by Iraqi ground based air defenses" (Biddle and Zirkle, 1993 p. 27). Although Asad was keenly interested in strengthening Syria's fighting capacity, and although it will never be possible to determine if Syrian military mistakes in 1973 resulted from Asad's deliberate prevention of coordinated preparations, it seems likely that if the expectation of international conflict were a primary cause of counterbalancing, he would have provided specialized missions to the various Syrian forces and then subsumed them under joint command structures to coordinate their efforts.

Symbolism

While international symbolic considerations may be important for explaining the proliferation of advanced weapons in the developing world (Wendt and Barnett, 1993), two considerations undermine the plausibility of this perspective for explaining Syrian counterbalancing in the early 1970's. First, if symbolic or reputational factors caused counterbalancing, then Asad

should not have devoted significant expenditures to the creation of new paramilitary forces in the early 1970's. One implication of institutional theory is that leaders should be more concerned with institutional appearances than organizational effectiveness. Eyre and Suchman note that "It is quite common for developing nations to maintain only a single 'squadron' of four or five advanced aircraft -- too few to offer any substantial strategic or tactical benefits in any but the rarest of circumstances, but enough to constitute a reasonable air show" (1996 p. 93). Asad did take many steps that undermined the effectiveness of his own armies including purging, spying, and keeping rival forces apart. At the same time, however, I noted above that the creation and maintenance of new paramilitary and intelligence forces absorbed about one-third of the overall Syrian military budget, and that some of the new forces were better equipped than the regular Syrian army. The new armies did not appear to be symbolic, organizational shells.

Second, Syria was not highly connected to the world system in the early 1970's. Connectedness to the world system refers to the degree to which states are likely to be influenced by international normative and cultural pressures. As Eyre and Suchman note, "...the number of international governmental organization memberships...[reflects] connectedness to the world system. Strong theoretical and empirical justification exists for the routine use of this variable as an indicator of the degree of connection of a country to the world polity" (1996 p. 102-3). However Syria had only 7 INGO memberships while the world average was 49.25.

An inverse relation between world culture and Syrian connectedness to that culture emerges from a study of the factor basis of developing world militarization by Wendt and Barnett (1993). They suggest that the ratio of

major weapons to military personnel may result from global normative and cultural pressures. According to their measure of capital-intensity, Syria received the ninth highest score in the world. To the extent that there was a global military culture that influenced most states and to the extent that the ratio of weapons-to-personnel was produced by connectedness to that culture, then Syria's outlier score indicates that it was connected to the global culture in a different way or to a different degree than most of the rest of the world. In that case, it would seem implausible to argue that Asad structured Syria's military forces to imitate legitimated patterns of other states' armed forces.

It is also important to note that according to Wendt and Barnett's measure, the Syrian capital intensity score of 11.054 was dissimilar to the scores of Egypt (2.625), the United States (14.672), France (4.877), and the Soviet Union (18.283). Scores ranged from 0 to 32 but 118 of 137 countries in the sample scored below 8. Although Wendt and Barnett's data are from 1986 and 1987, a period that falls after the focus of this study, these four countries were the most likely referents for Syrian legitimacy due to American and Soviet superpower status, the French colonial legacy in the Middle East, and Egypt's position as the leader of the Arab world. If Syrian capital intensity did not at least roughly reflect patterns in the rest of the world or in one of the four most likely referents for government legitimacy, then it seems difficult to claim that international cultural norms influenced Syrian military policy.

Social compartmentalization

While it is certainly true that social considerations influenced Syrian civil-military relations in the early 1970's, they did not cause the Asad regime to counterbalance. If social structures caused counterbalancing in Syria in the

early 1970's, then the Asad regime should have used newly-created military organizations to compartmentalize different social groups. For example, he might have created one agency for 'Alawi troops, one for Sunni Muslim troops, one for Druze troops, one for Circassian troops, and so on. This was not the case, however. On the one hand, Asad used universal conscription to create a mixed regular army whose rank and file reflected the highly heterogeneous demographics of Syrian society (Collelo, 1988 p. 260). The majority of officers in the regular army under Asad were 'Alawi but the 'Alawi already dominated the officer corps when Asad came to power (Batatu, 1981; Drysdale, 1979). On the other hand, Asad ensured that most troops and officers in the newly created paramilitary and intelligence forces were 'Alawi (Batatu, 1981; Drysdale, 1979). However, ethnic composition of the new forces did not reflect social compartmentalization because many non-'Alawi troops served in these organizations (Lawson, 1996 p. 120). Hence, it is highly unlikely that counterbalancing in Syria in the early 1970's was caused by the desire to compartmentalize social groups.

Conclusion

The analysis of Syrian civil-military relations in the early 1970's supports my theoretical claim that the possibility of a coup usually causes regimes to pursue counterbalancing strategies. While other strategies such as remuneration and indoctrination may constitute important elements of regimes' efforts to secure the loyalty of their own armed forces, counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits force against force and reduces the military's ability to displace the regime.

Chapter four: Regime vulnerability as a cause of counterbalancing during the Cold War -- a quantitative analysis

What is the relationship between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing? In chapter two, I outlined a theory that attempted to link these two factors. In this chapter I submit the theory to a hard test by deriving expectations that should be true if the theory is well-founded and then by verifying whether or not those expected implications obtain. Specifically, I suggest that if my theory is sound then regimes that are at-risk of a coup d'état should be more likely to counterbalance than regimes that are not vulnerable to their own militaries. My goal is neither to prove that my theory is true, nor to provide a precise estimate of its validity, nor to articulate the conditions under which it is more or less likely to be plausible. Rather, my aim is to subject the theory to a hard test that goes beyond the requirements of a plausibility probe (Eckstein, 1975; George, 1979).

In this chapter I submit the argument to a somewhat demanding variant of King et. al.'s procedure for evaluating theory (1994; Tetlock and Belkin, 1996a; Goodman, 1983). According to this approach, scholars who wish to assess the plausibility of causal claims should articulate the implications of their arguments and then test to determine if those implications obtain. To take a specific example from the natural sciences, if it is true that the extinction of the dinosaurs 65 million years ago was caused by the impact of an asteroid, then a host verifiable implications should have followed including the existence of a crater and the distribution of various trace elements in particular geological strata (Tetlock and Belkin 1996a). Verification of these implications does not mean that a crater impact was in

fact the cause of the dinosaur extinction, but it may constitute supporting evidence.

The prediction that I test in this chapter is counterintuitive. Regimes should not have needed to counterbalance during the second half of the Cold War because many other survival strategies were available during this period. Three strategies, in particular, should have been sufficient for protecting vulnerable regimes from their own militaries. To begin, the second half of the Cold War witnessed the rise of professional militaries on a global scale. Both the United States and Soviet Union promoted aggressively the professionalizion of their allies' and clients' armed forces. Wendt and Barnett, for example, note that since the end of the Korean War the United States trained almost one-half million military personnel from the developing world in the International Military Education and Training program (1993 p. 339). The point is not that all or even most developing world militaries attained high levels of professionalization during the second half of the Cold War. Rather, I argue that to the extent that professionalization ever was a viable strategy for subordinating the armed forces, then the latter part of the Cold War should have been a time when this strategy was extremely effective. Because of aggressive superpower efforts to promote the professionalization of their clients' and allies' armed forces, this option should have sufficed for protecting many regimes from their own militaries.

Second, related to the spread of professionalization, indoctrination should have been an important and effective strategy during the second half of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and United States acted as powerful, global suppliers of international political norms underscoring the importance

of civilian control as well as the legitimacy of particular political ideologies including, of course, Communism and anti-Communism. To the extent that indoctrination ever was a viable strategy for subordinating the armed forces, then the second half of the Cold War should have been a time when norms and ideas were very important. A variety of international as well as indigenous, nationalist ideas were widely available for any regime that sought to legitimate its control over the armed forces via indoctrination strategies.

Third, remuneration strategies should have been sufficient or at least very important ingredients in regime efforts to subordinate their own armed forces during the Cold War. A number of vulnerable regimes such as Iran and the Gulf States should have been wealthy enough to purchase the loyalty of their own militaries and even the poorest regimes tended to direct a disproportionate percentage of government spending to military salaries (Ball, 1988). Because the alternative strategies mentioned above should have been sufficient for subordinating the armed forces during the second half of the Cold War, it should not have been necessary for vulnerable regimes to pursue counterbalancing strategies.

Empirical domain

To assess the relationships between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing, I focus on the years 1966-1986, roughly the second half of the Cold War. While data from earlier periods are available for some of the variables discussed below, it is not possible to measure counterbalancing prior to the mid-1960's when The Military Balance expanded its annual report to include almost every country in the world. I focus on the second half of the

Cold War, then, for the simple reason that it is a period of unparalleled access to data.

This study includes all countries of the world whose populations exceed one million. By including a large number of countries over a two-decade time span, my aim is to improve on previous studies that limit themselves to narrow time periods or non-representative samples. As Levy notes (1989), many previous analyses that do cover extended time periods include only specific countries or regions (for example see Rosecrance, 1963). And many of the analyses that include broader samples of nations are restricted to quite narrow time periods. For example, Rummel's (1963) study of seventy seven countries covers a period of only three years, 1955 - 1957, yet this study gave rise to an entire literature on the relationship between domestic and international conflict (Stohl, 1980). Clearly, consideration of such restricted samples or time periods can bias results. In Rummel's case, for example, the period of 1955-1957 was generally peaceful (Levy, 1989 p. 266). This study, by contrast, incorporates a twenty-one year time span and includes all countries of the world whose populations exceed one million.

The statistical analysis below uses a set of 2,757 regime-years to assess the relationship between the possiblity of a coup and counterbalancing. Spain-1966, for example, constitutes one regime-year and Spain-1967 constitutes a second regime-year. The total number of regime-years, 2,757, reflects the average number of countries in the system during the second half of the Cold War (approximately 130) multiplied by the twenty-one year time span under consideration.

Dependent variable: counterbalancing

Counterbalancing refers to military fragmentation, the establishment and maintenance of a network of multiple armed organizations and branches. Counterbalancing does not refer exclusively to the precise instant at which regimes decide to create new military institutions. Rather, counterbalancing entails both the creation of new, rival military institutions as well as cultivation and maintenance of fragmented military structures that already exist. As far as I know, there is no discussion in the literature on civil-military relations on how to operationalize and measure counterbalancing. In this study, I measure counterbalancing in terms of two dimensions, (1) the number of military and paramilitary organizations and (2) relative size of the paramilitary as compared to the regular armed forces.

The first dimension, number of military and paramilitary organizations, reflects the diffusion versus concentration of the armed forces. If the military is divided into numerous branches and organizations, then leaders have more opportunities to foment cleavages and exploit rivalries among different institutions. If, on the other hand, the military is divided into just a few organizations, then there are less potential cleavages that leaders can exploit to create a check and balance system.

The second dimension, relative size of the paramilitary as compared to the regular armed forces, is determined by dividing the number of troops in the paramilitary by the number of troops in the combined armed forces. When leaders seek to balance the power of the regular armed forces, often they depend on paramilitary organizations, defined as those organizations "whose training, organisation, equipment and control suggest they may be

usable in support, or in lieu, of regular military forces" (International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1994-1995 p. 5).

It is true that regimes may establish large paramilitaries for reasons that do not involve checking the influence of regular service branches. And, conversely, counterbalancing strategies may not always depend on paramilitaries if regimes create check-and-balance systems within the regular armed forces by pitting the air force against the army or the army against the navy. At the same time, however, numerous studies suggest that sizable paramilitaries often reflect leadership attempts to reduce the risk of coups by playing divide and conquer politics with their own armed forces (Luttwak, 1968; Snyder, 1992; Farcau, 1994).

To measure counterbalancing, I use data from annual editions of The Military Balance to assign one score for each dimension to every observation.[1] For the year of 1986, for example, Ivory Coast receives a score of seven on the first dimension: (1) Army; (2) Navy; (3) Air Force; (4) Presidential Guard; (5) Gendarmerie; (6) Militia; (7) Military Fire Service; and a score of .615 on the second dimension as there were 8,000 paramilitary troops and 13,000 troops in the combined armed forces in 1986. To compute the total counterbalancing score, I take the product of the two dimensions. Hence, the score for Ivory Coast for 1986 is 7 x .615 = 4.305. Summary statistics are as follows: Number of military organizations: mean = 4.49; min. = 0; max. = 12. Relative size of the paramilitary: mean = .59; min. = 0; max. = 8.76. The

[1]As scores are quite stable over time, I measured each dimension for every country for the years 1966, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, and 1986 and then used the SPSS linear interpolation function to compute scores for intermediate years.

pearson correlation coefficient for these two dimensions is .367; $p < .001$). Continuous scores are reported in appendix 5.

Because the theory elaborated in chapter two distinguishes whether or not regimes engage in counterbalancing, I calculate dichotomous scores by adapting the procedure that Russett (1993 p. 77) used to distinguish democracies from non-democracies. After assigning continuous scores to every regime-year, I compared results to a random sample of cases coded in advance as counterbalancers and non-counterbalancers and "identif[ied] the most reasonable cut-off point" (Russett, 1993 p. 77). Then, I classified each observation above the cut-point (= .43) as counterbalancing and each observation below it as non-counterbalancing. Of all observations, 1,540 regime-years (79.4 percent) are coded as counterbalancers and 400 regime-years (20.6 percent) are coded as non-counterbalancers (see appendix 2).

I shared my data with an expert on comparative civil-military relations who confirmed that the scores seem to distinguish accurately between regimes that pursue counterbalancing strategies and regimes that do not.[2] At the same time, however, it is important to ensure that findings are not sensitive to specification of the cut-point. Hence, I formulate a second dichotomous counterbalancing score (counterbalancing II) by dividing the continuos score at its median value (= 1.46). According to the re-specification, 970 regime-years (50.0 percent) are coded as counterbalancers and 970 regime-years (50.0 percent) are coded as non-counterbalancers. Below, I run analyses with both specifications of the score (counterbalancing I and counterbalancing II).

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[2]I am grateful to Harold Trinkunas for help on this issue.

In spite of these precautions, however, two factors suggest that my operationalization and measurement of counterbalancing are not perfect. First, the definition of paramilitary forces used by The Military Balance is subject to ambiguity and it changes slightly over time. While the editors are careful to exclude local and regional police forces from the count of paramilitary organizations, some coding decisions may be open to multiple interpretations. For example, in the case of the Ivory Coast the Presidential Guard is listed as a paramilitary force but in the United States the Secret Service is not listed. Second, even though I identified two different thresholds for distinguishing counterbalancers from non-counterbalancers, these cut-points may be misspecified. To account for this possibility, I test the statistical models with both dichotomous measures described above as well as a continuos, logged counterbalancing score.

Independent variable: regime vulnerability

My definition of regime vulnerability refers to whether or not coups are possible in a given country at a given time. When coups are not possible, then there are almost no conceivable circumstances that could prompt the armed forces to intervene. In the United States, for example, it would be almost impossible for the military to stage a coup regardless of the preferences of various officer factions, the performance of the national economy or the President's specific policy agenda (Finer 1988). When coups are possible, however, militaries may intervene for a variety of reasons. For example, even though military intervention was not likely in the Soviet Union, it was possible (Conquest, 1969 discusses coups and attempted coups in Bulgaria and other Communist countries during the Cold War).

Notice the observable similarity and conceptual distinction between invulnerable and vulnerable regimes (Weingast, 1996 p. 231) . The observable similarly is that in both cases, coups may not occur. In the case of structurally invulnerable regimes, coups are very unlikely because background causes of coups are absent. In the case of vulnerable regimes, coups may be unlikely if leaders implement domestic survival strategies effectively. But survival strategies tend not to eliminate the background causes of coups. Rather, survival strategies are palliatives that suppress the symptoms (coups) of regime vulnerability. In both invulnerable and vulnerable regimes the actual incidence of coups may be zero. But leaders of vulnerable regimes may be forced to pursue domestic survival strategies to avoid coups while leaders of invulnerable regimes do not have to pursue domestic survival strategies to protect themselves. My measure of the independent variable, then, seeks to capture this critical distinction between when coups are not possible regardless of military preferences or leadership behavior and when they are possible.

According to Elster, "the social sciences are currently unable to identify...in advance the conditions in which one or the other mechanism would be triggered" (1993 p. 5). But I attempt to capture whether or not coups are possible by operationalizing the possiblity of a coup in terms of two indicators: (1) the strength of non-state organizations such as churches, unions, political parties, student groups, the media, and trade associations; and (2) the degree of consensus over the state's right to determine rules that people and institutions follow. In particular, I argue that weak non-state organizations or low consensus are important background causes of coups that make military conspiracy possible.

I specify weak non-state organizations or low consensus as background factors that indicate when coups are possible because persuasive empirical evidence suggests that they may influence regimes' vulnerability to their own armed forces, because it is possible to measure them across cases and over time, and because, as discussed below, they appear to do a good job of indicating when leaders are vulnerable and when they are not vulnerable. In one of several specifications of regime vulnerability developed below, for example, there was only one coup attempt in 703 regime-years coded as not-at-risk while there were 173 coup attempts in 1,941 regime-years coded as at-risk.

While strength of civil society and legitimacy seem to serve as useful indicators of the degree of regime vulnerability, I do not intend to argue that they are the only or even the most important background causes of coups. Clearly, these two indicators do not represent a comprehensive of list of background causes of coups. I exclude other relevant variables, however, because they tend to defy measurement, to lack empirical support, or to reflect the number of past coups rather than the possibility of future coups. Military alienation, for example, may be a cause of coups but it is a triggering cause rather than a background cause and it is difficult if not impossible to measure over time and across a large number of cases. To take another example, size of the military tends to be uncorrelated with the propensity to intervene (Zimmermann, 1983). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita et. al. (1992) conceptualize regime vulnerability in terms of past number of coups but this approach is flawed because even regimes that have survived for decades without experiencing a coup may be structurally vulnerable. A high number of past coups certainly indicates that future coups are possible. But a low number of

past coups does not mean that future coups are not possible. Specifying current risk as a function of the number of past coups also fails to capture the factors behind a country's first coup. Hence, vulnerable regimes that have not yet experienced their first coup might be coded erroneously as invulnerable.

Strength of non-state organizations

The strength of non-state organizations depends on whether they are voluntary, whether they adequately perform specialized social functions, and whether they are valued by citizens as a result of their providing meaning, resources, and strategies for coping with the problems of daily life (Fukuyama, 1995; Lipset, 1960 pp. 61-71; Migdal, 1988 p. 26). I suggest that non-state organizations constitute a powerful safeguard against military intervention as a result of their ability to "talk back" or resist a coup by mobilizing protests or refusing to comply with the plotters' orders (Luttwak, 1968 p. 103). When non-state organizations are strong enough to "talk back" in the event of a coup, officers fear that their efforts to displace the regime will be resisted. As David notes, "[w]ithout strong independent trade unions, political parties, and voluntary associations, there will be very little standing in the way of successful military coups" (1985 p. 5; Luttwak, 1968 p. 33; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982 p. 64; Migdal, 1988 pp. 206-237).

Both large-N empirical analysis and anecdotal evidence suggest that the strength of non-state institutions is an important determinant of whether or not coups are possible. On the basis of his analysis of 108 countries between 1948-1967, for example, Hibbs concludes that "institutionalization *alone* has a negative impact on coups...Weakly institutionalized societies, then, are far

more likely than those with highly developed institutions to suffer...political interventions by the military" (1973 p. 102 emphasis in original). Three of the variables that comprise his measure of institutionalization reflect partially the strength of non-state organizations: union membership as a percentage of the nonagricultural work force, age of the largest political party divided by the number of parties; and age of the largest political party (Hibbs, 1973 p. 99).

Finer attributes the failure of the Kapp putch in 1920 to "the tradition of civil institutions in Germany, and the highly organized nature of the public which supported them" (1988 pp. 83-85). When the German government escaped to Dresden and Kapp occupied the Chancellery, Workers' Councils coordinated a general strike as well as violent civilian revolts in Saxony and the Ruhr and Kapp and his family were forced to flee to Finland. In Bolvia in October 1979, an uprising by an army garrison in the Amazon Basin prompted the Bolivian Workers' Central labor union to organize protest strikes that sent the troops back to their barracks (Farcau, 1994, 156). In Spain in the 1930s, "there were simply too many individuals willing to fight, and too many organizations to enable them to do so to allow the luxury of a leisurely march on the capital" (Farcau, 1994 p. 150). It is true that the military can influence or even blackmail politicians when social forces are organized and strong (Finer, 1988 pp. 77-98). But there have been only a handful of attempted coups under such circumstances, most recently including a failed attempt in Spain in 1982 (Colton, 1979 p. 222; Farcau, 1994 p. 198; Finer, 1988 p. 147).

I measure the strength of non-state organizations in terms of newspaper subscriptions, telephones and university students, all divided by population and then standardized. Data for these measures are drawn from

O'Kane (1987), Luttwak (1968), Mitchell (1993; 1995), Gurr (1990), Russett (1993), United Nations (annual), International Institute for Strategic Studies (annual), and Dupuy (1993). Each of these three variables is expected to capture partially the essence of lateral, organized association among citizens that Luttwak (1968) and others claim is crucial to the deterrence of coups (Cohen and Arato, 1992). University students tend to have the time, energy and willingness to lead and maintain voluntary organizations. Telephones facilitate lateral communication and organization among citizens. And when society is populated by associations that people value, there is more news to report and more interest in consuming the news. After collecting data for every country in the world for every year of my study, I determine the non-state organization score by summing the standardized value of each indicator for each observation. Hence, I compute one score for Bolivia-1966 and one score for Bolivia-1967, etc. Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables are as follows: newspapers-phones: $r = .620$; $p < .001$. newspapers-students: $r = .485$; $p < .001$. phones-students: $r = .754$; $p < .001$.

Many other indicators would provide a more accurate reflection of strength of voluntary associations. For example, church membership, union membership, and party activism might better capture the strength of non-state organizations. However, time-series data on these factors do not exist for all countries in the world. In addition, phones, newspaper circulation, and college students do seem to reflect partially the strength of voluntary organizations. The non-state organization dimension of my measure, in other words, appears to have face validity. Based on data presented by Koek (1989), I counted the number of citizen associations in every country of the world for the year 1989 and then standardized that number by population.

The correlation between the standardized count and my non-state organization score is .46 ($p < .001$) and the correlation between the non-standardized count and my measure is .52 ($p < .001$). These correlations may be subject to different interpretations and several qualifications should be noted. First, Koek's data was compiled in 1989 but I compared it to data from the last year of my study, 1986. Second, I found a few government agencies in Koek's data, although for the most part her data consist of non-state organizations. Finally, third, Koek counts only one type of non-state organization, those with international ties to organizations outside of the home country. At the same time, Koek's data provide some evidence that my measure may reflect the number, if not the strength, of non-state organizations. Because the three variables also may reflect wealth and democracy, however, I control for gross domestic product per capita as well as regime type in the statistical models below.

Consensus about the state's right to make rules

According to the argument elaborated above, strong social organizations deter coups d'état through their ability to "talk back" in the event of a conspiracy. In some circumstances, however, strong organizations may encourage military intervention by dragging the armed forces into the political realm to protect their interests and displace disliked leaders. In Brazil in 1964, for example, "governors, women's groups, and business groups systematically lobbied the military to take political action to check President Goulart" (Stepan, 1971, p. 96). Hence, the second determinant of the regime's vulnerability to its own military is degree of consensus among citizens, elites, and organizations about the state's right to make rules.

There are several different ways to conceptualize this aspect of domestic politics and others have labeled this variable state strength, power, capacity, and loyalty of opposition (Barnett, 1992; Linz, 1978 p. 155). I prefer the terms "compliance" or "consensus over rules" in order to focus on whether the state has the recognized right to legislate the rules that people and organizations follow, and to avoid the misleading and tautological statement that the risk of a coup is lowest when the state is strong. According to Migdal, "in many societies, state officials have simply not gained the right and ability to make many rules they would like...These struggles are over whether the state will be able to displace or harness other organizations...which make rules against the wishes and goals of state leaders" (Migdal, 1988 p. 31). In Africa, "personal rule...is characterized by the seeming paradox of relative autonomy or freedom for the ruler and his clique to make policies but great constraint and incapacity to implement or enforce them" (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982 p. 30).

When non-military actors agree about the state's right to make rules, when there is common willingness to pursue institutionalized procedures to redress grievances and to forego extra-systemic channels for dispute resolution, and when laws are sufficient for protecting individual and organizational interests from executive abuse, political opposition is unlikely to drag the military into politics. When the converse is true, however, elites may "find it expedient to grant the military a limited degree of legitimacy to perform these specific tasks...In such a pattern of civil-military relations, the military is repeatedly called into politics..." (Stepan, 1971 p. 63). Another brief look at Hibbs' institutionalization index suggests the importance of consensus over the state's right to set rules as a determinant of whether coups are

possible: three of the variables in his institutionalization index reflect degree of consensus over the state's right to set rules: direct taxes as a percentage of general government revenue; age in decades of present national institutional form; and general government expenditure as a percentage of the gross domestic product (Hibbs, 1973 p. 99). Direct taxes as a percentage of government revenue may be a particularly valuable indicator of consensus as these taxes are more difficult to collect that indirect taxes such as customs duties.

I measure consensus over the state's right to make rules in terms of chronological age of the political system defined as "the number of years since the last fundamental, abrupt polity change" (Gurr, 1990 p. 41). While age does not always reflect level of consensus over the state's right to make rules, Jackman (1993) argues that age may constitute a useful indicator of adaptiveness as well as ability to provide and routinize meaningful roles and rules. Because rules take time to set in and to acquire meaning and because coercive systems may invoke violent opposition, old political regimes are more likely to depend on legitimacy to sustain themselves than young regimes (Jackman, 1993). Hence, I rely on age of political system to indicate degree of consensus over the state's right to make rules. Gurr sets age to zero for years in which coups occur, thus making it appear that coups take place when regimes are zero years old. To pose a harder test for my argument, I recode age in the year of a coup to previous year's age plus one.

To determine whether or not a regime is at-risk with respect to either strength of non-state organizations or legitimacy, I identify the inflection point for each dimension. The inflection point is the point that maximizes the difference between the rate of coups for observations on each side of the

point. For the non-state organization dimension, the inflection point of the standardized score is 1.38. The rate of coup occurrence among regimes falling above this point is .02 (2 coups per 100 observations) and the rate for those that fall below it is .09. The difference between the rates is .07 and this represents the maximum difference of all possible non-state organization scores. Thirty seven percent of the observations in the sample fall above this point and all these cases are coded not-at-risk in terms of strength of non-state organizations. For the legitimacy dimension, the inflection point falls at 19 years: the rate of coups among polities 19 years or older is .01 (1 coup per 100 observations) and the rate for those that are younger is .09 (9 coups per 100 observations). The difference between the rates is .08 and this represents the maximum difference of all possible legitimacy scores. Thirty six percent of the observations in the study are 19 years or older and all these observations are coded not-at-risk in terms of legitimacy. Summary statistics for the two dimensions follow. Non-state organization score: mean = .35; s.d. = 2.58; min. = -5.51; max. = 5.89. Age: mean = 25.11; s.d. = 38.32; min. = 0; max. = 297.

For each dimension, then, cases that fall below the inflection point are scored as at-risk for a coup and those above the point are scored as not-at-risk with respect to that particular dimension. Finally, I compute the total regime vulnerability score according to theoretical expectations described above: If a regime is deemed at-risk with respect to strength of non-state organizations or consensus, it is coded as at-risk for a coup. If a regime is deemed not-at-risk for both dimensions then it is coded as not-at-risk for a coup.

The combined score is dichotomized into high and low categories rather than treated in continuous terms. I classify regimes as vulnerable or invulnerable, in other words, rather than specifying how much risk a regime

might face. Although the score could be presented in continuous terms, it is more empirically meaningful to present dichotomous scores because there appears to be an empirical cut-point above which regimes are almost completely immune from the risk of coups. Of all observations, 1,941 regime-years (73.4 percent) are coded as at-risk for a coup and 703 regime-years (26.6 percent) are coded as not-at-risk (see appendix 1).

Two arguments lend support to the validity of the measure of regime vulnerability developed in this chapter. First, the measure seems to capture the absence of the possibility of a coup d'état. During the 703 country-years coded as not-at-risk there was only one successful coup (in Ethiopia in 1974) and there were no failed coup attempts. Hence, when a regime is scored as not-at-risk we can be almost completely confident that there is no opportunity for the military to attempt to displace the regime.

Second, the measure appears to capture the presence of the possibility of a coup d'état. Although the measure is unable to make point predictions as to when and where coups will occur, it does seem to indicate whether a regime is at-risk. In the same way that cholesterol tests may indicate whether or not a person is at-risk for a heart attack without being able to determine if and when the attack will take place, my measure of regime vulnerability appears to capture whether or not a coup is possible. Out of 1,941 country-years coded as at-risk, coups or coup attempts took place in 173 cases (8.9 percent). And, of the 105 regimes in the study that are coded as at-risk for a coup for at least four years, 58 regimes (55 percent) experienced a coup or coup attempt at some point during the period under consideration.

Despite these arguments supporting the measure's validity, I recode the independent variable to ensure that results are not sensitive to coding

procedures. In the first specification of the independent variable (coup-risk I), observations were coded as at-risk of a coup if they were at-risk in terms of either strength of non-state organizations or legitimacy. In the re-specification (coup-risk II), observations are coded as at-risk of a coup if they are at-risk for both dimensions. In the second specification (coup-risk II), coups or coup attempts occur in 27 out of 1,218 regime-years scored not-at-risk. While coup-risk II does a better job of determining when regimes are at-risk than coup-risk I, it does worse at identifying when they are not at-risk. Below, I run analyses with both specifications of the independent variable (coup-risk I and coup-risk II).

Control variables

Militaries may be divided into separate branches for at least four reasons that have little to do with the possibility coup d'état. First, regimes may divide the military to achieve increased fighting capacity that results from specialization. Second, regimes may separate branches of the armed forces intended for internal-use missions such as suppression of domestic insurgents from other branches that are reserved for external purposes. Third, international reputational factors may prompt leaders to divide their militaries if they seek to acquire the trappings of the modern state by imitating institutional patterns of other states (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Fourth, regimes may create new military organizations to compartmentalize distinct social groups.

In order to determine whether or not regime vulnerability is related positively to counterbalancing, statistical models should control for these alternative causal factors. It is important to note, however, that the factors

mentioned above refer to regime intentions that are difficult to measure. Hence, while control variables may reflect partially the various reasons that prompt regimes to divide their armed forces, these controls are not perfect proxies. And I have not included a control variable to capture the possibility that regimes may create new military organizations to compartmentalize distinct social groups. Correlations among the variables used in this section of the analysis are reported in the first table of appendix 6 (also see footnote 13).

Previous conflict involvement: Recent involvement in international disputes may reflect the degree of international threat confronting a regime. And degree of international threat, in turn, may influence whether regimes seek to unify or divide their armed forces (Desch, 1996). This dichotomous measure is set to one if the regime has been involved in a militarized international dispute in the previous six years and zero if it has not been involved in a conflict (Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Brecher et. al., 1988).

Domestic unrest: In domestically unstable situations, leaders may create distinct paramilitary forces designed for internal-use missions including suppression of domestic dissent. This variable is an annual count of strikes, riots, assassinations, revolutionary actions, purges, anti-government protests, and acts of guerilla warfare.

Regime type: Although I argued in chapter two that all types of regimes may pursue all different control mechanisms for subordinating the military, conventional wisdom in the literature holds that regime type is an important determinant of strategies leaders select. In addition, regime type may influence leaders' susceptibility to international normative pressures and, in turn, whether they attempt to imitate the institutional patterns of

other states (Wendt and Barnett, 1991). Hence, I include regime type as a control variable and I rely on Gurr's ten point democracy scale, with ten representing full democracy and zero representing non-democracy.

Wealth: Wealthy regimes may be able to purchase the loyalty of their own armed forces without resorting to counterbalancing strategies. Below, I use a cross-national comparison of gross domestic product, standardized in 1980 U.S. dollars (Summers and Heston, 1991).

Statistical analysis

Is the possibility of a coup related positively to counterbalancing behavior? A simple cross-tabulation reveals that counterbalancing strategies were pursued in 91.8 percent of all regime-years coded as at-risk of a coup according to the first specification of regime vulnerability and in 90.0 percent of all at-risk observations identified by the second specification. (By contrast, counterbalancing strategies were pursued in only 54.4 percent and 70.5 percent, respectively, of regime years classified as not-at-risk of a coup by the two specifications of regime vulnerability).

Although the cross-tabulation reported above indicates that the possiblity of a coup may be associated positively with counterbalancing, alternative statistical procedures provide more precise assessments of the relationship between these two factors. Because the dependent variable of interest, counterbalancing, has been specified in dichotomous form, I use probit analysis (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) to estimate the following simple model: $\Pr(\textbf{counterbalancing} = 1) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \textbf{coup-risk})$.[3] The models in the first and second rows use counterbalancing

[3] $F(\ )$ is the cumulative normal distribution.

I as dependent variable while the models in the third and fourth rows use counterbalancing II. As can be seen from the table, coefficients are positive and statistically significant.

Table 4.1
Probit Analysis

(EFFECT OF COUP-RISK ON COUNTERBALANCING; COUNTERBALANCING AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE)

Independent Variable	*Counterbalancing*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*
COUP-RISK I	.949***	.065	14.50
COUP-RISK II	.466***	.064	7.32
COUP-RISK I	.537***	.062	8.70
COUP-RISK II	.221***	.057	3.85

Number of Observations = 1,940

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

Although the first set of tests reported above is consistent with expectations, it is possible that the positive, statistically significant relationship between the possiblity of a coup and counterbalancing is spurious. To determine if the relationship is accounted for by other factors such as regime type and wealth, I specify a series of models in which the occurrence of counterbalancing depends on the possiblity of a coup in combination with one other control variable: Pr(**counterbalancing = 1**) = F($ß_0$ + $ß_1$**coup-risk** + $ß_2$**control variable**). Table 2 reports parameter coefficients for

four different variants of this model. In each model, the possiblity of a coup is paired with a different control. As the table shows, the possiblity of a coup is positively and significantly related to counterbalancing in each of the models regardless of which control is introduced. The results reported below are based on the first specifications of the possiblity of a coup and counterbalancing but for the most part the second specifications yield similar results.

Table 4.2
Probit Analysis

(PAIRWISE EFFECT OF COUP-RISK I ON COUNTERBALANCING I)

Independent Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*	*Number of Observations*
COUP-RISK I	.532***	.077	6.95	1,909
REGIME TYPE	-.105***	.009	-11.77	
COUP-RISK I	.501***	.110	4.54	1,683
WEALTH	-.00013***	.00001	-8.75	
COUP-RISK I	.940***	.071	13.30	1,844
PREVIOUS CONFLICT	-.073	.071	-1.02	
COUP-RISK I	.941***	.066	14.27	1,908
DOMESTIC UNREST	.010	.007	1.50	

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed)

The first two sets of tests consisted of incompletely specified models. It is important to determine if the relationship between the possiblity of a coup and counterbalancing disappears in a more complete model. In the third test, such a model is specified: $Pr(\textbf{counterbalancing = 1}) = F(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \textbf{coup-risk} +$

ß2**regime type** + ß3**wealth** +ß4**previous conflict** + ß5**domestic unrest**).

Parameter coefficients are presented in table 3. As above, the results in table 3 are based on the first specifications of the independent and dependent variables but for the most part the second specifications yield similar results.[4]

Table 4.3 - Probit Analysis

(COUP-RISK I AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE; COUNTERBALANCING I AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE)

Independent Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*
COUP-RISK I	.486***	.115	4.24
REGIME TYPE	-.067***	.012	-5.58
WEALTH	-.00007***	.00002	-4.32
PREVIOUS CONFLICT	-.164*	.082	-2.00
DOMESTIC UNREST	.020**	.008	2.61
INTERCEPT	1.007***	.144	7.02

Number of observations = 1,622
Pseudo - R^2 = .458

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Table 4 reports the marginal contribution of the independent variable in the completely specified model. While there are many reasons that may

[4]Because coefficients are relatively stable between bivariate and multivariate models, we can be fairly sure that estimates of statistical significance are not biased by multicollinearity. However, due to high correlations among the variables (reported in the first matrix of appendix 6), I ran pairwise regressions of the dependent variable on each independent variable by itself. Coefficients and standard errors were stable between the pairwise and multiple regressions, indicating that statistical significance or lack thereof was unlikely to result from multicollinearity among the independent variables. I am grateful to John Squier for this suggestion.

account for division of the armed forces, vulnerable regimes appear almost eighty eight percent more likely to counterbalance than regimes that are not at-risk of a coup d'état.

Table 4.4
Marginal Impact of Independent
Variable on the Probability of Counterbalancing

Change in Value of the Independent Variable	*Percent Change in Probability of Counterbalancing*
Coup-risk	
Not at-risk 0 to At-risk 1	+87.7%

Marginal impact was calculated according to the procedure explained by Huth and Russett (1993 p. 169). The value of the independent variable in table 3 is manipulated while all other variables are held constant at their mean. Then, the "change in position on the cumulative standard normal distribution is...converted into the percentage change in the probability [of the dependent variable]" (Huth and Russett, 1993 p. 169).

Finally, I used multiple regression to estimate the completely specified model and to determine whether results presented above are sensitive to the choice of statistical procedure. To account for the possibility that both of the cut-points used for coding dichotomous counterbalancing scores were misspecified, I used a logged, continuous measure of counterbalancing as dependent variable. And to correct partially for the possibility that counterbalancing scores in one year are not independent of previous scores, I included only observations from every fourth year in the analysis. Results, not presented here, confirm the findings presented thus far. Regime vulnerability to a coup d'état is strongly and positively related to

counterbalancing regardless of the specification of the variables or the statistical technique used, even after correcting for the non-independence of the dependent variable over time.

Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that during the second half of the Cold War, regimes that were vulnerable to their own armed forces were more prone to use counterbalancing strategies than invulnerable regimes. The results, of course, do not constitute positive proof of my argument and several common sense qualifications need to be recognized. For example, my operationalizations of the variables may not capture underlying concepts and selection bias, endogeneity (reverse causation), and a variety of other methodological pitfalls may have crept into the analysis. Despite the importance of these qualifications, I delay their consideration until chapter seven, where I address them at some length. At this point I not simply that while the results of this chapter must be interpreted with caution and although we should not conclude that my theory has been confirmed, there are also grounds for suggesting that the theory seems to have passed a hard test.

Chapter five: A theory of counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict

In the first section of this dissertation I argued that when coups are possible, regimes usually create rival military and paramilitary organizations that they intend to check and balance each other and protect the regime as a byproduct of their independent coercive capacity. Unlike other theories of civil-military relations that ignore counterbalancing or list it as one of many possible strategies that vulnerable regimes might follow, I specify counterbalancing as a critical domestic strategy that almost all vulnerable regimes pursue. This expectation is based on the bloody consequences leaders often pay when they are vulnerable to their own armed forces, the extent to which alternative survival strategies rely on manipulation of fickle preferences, and the fact that counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits force against force. Even though counterbalancing is not always successful for eliminating the possibility of a coup, vulnerable leaders almost always attempt to protect themselves by creating and exploiting cleavages among their own forces. After developing the argument, I use statistical and historical evidence to test its plausibility. Although my objective is not to establish the truth of the theory, my conclusion is that the theory is plausible. Counterbalancing appears to be a crucial and widespread domestic process when coups are possible. Does it lead to international outcomes?

In this second section of the dissertation I turn to the link between domestic process and international politics. My claim is that counterbalancing may cause leaders to prepare for war, invent enemies, and

engage in low-level international disputes. International conflict makes counterbalancing possible by concealing how leaders benefit when they promote competition among their own armed forces. Hence, leaders may engage in international conflict when their primary objective is to use counterbalancing to reduce the risk of a coup.

Dependent variable: international conflict

I seek to account for three related aspects of international conflict: (1) preparation for hostility such as internal balancing and the formulation of external military missions; (2) non-violent aspects of conflict such as the invention of enemies and use of hostile rhetoric and threats; (3) limited uses of force such as military strikes, sabotage, troop mobilizations and blockades. My claim is not that preparation for conflict is the same as the use of force or that non-violent behavior is the same as violence. At the same time, I lump these phenomena together, label the cluster as conflict and proceed *as if* they were the same for the following reasons.

First, according to the argument that I develop below, all three phenomena can result from the same causal pathway. Since my interest is how the causal pathway produces international outcomes rather than distinctions that differentiate variants of the dependent variable, I group phenomena together to direct attention to the operation of the mechanism rather than distinctions among outcomes. This is the same as studying assembly line production without analyzing differences among minivans, automobiles, and light trucks. The outcomes are "close enough" to justify

analysis of their production without concentrating on distinctions among them.

Second, preparation for conflict, non-violent actions, and engagement in low-level hostilities deserve attention because they can cause war (Van Evera, 1984; Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981). It is true that "Not all diversionary actions lead to war...and an important question is whether those that do (and those that do not) follow any particular pattern" (Levy, 1989 p. 282). At the same time, I justify focusing on the aspects of conflict mentioned above while neglecting the subsequent mechanisms by which they may or may not escalate for the same reasons that a medical researcher might study the determinants of cholesterol levels without simultaneously analyzing when cholesterol leads to heart attacks and when it decreases the chance of a heart attack. In other words, I focus on preparation for conflict, non-violent actions, and engagement in low-level hostilities because sometimes they can be background causes of war (Welch, 1993) even though they can also lower the likelihood of war.

Third, the literature has a long history of defining domestic, unilateral, non-violent, and even non-governmental events as instances of international conflict. Rummel, for example uses thirteen different indicators for foreign conflict behavior including (1) antiforeign demonstrations (2) negative sanctions (3) protests (4) countries with which diplomatic relations were severed (5) ambassadors expelled or recalled (6) diplomatic officials of less than ambassador rank expelled or recalled (7) threats (8) military action (9) war (10) troop movements (11) mobilizations

(12) accusations and (13) people killed in all forms of conflict behavior (1963; cited in Stohl, 1980 p. 301).

Notice the different dimensions of conflict embodied in Rummel's indicators. Some indicators such as people killed entail violence and the use of force while others such as threats entail the possibility of force. Some indicators such as wars involve interactive phenomena while others such as antiforeign demonstrations refer to unilateral, domestic outcomes. Some indicators such as troop movements involve government and military institutions while others such as protests do not necessarily involve the agencies of state. Finally, some of the indicators listed above may be more useful for deterrence while others might be more effective for compellance. Given that the literature has used domestic protests and antiforeign demonstrations in the definition of foreign conflict behavior, it seems permissible to include other nonviolent, unilateral factors such as invention of enemies and army-building in the specification of international conflict.

Fourth, any generalized analysis of international conflict must handle tricky specification problems that arise from the facts that numerous types of events constitute conflict and that the distinction between the causes of conflict and conflict itself may be blurry. For example, a threat to defend territory can be a cause of conflict, a cause of peace, a result of conflict, or an aspect of conflict itself. As a result, any definition of conflict must brush aside complexities, invoke somewhat arbitrary criteria for deciding which aspects to emphasize and which to ignore, and group into the same category events that may be dissimilar. Consider Nikita Khrushchev's decision to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962. This decision could be

classified as a military action, a threat, or a troop movement (as Soviet forces accompanied the missiles). Or, even if common sense suggests that the provocative nature of the deployment calls for its classification as an instance of conflict, the argument has another side. In particular, the deployment did not constitute conflict if conflict is defined exclusively as an interactive phenomenon. Should all weapons deployments count as instances of conflict? Even though including war-preparations and non-violent behavior may allow some non-conflictual events to be counted as conflict (false positives), excluding these dimensions would entail overlooking events that should be included.

Fifth, I seek to avoid terminological clutter. While various terminology such as costly signals (Fearon, 1992), bashing the foreigners (Russett, 1990), limited probes (George and Smoke, 1974), manufacturing crises, fabrication of the national security state and diversionary actions short of war reflect partially my conceptualization of conflict, these terms are too cumbersome for this analysis. Hence, I group different phenomena under a single term and avoid clutter by referring simply to conflict.

Levy claims that "Most of the literature on the diversionary theory of war exhibits a puzzling lack of attention to the question of the nature of the dependent variable" (1989 p. 281). However, it should be clear that no clean solution is possible regardless of the care with which the dependent variable is specified. Problems of classification hinder conceptualization and operationalization of many social variables and it is important to remain humble about analytical limitations that result from categorization and aggregation. At the same time, it is equally important not to sacrifice

willingness to generalize about domestic and international political outcomes. With these caveats in mind, I plow ahead.

The independent variable: counterbalancing as tertius gaudens and the creation of structural holes

As described in chapter two, counterbalancing refers to the establishment and maintenance of a system of rival military and paramilitary organizations. Here I note that counterbalancing is a variant of the strategy of tertius gaudens, "the third who benefits,...an individual who profits from the disunion of others" that has been articulated recently by network theorists such as Burt (1992 pp. 30-31), White (1992), Leifer (1985), and Padgett and Ansell (1993). These theorists have developed the concept of network or structural holes to refer to relations among people (or in this case, organizations) that are not connected to each other. If B and C have no relations between them but they are both related to A, then a structural hole exists between B and C. As Burt notes, structural holes are "relations visible only by their absence" (1992).

Counterbalancing is equivalent to the establishment and management of a network of military organizations that is rich in structural holes. In other words, vulnerable leaders seek to structure their forces such that armed organizations are not connected to each other in strong relationships. They pursue monopoly power to create and preserve structural holes among various military organizations so that they can broker relations among them. Burt says that "The *tertius* plays conflicting demands and preferences against

one another and builds value from their disunion" (1992 p. 34; Simmel, 1902; Coser, 1975).

Network theorists describe two distinct tertius strategies, approaches for brokering relations in a network of structural holes. The first strategy (bidding war) is "being the third between two or more players after the same relationship" (Burt, 1992 p. 31). For example, when one seller faces the enviable possibility of offering a good to many potential buyers, all bidders seek the same relationship (to buy the product) from the seller. In this situation, the seller can prompt a bidding war as buyers compete for the right to enter into commercial relations with the seller. When star quarterbacks are sought by numerous different football teams or star professors are courted by multiple departments, they can pit rival bidders against one another to increase salary and other benefits. The key to this strategy is to put "redundant contacts into play against one another" (Burt, 1992 p. 229).

The second tertius strategy (exploit cleavages) is more closely analogous to counterbalancing among military organizations. In particular, this approach involves "being the third between players in two or more relations with conflicting demands" (Burt, 1992 p. 31). Unlike the first approach, the key to the second strategy does not entail cementing relations with one bidder to the exclusion of others. This strategy does not refer to the professor who plays suitors off one another and then signs a contract with a single department. Rather, this second strategy refers to brokering and control that become possible when the tertius perpetuates conflict among third parties. The tertius puts players who have no relationship "into play against one another" (Burt, 1992 p. 230). According to Burt, players "can be played against

one another when they make conflicting demands on the same individual in separate relationships" (1992 p. 48). This second tertius strategy describes divide-and-rule approaches that leaders use to exploit antagonisms among followers. When followers compete with each other rather than with central authority, leaders can remain above the fray and consolidate their own control.

Tertius strategies deliver two types of benefits. First, tertius strategies provide control benefits by "giving certain players an advantage in negotiating their relationships" (Burt, 1992 p. 30). Second, tertius strategies provide information benefits. When relations among people or organizations in a network are strong, then everyone "knows what the other people know and will discover the same opportunities at the same time" (Burt, 1992 p. 17). By promoting conflict among rivals and then standing above the fray, leaders increase the likelihood that rivals will not share information with each other and that information will flow up the chain of command rather than horizontally.

Promoting antagonism to obstruct collusion

Tertius strategies that involve A's exploitation of a cleavage between B and C are not effective when B and C collude. In the military realm, counterbalancing strategies depend on promoting conflict and jealousy among military organizations in order to keep them apart. Otherwise, to borrow a phrase from Migdal, the balancing act can topple (1988 p. 202). When the rival organizations or factions that populate a hub-and-spoke system intermingle, communicate, overlap and cooperate, potential

challengers may form horizontal ties and undermine the center's authority. Therefore, leaders face powerful incentives to promote jealousy among rivals and to keep them apart by reinforcing differences among them. As Feaver argues, "institutional checks work best when the interests of the two agents are in conflict...Otherwise, the two agents could collude" (1995 p. 28).

In the art world, MOMA trustee William Paley "used many agents...and these agents were sufficiently differentiated from one another that he could keep control as principal" (White, 1992 p. 316). In Renaissance Florence, Cosimo de' Medici's ability to control the city-state depended on segregating elite partisans into distinct factions, one centered on commercial and neighborhood solidarity and the other based on marriage and friendship ties (Padgett and Ansell, 1993). In the corporate world, "large business firms are sites for dual hierarchies...[C]orporations are split into self-contained divisions each of which operates in a different market" (White, 1992 p. 271). In each of these cases, leaders' control depends on structuring potential challengers into multiple hierarchies whose components are kept apart from each other (Burt, 1992; Leifer, 1988; Padgett and Ansell, 1993).

In the military realm, counterbalancing strategies depend on leaders' ability to promote conflict and jealousy among rival forces in order to keep them apart. (Janowitz, 1964 p. 68; Zimmerman, 1983 pp. 277-279). Regimes must prevent their militaries from becoming cohesive by creating and exploiting cleavages among rival chains of command. The goal is to increase coup plotters' uncertainty about their peers' loyalty and to complicate the planning and implementation of any contemplated conspiracy. As plotters plan and organize their conspiracies, they must be able to persuade potential

recruits that the coup will succeed. Farcau notes that "the ultimate enticement for the potential recruits to the ranks of the coup plotters...is the likelihood of success...The principal goal of the coup plotters in their recruitment approach, therefore, is to convince the 'critical mass' of the officer corps, not so much of the rightness of their cause, but of the likelihood that they will prevail..." (1994 p. 107; also Luttwak, 1968). Officers' willingness to support the coup or at least to remain neutral, in other words, depends on their beliefs about their peers' beliefs about the regime's vulnerability. And the regime, in turn, attempts to complicate each individual's ability to resolve this variant of the collective action problem (Olson, 1965). As Padgett and Ansell (1993 p. 1286) argue "a 'revolt of the colonels' requires more than just comparing dissatisfactions. Colonels have to have confidence that other colonels are not just stabbing them in the back".

A fascinating pattern emerges from analysis of Luttwak's index of all coups and coup attempts between 1945 and 1978 (1979 pp. 195-207). For each attempt, Luttwak lists whether or not the coup was successful as well as the specific military, paramilitary, and police organizations that participated. Of the 173 coup attempts staged by a single military or domestic armed organization (army, navy, air force, paramilitary, or police), 80 (46%) were successful. Of the 63 coup attempts staged by two or more armed forces, 54 (86%) were successful. The large difference in success rates appears indicate that when leaders fail to keep officers in different forces from colluding with each other, attempted coups are much more likely to lead to the toppling of the regime.

Concealment: disguising motives to obstruct collusion

Leaders must conceal control benefits they accrue when they create and exploit cleavages among their forces. If benefits become visible, then officers may come to resent how inter-organizational antagonism promotes leaders' interests. However, civil-military relations is just one domain in which exploiting rivalries depends on concealment. Consider, for example, how Lyndon Johnson used concealment as a critical tactic for accumulating power as an undergraduate at Southwest Texas State Teachers College in San Marcos, Texas in 1929 and 1930. When Johnson arrived at San Marcos most students, administrators and faculty ignored campus politics. An athletic club known as the Black Stars nominated class officers who were elected without opposition. Little was at stake and issues were not contested. But Johnson changed that by exploiting two distinct cleavages.

First, he bridged a chasm between the campus community and President Prexy Evans, who was "Crusty, dignified,...an awesome figure on the little campus...[who] held himself aloof" (Caro, 1981 p. 144). One student says that he had around him "'an invisible wall...which we didn't dare go beyond'" (Caro, 1981 p. 144). But Johnson pierced that wall by flattering Evans constantly and by writing editorials in the student newspaper that showered the President with praise. Johnson used his friendship and position as Evans's office assistant to create "an impression on campus that [he] was close to the president" (Caro, 1981 p. 152). Faculty who needed access to Evans and who believed that the two had close relations went through Johnson. In turn, the President came to rely increasingly on Johnson for advice and soon "began to listen to Johnson's suggestions on student job assignments" (Caro,

1981). In an era when the economy was so depressed that students who could not find campus employment sometimes were forced to quit school, Johnson's influence over the allocation of jobs allowed him to build a loyal patronage network.

Second, Johnson pitted popular athletes against marginalized intellectuals. He joined a social group named the White Stars and suggested they nominate one of their members for senior class president. No one had ever challenged Black Star candidates in campus elections and the White Stars had no campaign experience and no issues to advocate. Playing on intellectuals' resentment of Black Stars' popularity, Johnson coined the issue "Brains are Just as Important as Brawn". The White Star candidate used a promise to increase funding for debate and drama to win the election and White Stars soon acquired a majority of class offices and Student Council seats.

Johnson used tertius strategies to acquire tremendous power at San Marcos. Numerous students, faculty and administrators owed him favors and depended on him for information, access and financial support. Volunteers ran his errands and ghost wrote editorials that appeared in the newspaper under his name. When Johnson decided he did not want to take physical education classes, a gym teacher known for strict adherence to the rules allowed him to write a paper on athletics. When the campus newspaper published a satirical essay making fun of Johnson's relationship with the faculty and the President, Johnson informed the Dean of Students and the publication was confiscated.

Concealment was critical to Johnson's implementation of tertius strategies. First, Johnson avoided taking public positions on campus issues. Even though he provided issue positions for White Star candidates to endorse, he refused to take political stands himself. This pattern carried over into his congressional career, when Johnson did not participate in a single floor discussion in 1937, 1938, 1939, 1942, 1943, or 1944. Johnson bartered favors and dispensed patronage but usually he did not advocate issues. Caro notes that when students "were discussing a serious issue in campus politics, he would hastily walk away. 'He'd avoid us because he didn't want to have to take a position'" (1981 p. 194). As a Congressman, "he would go to unusual lengths to avoid having to reveal his opinion" including fleeing from reporters (Caro, 1981 p. 549).

Second, Johnson created special rules to ensure that the existence of the White Stars would remain secret from the rest of campus. For example, no three White Star members could gather on campus and if such a gathering took place, one member had to leave. Johnson moved club meetings to the second story of an off-campus hotel where pedestrians would be unable to detect proceedings through street-level windows. And, any club member who was asked if he was a member of the White Stars was automatically expelled and re-admitted at the next meeting so that he could answer the question with a straight face. One White Star says that "'The Black Stars didn't know we were organized--nobody knew...They didn't know this was an organization working on them'" (Caro, 1981 p. 184).

Third, Johnson concealed the extent of his own influence from White Star members who were his own allies. Caro says that he kept "even the fact

that he had a strategy...secret from the White Stars themselves" (1981 p. 184). The founders of the White Stars, Horace Richards and Vernon Whiteside, continued to chair group meetings and do the majority of talking. Johnson, on the other hand, said little.

Why did Johnson conceal his motives, preferences, and tactical maneuvering, and why do tertius strategies depend on such concealment? Michel Foucault argues that power operates most effectively when it is concealed. He claims that "power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms" (1978 p. 86). According to Foucault, those who are dominated by power would not accept their subjugation if they recognized the extent to which their freedom was curtailed (1978 p. 86; Douglas, 1986 pp. 92; 98; 103; 120). Johnson "couldn't let even his allies know what he was planning...If anyone on campus, even his allies, realized his purposes, he would not be able to accomplish them. If anyone saw what he was doing, he would not be able to do it" (Caro, 1981 pp. 184; 186).

More generally, divide-and-conquer (tertius) strategies depend on disguise because concealment prevents opponents from recognizing how conflict among them promotes leaders' interests. Concealment diminishes opportunities for rivals to collude by masking how their dispute produces control benefits for leaders. When A's selfish motives become visible, B and C may perceive their conflict as unnecessary or unjust and in turn they may come to resent authority and cooperate to overthrow it. At San Marcos, Johnson realized that intellectuals would be less likely to support his "candidates if the voters discovered that...they were being asked to vote for

members of another secret organization--also one in which they were not invited" (Caro, 1981 p. 184). And within the White Star organization, if Johnson had acted like the leader of the club rather than continuing to let the club's founders chair meetings and do most of the talking, they might have become "jealous of their leadership, might well balk at a Johnson plan simply because it wasn't *their* plan" (Caro, 1981 p. 184)

Psychologists and economists have documented the difficulty of achieving control when authorities appear to be acting out of their own self interest. Public rioting, disobedience and willingness to take high risks are more likely when leaders appear to have a personal stake in the outcome of a decision. In such cases, citizens are more likely to conclude that the government is unjust and they are less likely to obey the law, accept personal sacrifice and acknowledge the legitimacy of authority (Tyler, 1990).

In the realm of civil-military relations, rival military forces may collude and launch a coup if they come to believe that conflict among them advances leaders' interests (Simmel, 1902). Two possibilities are apparent. On the one hand, military elites are likely to resist efforts to promote strife among already-existing armed organizations if they believe that such inter-organizational antagonisms are intended to advance leaders' narrow political interests (Migdal, 1988 pp. 200-203). If military elites conclude that the regime is promoting competition among them for its own sake and that consequent rivalries threaten military effectiveness and compromise national security, they are likely to question the regime's legitimacy and to take high risks to rectify the situation. To prevent officers from experiencing divide-and-conquer politics as an assault on their sense of fairness and corporate spirit

and a threat to the state's ability to defend itself, I argue that leaders must conceal their motives for counterbalancing. Failure to do so could prompt officers to portray themselves as victims of manipulative control efforts.

On the other hand, military elites are likely to resist any effort to create new forces that might jeopardize pre-existing corporate prerogatives (Thompson, 1973 p. 29; Nordlinger, 1977 p. 75; Laguerre, 1993 pp. 176-177). Stepan suggests that "no organization -- least of all a military organization -- wants to coexist with an alternative claimant to doctrinal and political authority in its sphere of action" (Stepan, 1988 p. 46). Farcau suggests that "often, just the rumour that such a [rival] militia force is being considered by the government will be sufficient to cause the military to react..." (1994 pp. 192-193; Perlmutter, 1977). In Guatemala (1954), Argentina (1955), Bolivia (1971) and Chile (1973), word of the regime's plans to create rival militias inspired the regular army to launch a coup d'état (Farcau, 1994). Finer concludes that "the motive of corporate self-interest stands out boldly in those situations where the government is thought to be contemplating the establishment of some form of militia" (1988 p. 48).

International conflict and the concealment of control benefits that result from inter-organizational antagonism

Vulnerable leaders use international conflict to promote competition among their forces and to conceal control benefits they accrue when they induce their own military organizations to compete. This claim runs counter to standard arguments in social science theory that suggest that conflict with out-groups can promote cohesion among in-groups. When group members

perceive a common external threat, when they agree that cooperation can overcome the threat, and when they believe that preservation of the group is worthwhile, then conflict inspires unity (Coser, 1956; Stein, 1978 p. 11, Levy, 1989 p. 261). According to Coser, "Internal cohesion is likely to be increased in the group which engages in outside conflict" (1956 p. 92). Cohesion increases because group members mobilize common energy and because fighting requires functionally specialized agents to coordinate their efforts. Whether the focus is small groups or the entire nation, conflict can bring people and organizations together.

Because external conflict can promote internal cohesion, Coser says that groups may manufacture external adversaries to enhance their own unity: "...the outer enemy...may be invented to bring about social solidarity" (Coser, 1956 p. 107). In the realm of civil-military relations, the implication is that when coups are possible, leaders may use international hostility to divert attention from domestic problems, to rally the public to its side, and to unify the military. Indeed, some of these points are common, familiar themes that emerge from the literature on domestic sources of international conflict. Levy and Vakili, for example, suggest in the case of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war that Argentina's invasion was "a means of reestablishing the corporate unity of the military" (1992 p. 135). They suggest that during domestic crises vulnerable elites may be "tempted to engage in diversionary action for...unifying the regime internally" (1992 p. 135).

Here I develop a different argument by inverting the causal impact of external conflict on cohesion. Similar to other scholars who question the universal applicability of the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis and explore how

external conflict can promote internal strife, my claim is that when coups are possible, the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis is not relevant (Bueno de Mesquita, 1980; Stein, 1978; Levy, 1989; Tilly, 1975). Without denying the validity or importance of this hypothesis in some contexts, I argued in chapter one that vulnerable leaders tend not to seek to unify their armed forces because unity is not equivalent to loyalty and because unified militaries are dangerous when coups are possible. In addition, the armed forces consist of a network, not a group.

More specifically, my argument is that vulnerable leaders use international conflict to facilitate divide-and-conquer politics at the domestic level. My claim is that international hostilities help leaders promote conflict among their own forces and conceal control benefits they accrue when they induce their own armed organizations to compete. I develop the following two points: First, international conflict creates inter-service rivalries among military forces (generally the army, navy, and air force). Second, international conflict generates organizational denial that makes the distinction between military forces on the one hand and domestic forces (the police and paramilitary) on the other hand seem natural. In these two ways, international conflict makes counterbalancing possible.

Inter-service rivalries

International conflict can create and exacerbate inter-service rivalries. My claim is that each of the three aspects of conflict specified above -- preparation for hostility (military build-ups and formulation of external military missions), non-violent aspects of conflict (hostile rhetoric and

invention of enemies), and limited uses of force (military strikes and blockades) -- can cause service branches to compete with each other.

Preparation for conflict can foment inter-service rivalry when service branches offer divergent assessments of threat, capabilities, or the balance of power. To take one example, as they considered Anwar Sadat's plan to attack Israel in October, 1972, Egyptian military elites bitterly contested whether or not Egyptian forces possessed the capacity to prevail in a limited ground operation (Stein, 1985 p. 46). Preparation can promote inter-service antagonism when service branches stress the doctrinal importance of particular organizational missions to secure favorable budgetary and procurement decisions. Throughout the Cold War, clashes among the U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines often stemmed from doctrinal differences about how the Pentagon should prepare for war (Betts, 1991 pp. 115-138). The Air Force emphasized the primacy of deterrence and "the efficacy of air power in the quest for service independence" while the Army tended to stress the importance of maintaining large reserve forces that would facilitate territorial seizure and control (Betts, 1991 p. 117). Betts shows how doctrinal differences became institutionalized and manifested themselves in numerous inter-service disputes (1991).

Non-violent behavior such as the invention of enemies and use of hostile rhetoric can promote inter-service rivalries when forces disagree on the danger posed by alleged, external threats. In the next chapter, I argue that in Georgia in the mid-1990's disagreements about the magnitude of the Russian threat have been a source of ongoing conflict between the Army and the Border Guards. The regime of Eduard Shevardnadze has manipulated its

relationship with Moscow partially in order to drive a wedge between the Army, which maintains close ties to the Russian armed forces, and the Border Guards, who are oriented toward Europe, Ukraine, and the United States.

Engagement in conflict can promote inter-service rivalry by legitimating a service branch's claim for independent status. In Israel, the air force's outstanding performance during the 1967 war fueled its demands for autonomous status from the Israeli Defense Forces (Ben Meir, 1995 p. 82). In addition, conflict can prompt service branches to take credit for success or avoid blame for failure and it can unmask and exacerbate differences over tactics. During the Falklands/Malvinas war between Britain and Argentina, the Argentine army and air force "became increasingly reluctant to accept direction of the war effort from a naval officer, when the navy's ships lay impotent in their ports" (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983 p. 218). During the campaign for the island of Peleliu in the fall of 1944, U.S. Marines became livid at Army troops' habit of retreating from exposed positions to regroup (Cameron, 1994 p. 153).

One might object that even if preparations, non-violent behavior, and limited conflicts can generate inter-service rivalry, perhaps during long-term wars Coser's ingroup-outgroup hypothesis should apply and battlefield experience should cause militaries to become cohesive. In addition, it is possible to object that my argument might apply only to poorly-integrated militaries in the developing world in which service branches are not properly coordinated. But international conflict is such a powerful determinant of inter-service rivalry that its impact can be apparent even in Western armed forces, even during battle. In the Second World War, the campaign in the

Pacific theater inflamed bitter antagonisms among the Army, Navy, and Marines. Cameron notes that "The marines' growing insecurity concerning their elite status was reflected in the continued animosity directed toward the Army. It was impossible to avoid comparisons of Army and Marine Corps performance on Okinawa, and the marines continued to pad their pride at the expense of the Army" (1994, pp. 174-175). After the fight for Okinawa, "Navy admirals were furious about losing so many ships and men while the generals fought a long, slow campaign ashore, and the Army felt victimized by a public relations campaign suggesting that the Marine Corps's proposed second landing on southern Okinawa might have brought the operations to a quick end" (Cameron, 1994 p. 169).

Inter-service rivalries generate control benefits for political leaders. Consider how Richard Betts interprets the American experience during the Cold War: "interservice controversy enhanced civilian control by deflecting conflict away from civilian-military lines" (1991 p. 116). When leaders are called on to arbitrate disputes among their own forces, they profit from inter-organizational antagonism by standing above the fray. Inter-service rivalries produce options that leaders must evaluate, modify, select, and reject. In Israel, bitter disagreements among the air force, navy and army about each force's share of the defense budget "are invariably brought to the attention of the defense minister -- who can then arbitrate among conflicting views..." (Ben Meir, 1995 p. 157). This is precisely the strategy of the tertius gaudens who profits from the interplay of conflicting demands.

Leaders do not require international conflict to generate inter-service rivalries. They can criticize certain organizations while praising others or

they can take sides in inter-organizational squabbles. However, when military organizations frame their disputes in terms of the pursuit of national security, leaders can arbitrate competition according to the standard of military effectiveness. For example, Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín justified development of the Condor II ballistic missile in terms of "defense of our sovereignty" even though his primary motivation appears to have been to seal an alliance with the Air Force against the Army (Tollefson, 1994). When leaders adjudicate disputes among their own armed forces according to narrow political standards, they sacrifice concealment that is essential for divide-and-conquer tactics. In Haiti in 1959, for example, personal animosities prompted militia members of the Tontons Macoutes to denounce members of the Army. When President François Duvalier "gave more credence and encouragement to what the Macoutes said against the words of the military officers and soldier", the regime alienated the Army's officer corps and compromised its morale (Laguerre, 1993 p. 115). By arbitrating disputes according to the standard of military effectiveness rather than their own parochial interest, leaders can play honest broker and conceal control benefits they accrue from inter-service rivalry.

The argument I develop here may appear to be at odds with two tenets of conventional wisdom. On the one hand, inter-service rivalry can undermine military effectiveness. As Ben Meir notes, the technological complexity of modern warfare has "created an urgent need for interservice coordination at the highest military level" (1996 p. 78; Biddle and Zirkle, 1993 p. 4; Coser, 1956 p. 88; 92). Why would leaders use international conflict to

promote inter-service rivalries if such rivalries obstruct military effectiveness?

On the other hand, Durkheim argued that differentiation leads to interdependent affiliation that leads to integration (1893). One reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper noted that "functional specialization toward the accomplishment of a common task increases what Durkheim calls organic solidarity". As Huntington argues, preparing for international conflict tends to promote organizational differentiation when navies focus on sea power, air forces focus on air power, and armies focus on ground combat (1957 p. 12). If international conflict promotes organizational specialization and if specialization promotes cooperation, then how can international conflict lead to inter-service antagonism?

Three responses deserve consideration. First, when coups are possible leaders tend to be more concerned about conspiracy at home than victory abroad. Hence it should be no surprise that vulnerable leaders may be willing to sacrifice military effectiveness in order to reduce the risk of a coup. The reason that leaders tend to fear coups more than international defeat, as argued in chapter two, is that coups are much more likely than wars to lead to bloody regime change. As a result, many leaders have been willing to sacrifice military effectiveness to minimize the risk of a coup. For example, Syrian leaders kept their most powerful and loyal units in Damascus during battles against Israel and Jordan to ensure that no coup would take place during fighting (Seale, 1988). During and after the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein executed and incarcerated hundreds of officers including two successful generals, Maher Abd al-Rashid and Hisham Sabah Fakhri, who he

feared "would develop a local or national following" (Biddle and Zirkle, 1993 p. 13). In their careful analysis of Iraqi air defense during the Gulf War, Biddle and Zirkle show how Saddam Hussein refused to integrate multiple lines of command even when the absence of coordination entailed disastrous military consequences (1993).

Second, the benefits of inter-organizational cooperation may not be sufficient to overcome rivalry. Inter-service antagonisms generated by international conflict can be so intense as to prevent organizations from cooperating even when lives and military effectiveness are at stake. When U.S. Army reinforcements joined units of the First Marine Division in the South Pacific Theater during World War II, for example, there was so much hatred between the these two forces that experienced Marine scouts did not "introduce the new Army troops to the patrol routs and key terrain outside the perimeter" (Cameron, 1994 p. 128).

Third, fragmentation among military organizations is not a random accident, at least according to the perspective developed here. Rather, the logics of counterbalancing and tertius gaudens strategies suggest that divide-and-conquer politics are critical to leaders' survival when coups are possible. If leaders seek and prefer fragmentation, there is no reason to expect specialized military organizations to develop organic solidarity automatically. This is why a recent U.S. Government Accounting Office publication on naval operations was subtitled "Interservice Cooperation Needs Direction from Top" (1993). Certainly it is true that leaders who are not vulnerable to a coup and who are motivated to build effective fighting forces should be expected to design institutions that integrate their armed forces. As Ben Meir

notes, during the Cold War many Western countries developed defense organizations that promoted unification, centralization and integration (1995 p. 77). Hence, when coups are not possible specialization often should lead to interdependence and solidarity. But when leaders do not seek to develop military cohesion, they can and do attempt to play divide-and-conquer politics in order to prevent their own forces from becoming interdependent.

Organizational denial

In the previous section of this chapter, I focused on the wedge that international conflict can drive between different branches of the military. Here I address how international conflict can drive a wedge between military forces (generally the air force, army, and navy) on the one hand and armed domestic organizations (the police and paramilitary) on the other hand. My argument is that international conflict can create organizational denial that prevents military forces from realizing how their isolation from domestic forces promotes leaders' interests. International conflict sustains the critical cleavage between military and domestic forces and makes the cleavage seem natural. By naturalizing the distinction and diverting attention away from its significance for regime survival, international conflict can conceal control benefits that leaders accrue when military and domestic organizations differentiate.

When militaries conceptualize their role in terms of external security, they tap into a powerful international norm about the legitimate configuration of armed force. In particular, they may naturalize their existence as separate from the police and paramilitary. As Janowitz notes, "It

is a basic assumption of the democratic model of civilian-military relations that civilian supremacy depends upon a sharp organizational separation between internal and external violence forces" (1964 p. 38). When militaries tap into this norm by defining their roles in terms of external defense, they can legitimate and naturalize their organizational purpose as distinct from domestic forces.

Janowitz argues that "there is a strong pressure within the military profession of the new nations to differentiate themselves from the police" (1964 p. 37). But it is important to realize that not all militaries define their missions primarily or exclusively in terms of external defense. In Haiti under Jean-Claude Duvalier, for example, the army and police were indistinguishable as the army performed internal policing as well as external defense-related roles. When the regime contemplated establishing a separate police force in the late 1980's, army officers objected that they would lose status as well as opportunities for corruption if the military forfeited its internal security mission to a new police force (Laguerre, 1993 p. 177). Indeed, one implication of Stepan's new professionalism is that militaries do not always prefer to differentiate themselves from domestic organizations (Desch, 1996 p. 14; Stepan, 1988 p. 15; Stepan, 1971; Stepan, 1973; Pion-Berlin, 1989).

When militaries do conceptualize their missions exclusively or primarily in terms of external defense, this creates a cleavage or structural hole between military and domestic forces. In the United States, for example, preparation for war has led the military "...to think of police activities as less prestigeful and less honorable tasks..." (Janowitz, 1960 p. 419). My argument is that when militaries focus exclusively or primarily on external security, they

tend to ignore domestic forces rather than to pay attention to them and to define their status as distinct from domestic organizations. In turn, this cleavage facilitates regime survival by making it possible for leaders to keep domestic and military forces apart. Luttwak observes that "[i]n the newly-independent countries the para-military element of the police can be a very serious obstacle to the coup" (1968 p. 90) and Snyder suggests that the possibility of a coup depends partially on "whether the dictator has a paramilitary force which functions as a counterbalance to the regular armed forces..." (1992 p. 381). Divide-and-conquer strategies that involve A's exploitation of a cleavage between B and C are not effective when B and C collude. When militaries concentrate on external security and domestic organizations concentrate on internal security, this creates a critical, first-order cleavage that makes divide-and-conquer strategies possible.

As indicated above, however, militaries' focus on external security cannot be taken for granted. If the external environment obviously is threatening, then the armed forces should be expected to define their role in terms of external defense. When the possibility of conflict is not apparent, however, militaries may come to define their missions in terms of internal security. In Latin America in recent years, "...the roles and missions of the police and military have become increasingly difficult to distinguish..." (Rial, 1996 p. 56). Only a few years after the end of the Cold War, Desch found it necessary to implore American leaders to keep the armed forces focused on external defense by finding "new military missions" and by stressing "the inevitability of future conflicts" (1996 pp. 26-27). And Stepan urged post-authoritarian leaderships in South America to "play a role in creating new

doctrines of national defense" (1988 p. 144). It is the anticipation of international conflict, in other words, that reinforces the norm that holds militaries responsible for external missions and police and paramilitary organizations responsible for domestic missions. When international conflict does not appear to be likely, then militaries may come to forget, ignore, or move away from their external missions.

Here I want to argue that when international conflict is not likely, leaders may invent enemies, prepare for war, and provoke and engage in low-level disputes in order to orient the military outward and create and reinforce the cleavage that separates military and domestic organizations. My argument is that international conflict makes counterbalancing possible by reinforcing and naturalizing the military's self-awareness as distinct from domestic organizations. By making the distinction between military and domestic forces seem normal, international conflict can cause militaries to experience organizational denial that precludes them from recognizing and questioning their role as counterbalancers.

Many scholars have emphasized the benefits leaders accrue when the military defines its role in terms of external defense. Welch and Smith claim that "The likelihood of military intervention diminishes with the emergence of a clear-cut, external focus for national defense" (1974 p. 11, cited in Zimmerman, 1983 p. 517). And Desch argues that "external threat orients the military outward, making it less inclined to meddle in domestic politics..." (1996 pp. 13-14; Stepan, 1988 p. 144; Janowitz, 1964 p. 34; 36; Andreski, 1980 pp. 3-4, cited in Desch, 1996 p. 27).

But these scholars err when they suggest that international conflict causes militaries to become less interested in domestic politics. There is no direct link between internal missions and willingness to stage a coup or external missions and reluctance to stage a coup. Even in the countries that developed Stepan's new professionalism, there were many coups and coup attempts before internal doctrine was articulated in the mid-1950's and early 1960's. Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil experienced at least five coup attempts between 1945 and 1954 (Luttwak, 1968; Stepan, 1971). Bangladesh experienced at least three coup attempts in the decade preceding its development of internal military doctrine in the 1980's. (Ball, 1988 p. 43; Luttwak, 1968). In addition, many war-prone states are quite coup-prone (Bueno de Mesquita et. al., 1992). As Stepan argues, internal military doctrines rationalize and legitimate military rule after the armed forces seize power (1988 p. 14). But I suggest that international conflict does not cause militaries to become less interested in domestic *politics*.

Rather, international conflict may cause militaries to become less interested in domestic *organizations* (the police and the paramilitary). When militaries focus on internal missions, they may become involved with domestic forces in ways that jeopardize central authorities. In Haiti in the 1960's and 1970's, for example, where both the Army and the paramilitary (Tontons Macoutes) were responsible for suppressing domestic opposition, "pockets of institutional cooperation developed between the Army and the Macoutes" (Laguerre, 1993 p. 121). In Lithuania in the early 1990's, the military's involvement in internal affairs led to gun fights between military soldiers and the police (Vitas, 1996 p. 81). By reinforcing the military's status

as distinct from the police and paramilitary, international conflict creates a structural hole or cleavage that makes counterbalancing possible. As argued in chapter two, counterbalancing may not eliminate the risk of a conspiracy, but vulnerable leaders almost always attempt to use this strategy to protect themselves when coups are possible.

International conflict thus grounds the distinction between military and domestic forces in nature and confers natural status on this cleavage. In this sense, international conflict is a "social construction...[that] determine[s] what is natural" (Douglas, 1986). Douglas says that every institution "needs a formula that founds its rightness in reason and in nature" (1986 p. 45). However, the attempt to legitimate and naturalize an institution "by grounding it in nature is defeated as soon as it is recognized as such". As a result, a naturalizing convention can draw on anything "so long as it is not seen as a socially constructed arrangement" (Douglas, 1986 pp. 48; 52). International conflict is a naturalizing convention that makes the distinction between military and domestic forces seem normal.

When this cleavage appears normal, then armies, navies, and air forces may experience a form organizational denial in which they fail to recognize or question their role in the balancing equation against paramilitary and police forces. Alternative terms that capture the idea of denial are structural amnesia, selective deafness, and self-deception (Douglas, 1986 pp. 3; 70; Hirschman, 1970 p. 93). Typically, denial refers to an individual emotional phenomenon. But it can be an organizational feature as well if an institution's members emphasize some thoughts and obscure others on a collective basis. Agócs notes that "Denial is institutionalized when it is

expressed through the power of organizational authorities to confer legitimacy on some interpretations of experience and deny it to others" (1997 p. 51). And Douglas says that institutions can "direct and control the memory...[and] create shadowed places in which nothing can be seen and no questions asked." (1986 pp. 73; 69).

The diversionary power of international conflict has been recognized by many scholars (Levy, 1989). As Edelman notes, constructing enemies "displaces...alternative explanations[s]...and inhibits understanding of a damaging problem" (1988 p. 69). And Levy suggests that "the very concepts of scapegoating or of diversionary mechanisms...assume that some form of psychological mechanism is at work" (1989 p. 280). In the realm of civil-military relations, international conflict can naturalize the distinction between military and domestic forces and generate organizational denial that prevents militaries from recognizing their role in the balancing equation against paramilitary and police forces. Hence, if external threats are not apparent, vulnerable leaders may prepare for war, invent enemies, and engage in low-level disputes in order to naturalize this critical organizational cleavage.

Performing the national security state

A brief restatement of the four steps in the argument may be useful at this point. First, I claimed in chapter two that when coups are possible, usually leaders divide their militaries into rival armed forces that they intend to check and balance each other. Counterbalancing is a variant of tertius gaudens strategies that entail the exploitation of structural holes by brokers

who profit from conflict among opponents. Second, I argued that tertius or counterbalancing strategies cannot succeed when rivals collude. Hence, counterbalancing depends on leaders' ability to keep rival forces apart by promoting conflict among them. Third, I claimed that promoting conflict among rival forces requires leaders to conceal their motives. When rivals understand how brokers profit from conflict among them, they may come to realize that their mutual antagonism is unnecessary and they may become strongly motivated to rebel. Finally, fourth, I argued that international conflict conceals how leaders obtain control benefits when they promote hostility among their own forces. International conflict generates inter-service rivalries among military forces as well as organizational denial that makes the distinction between military and domestic forces seem natural. Hence, leaders may prepare for war, invent enemies, and engage in low-level international disputes when their foundational objective is to use counterbalancing to subordinate their own forces.

According to the perspective developed here, the national security state may reproduce itself through "a string of performances" (Butler, 1993 p. 311). Nicole Ball notes that "Protection against external aggression provides the raison d'être for all armed forces" (1988 p. 33). But why do states often justify their militaries in terms of the possibility of international conflict? I conclude by suggesting that leaders often behave *as if* national security is at stake to conceal control benefits they accrue from that fabrication. Because inventing enemies can create real enemies, however, performing the national security state generates the possibility of actual violence (Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981; Van Evera, 1984). International conflict then becomes an "effect and consequence

of the imitation of itself" (Butler, 1993 p. 313). In the next two chapters, I test the plausibility of the argument. First I use a historical case study of Georgian civil-military relations under Eduard Shevardnadze and then I conduct a statistical analysis of almost every country in the world during the second half of the Cold War.

Chapter six: Counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict in Georgia in the mid-1990's

On September 27, 1993, Georgian forces were defeated by Abkhazian separatists during the battle for the city of Sukhumi. The next day, President Eduard Shevardnadze consented to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, reversing his previous efforts to pull Georgia away from Moscow's orbit. Shevardnadze had few alternatives except to bandwagon with Russia because fighting in Abkhazia nearly completely destroyed Georgia's armed forces, and because followers of the previous president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, were threatening to march on Tbilisi from their base in western Georgia. But over the next four years, despite the decision to ally with Moscow, Georgian-Russian relations continued to include a significant measure of hostility that entailed border incidents, accusations, and threats. During the same period, Shevardnadze cultivated no less than five different ground forces including the Army, Border Guard, Interior Troops, Special Units of the Ministry of State Security, and Government Guard. Why did Shevardnadze develop so many armies and why did Georgian-Russian relations remain conflictual despite the alliance between Tbilisi and Moscow?

In this chapter I argue that counterbalancing was an important driving force that contributed to the continuation of Georgian-Russian hostilities. Shevardnadze built multiple armed forces to protect himself from a coup and he manipulated tensions with Moscow in order to drive a wedge between the Army and the Border Guard and to naturalize the cleavage between Georgian military forces on the one hand and domestic paramilitary organizations on the other hand. After this brief introduction, I divide the remainder of the

chapter into five sections. First I present a history of civil-military relations under Shevardnadze from 1992 through 1996. Second I discuss the dependent variable, international conflict. Third, I argue that the Shevardnadze regime was vulnerable to a coup during the period under consideration. Fourth, I claim that counterbalancing was an essential aspect of Shevardnadze's strategy for protecting himself from a coup. Fifth, I claim that international conflict made counterbalancing possible by allowing Shevardnadze to drive a wedge between his forces and to naturalize the cleavage between military and domestic organizations.

It is important to emphasize that this analysis does not present a comprehensive account of Georgian foreign and national security policy or Georgian-Russian relations. To begin, there are numerous aspects or outcomes of Georgian foreign policy that this study does not seek to explain such as international economic policy and arms control. In addition, there are many causes or determinants of Georgian foreign policy that this analysis does not consider. Finally, this study does not account for specific decisions or episodes in the recent history of Georgian foreign affairs. In these three senses then, the analysis at hand is not comprehensive. Rather, this chapter is a test of one theory that underscores foreign policy implications of one particular causal factor (counterbalancing) during a specific historical period in Georgia.

Consideration of the recent history of Georgian civil-military relations is motivated by the nearly total destruction of the Georgian armed forces after Tbilisi's defeat in the war with Abkhazia in September, 1993. As a result, post-1993 remilitarization presents a rare opportunity to trace the establishment of a network of security organizations from the earliest phase

until the regime brought extra-legal paramilitary groups under control in 1995 and 1996. If this chapter focused on a country whose armed forces already were consolidated, it would not be possible to determine if foreign policy consequences followed from the establishment and not just the maintenance of a network of security organizations designed to mitigate regime vulnerability to a coup.

In addition, Georgia's political, non-military institutions were so weak in the mid-1990s that national politics approximated a state of nature. Certainly it is true that Georgian civilization is ancient and that recent developments did not take place on a blank institutional slate. Lordkipanidze, for example, traces the beginning of Georgian civilization to the third century BC (Gachechiladze, 1995 p. 18; Suny, 1994) and Georgia's indigenous, linguistic tradition has been so stable that "almost everything written some 1500 years ago is easily understandable, even to children of 14 or 15..." (Gachechiladze, 1995 p. 17). Without ignoring the influence of Georgia's political, cultural, and linguistic heritage on contemporary affairs, it is important to note that in the years following the Tbilisi war of December, 1991 and January, 1992, Georgia found itself at the earliest stage of state building. Tbilisi was characterized by chaos, if not anarchy, as nightly shooting matches disrupted urban life. There was little electricity even during the winter and "hospitals, schools and public transport worked only intermittently" (Aves, 1996a p. 50). Georgia had no currency and little ability to collect taxes or enforce laws. In March, 1993, forces under Tbilisi Police Chief Davit Zeikidze invaded and occupied parliament and in the first half of 1994 ten senior officials in the Ministries of Defense, Internal Affairs, and State Security were assassinated (Aves, 1996a p. 11; Fuller, 1994a p. 25; Radio

Free Europe Daily Report 76, April 21, 1994). Aves refers to this period as "the catastrophic breakdown of law and order" (1996a p. 1).

By focusing on a case of very early state building and militarization, it may be possible to determine if patterns of international conflict might become locked-in by the imperatives of civil-military relations. When fragile institutions cause leaders to be extremely vulnerable to the possibility of a coup, the strategies they follow to reduce their vulnerability to their own forces might initiate path-dependent international disputes that endure even after the risk of a coup diminishes. Examination of the Georgian case provides an opportunity to probe for this possibility.

Civil-military relations in Georgia, 1992-1996

In March, 1992, the Military Council, the junta that orchestrated the January, 1992 coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia, asked the Georgian parliament to invite Eduard Shevardnadze back to Georgia to chair the Council. Shevardnadze had led Georgia as First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party from 1972 until 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev appointed him Soviet Foreign Minister. But in the seven years between his appointment as Foreign Minister and his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze rarely participated in the republic's politics.

After the January, 1992 coup in Tbilisi "It rapidly became evident...that the Military Council enjoyed at best dubious legitimacy..." (Fuller, 1993d p. 22). The Council flirted briefly with the idea of restoring the Georgian monarchy but soon discovered that the heir to the throne, a member of the Bagrationi family that ruled Georgia from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries, was a taxi driver in Spain who was uninterested in becoming King.

Subsequently, Council leaders Tengiz K'it'ovani and Jaba Ioseliani invited Shevardnadze back to Georgia to legitimate the new government and attract western attention and aid. They intended him to serve as a figurehead, however, not as the final arbiter of power.

K'it'ovani and Ioseliani both were warlords who ran private paramilitary forces that were the major forces behind the ouster of Georgia's first democratically elected president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Tengiz K'it'ovani was an artist with a criminal background who was an old school friend of Gamsakhurdia. He commanded the **National Guard** that was established by decree of the Supreme Council of Georgia on December 20, 1990 to fulfill both police and military functions. The Guard's mission was to defend the interests and territorial integrity of the homeland, preserve the life, dignity, rights and freedoms of Georgian citizens, protect industry, enforce states of emergency, and end violations of public disorder (Fuller, 1993a; Jones, 1996 p. 40). By the end of 1991 the Guard included 14,500 to 16,500 troops, thus exceeding its planned size of 12,000. However, the Guard's formal structure was practically meaningless as it consisted of a poorly organized conglomerate of separate units (Darchiashvili and Aladashvili, 1996). Many of the Guard's senior officers were friends of Gamsakhurdia or retired Soviet army officers (Darchiashvili, 1997 pp. 5-6).

Ioseliani commanded the **Mkhedrioni**, a confederation of mafia members, criminals, and "'street boys' from town's districts and villages" (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 1; Darchiashvili, 1995b). It was established in the fall of 1988 as an illegal paramilitary outfit and consisted of between 2,000 and 5,000 members at the time of the coup (Jones, 1996; Darchiashvili, 1995b). Having

served time in prison for bank robbery during the Cold War, Ioseliani was a well-known criminal (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 1).

K'it'ovani and Ioseliani led the January, 1992 ouster of Gamsakhurdia, whose dictatorial and paranoid tendencies alienated Georgians as well as Russian troops based in Georgia (Jones, 1996 pp. 38-9). A prominent dissident during the Soviet period, Gamsakhurdia emerged as a human rights advocate and subsequent spokesman of the nationalist movement under Perestroika. Elected President of Georgia in May, 1991 with 87 percent of the vote, he came to power on "a wave of militant nationalism, which included a drive for ethnic homogenization, Georgian cultural hegemony, the removal of Soviet occupation troops, and the revival of Christian Orthodoxy" (Jones, 1996; 1990; 1994). However, Gamsakhurdia soon alienated opposition as well as members of the armed forces by refusing compromise, using hostile rhetoric and name-calling to demonize political opponents, curtailing of enemies' civil rights, and taking advantage of his official position to accumulate personal wealth (Ekedahl and Goodman, 1997 p. 262; Jones, 1996 pp. 38-9; Aves, 1996b p. 13). In addition to alienating domestic constituents, Gamsakhurdia incurred Moscow's wrath by supporting Chechen separatist demands, replacing the KGB with a Georgian National Security Department, confiscating and nationalizing MVD property, declaring Soviet troops in Georgia as an occupying force and calling for their immediate withdrawal, demanding the transfer of Soviet troops to Georgian command, and refusing to criticize frequent attacks on Soviet military institutions in Georgia (Jones, 1996).

As wave after wave of strikes, boycotts, physical threats, occupations and protests drove the temperature of Georgian politics to the boiling point,

Gamsakhurdia clamped down on potential rivals in the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni. In February, 1991 he disbanded the Mkhedrioni with help of Soviet troops and imprisoned Jaba Ioseliani without trial (Jones, 1993b). In September he attempted to balance the National Guard with a rival power structure by upgrading the Defense Department to ministry status (Jones, 1996 p. 41). Simultaneously he ordered the Ministry of Internal Affairs to incorporate the National Guard into its organizational structure and he created a National Security Council to bypass paramilitary leaders in the decision making process (Jones, 1996 p. 41; Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 6) .

When Gamsakhurdia tried to disarm the Guard, K'it'ovani and 13,000-15,000 followers retreated to their barracks on the outskirts of Tbilisi, leaving behind only 1,500 troops who remained loyal to Gamsakhurdia (Fuller, 1993a p. 81). With the help of Russian soldiers, Georgian intelligentsia, smaller paramilitary groups, and Ioseliani (released recently from prison), K'it'ovani overthrew Gamsakhurdia on January 6, 1992 after a bloody, two-week battle in the center of Tbilisi (Jones, 1996 pp. 39-40). Gamsakhurdia then fled to western Georgia after a brief stay in Chechnya (Ekedahl and Goodman, 1997 p. 263).

From January until March of 1992, K'it'ovani and Ioseliani controlled the government of Georgia through the Military Council, that promised to resign after restoring democracy and domestic order (Jones, 1996). In order to patch up relations with the Russian Army, whose regional command structure was known as the Transcaucasian Military Command, the Military Council appointed General Levan Sharashenidze, a professional former Soviet soldier, as acting Georgian Defense Minister Sharashenidze promised to protect Russian servicemen and to prohibit use of the term "occupation

forces" to describe Russian troops in Georgia (Jones, 1996 p. 42). K'it'ovani and Ioseliani asked Parliament to invite Shevardnadze back to Tbilisi in March, 1992 and he "returned to a country divided into fiefdoms presided over by warlords and their private armies...Mafia gangs and paramilitary thugs roamed the streets and terrorized towns and villages; corruption and violence were rife" (Ekedahl and Goodman, 1997 p. 263). Shevardnadze replaced the Military Council with a State Council that included representatives of 44 political parties as well as ethnic minorities. He established a four-man Presidium consisting of himself as Chairman, K'it'ovani as First Vice Premier for Defense, Ioseliani as Vice Chairman and Tengiz Sigua as Prime Minster and he gave each member the right to veto Presidium decisions.

In March, 1992 the Council ordered the Ministry of Defense to create a National Army of not less than 10,000 soldiers (Fuller, 1993a p. 81) and three weeks later it ordered the Ministry to recruit 20,000 troops to staff the Army, Navy, Air Force, Border Guard, and Air Defense Forces. The Council approved a budget of 6 billion rubles and declared that armaments would include equipment appropriated from Russian bases as well light arms and fighter aircraft produced in Georgia. Finally, the Council set the length of military service at eighteen months (Fuller, 1993a p. 81). The Army's first motorized rifle brigade was formed on April 1 with a brigade commander and only seven officers, most having graduated from Soviet military academies. The first conscripts arrived in May and June and by August the brigade included about 700 soldiers and officers as well as 36 tanks received from Russian forces over the summer. As of June, 1992, only 2,000 troops had been drafted into the Army and the first brigade described above was the only fully-

staffed unit within the entire Ministry of Defense (Fuller, 1993a p. 81; Darchiashvili and Aladashvili, 1997).

K'it'ovani replaced Levan Sharashenidze as Defense Minister in May, 1992. With the Army and the National Guard under his control, K'it'ovani became the most powerful figure in Georgia. When Shevardnadze sent him to Abkhazia during the summer to locate officials who had been kidnapped by Gamsakhurdia's followers, K'it'ovani disobeyed orders and without authorization marched his troops into the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi when the Abkhazian parliament declared the region's independence (Fuller, 1993a). After a series of violent skirmishes that included the torching of the Abkhazian parliament, Shevardnadze, Russian President Yeltsin, Abkhazian leader Ardzinba and other parties to the violence agreed to a cease-fire in Moscow on September 3. K'it'ovani, however, sabotaged the cease-fire because he "refused to condone any degree of autonomy for Abkhazia and, accordingly, refused to comply with the agreement to with-draw Georgian troops" (Fuller, 1993b p. 30). Fighting between Georgian and Abkhazian forces took place over the next twelve months.

In late 1992 Shevardnadze made the first of a series of moves intended to dislodge K'it'ovani from power. He replaced the State Council with a new National Security and Defense Council that eliminated much of the paramilitary leaders' power (Jones, 1996 p. 43). The stated purpose of the NSDC was to prevent crime and establish order in the armed forces but "its main function was supposed to be the maintenance of a shaky balance between the military and civil authorities, and in particular the restriction of unchecked actions of the Minister of Defense Kit'ovani" (Georgian Chronicle, April, 1993 p. 1; December, 1992 p. 2). Shevardnadze also created independent

committees and departments to monitor the armed forces and provide alternative channels of expertise and information about the military. (Jones, 1996 p. 43). In December, Shevardnadze criticized K'it'ovani openly for the first time after K'it'ovani's unauthorized meeting with Russian Defense Minister Grachev (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1992 p. 3).

K'it'ovani's political clout was undermined by Shevardnadze's efforts to bypass him, by the military's poor performance in the war with Abkhazia, by his rivalry with Ioseliani, and by rumors of the military's and National Guard's involvement in the black market (Jones, 1996 p. 44). Despite these considerations, however, K'it'ovani's command of the National Guard and Defense Ministry made it difficult for Shevardnadze to engineer his removal. K'it'ovani openly criticized Shevardnadze, confiscated Russian arms, and entered into unauthorized negotiations with the commander of ex-President Gamsakhurdia's forces, Loti Kobalia. The pretense of these negotiations was national reconciliation and the creation of a joint military effort against Abkhazian separatist forces. But it is likely that K'it'ovani's true aim was to conspire with Gamsakhurdia's followers to stage an anti-Shevardnadze coup. K'it'ovani maintained independent contacts with the Russian KGB, thus providing "additional grounds to suspicions that certain forces in Russia were involved in anti-Shevardnadze conspiracy" (Georgian Chronicle, April, 1993 p. 2). During an April 26 press conference, K'it'ovani referred to Shevardnadze as an old communist and in response to parliamentary calls for his resignation, K'it'ovani responded that only the Army and the people could dismiss the Minister of Defense (Georgian Chronicle, April, 1993 p. 2)!

As of April, 1993 the "NSDC was no longer effective in dealing with [K'it'ovani]" and Shevardnadze disbanded it in May (Georgian Chronicle,

April, 1993 p. 2). He then dismissed K'it'ovani as Defense Minister and replaced him with 27 year-old Giorgi Qarqarashvili, a former captain in the Soviet Army. Although Qarqarashvili was K'it'ovani's ally, his age and poor military record in Abkhazia made him easier for Shevardnadze to manage (Jones, 1996 p. 44). Three weeks after appointing Qarqarashvili, Shevardnadze issued a personal decree ordering the restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and the abolishment of the National Guard as a separate unit. The Ministry was reshuffled and K'it'ovani's appointees were removed. "[T]he absorption of the National Guard into the army, his uninspiring role in the war against Abxazia, and his low popularity ratings, removed [K'it'ovani] as a serious military threat to Shevardnadze despite continuing rumors of his plans to launch a coup" (Jones, 1996 p. 44; Georgian Chronicle, May, 1993).

One footnote to K'it'ovani's demise is that despite several Presidential decrees ordering the disbanding of the National Guard, its status remained unclear for at least eighteen months. One Georgian scholar suggests that between late 1992 and 1994, whether the Guard was part of the tiny regular Army or not depended on the particular Minister of Defense (Interview, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, July, 1997). Qarqarashvili, for example, made a sincere attempt to merge the Army and National Guard. The only troops in the regular Army who were not part of the National Guard included about 40 soldiers in the city of Batumi as well as members of a few other units such as the one-one brigade, the first brigade of the first corps.

With K'it'ovani removed from office, Ioseliani became the most important pillar of regime support as well as the most dangerous threat to Shevardnadze's authority. On the one hand, the Mkhedrioni paramilitary

force that he commanded was vital to Georgia's survival. Its official mission was to coordinate civil defense and natural disaster relief but the Mkhedrioni was essential to the Georgian war efforts against Abkhaz separatist forces as well as armed followers of ex-president Gamsakhurdia in west Georgia (Jones, 1996; Georgian Chronicle, September, 1993 pp. 7-9). The Mkhedrioni probably included over 2,000 members in mid-1993 and it was the most powerful and best disciplined of Georgia's armed organizations at the time (Jones, 1996; Georgian Chronicle, May, 1993 p. 2).

On the other hand, Ioseliani's unrivaled military power allowed him to disobey Shevardnadze's orders. Jones notes that the Mkhedrioni attacked a Russian military base in Kutaisi in May and that Ioseliani deployed armed pickets outside parliament and threatened to withdraw from west Georgia "to force Mxedrioni's formal recognition within the Defence structure" (1996 p. 45). Shevardnadze appeased Ioseliani by renaming the Mkhedrioni the Georgian Rescuers Corps and giving it official status within the cabinet in September, 1993 (Jones, 1996 p, 45). At the same time, however, Shevardnadze sacked the Minister of Internal Affairs, a Rescue Corps member and an ally of Ioseliani. When he dissolved parliament in September during a crisis in Abkhazia, Ioseliani criticized him publicly for the first time and referred to the emergency measures as a "return to communist methods" that the Rescue Corps would not tolerate (Georgian Chronicle, September, 1993 p. 6).

The Georgian Army and National Guard were nearly completely destroyed in Abkhazia in September, 1993. Despite a cease-fire agreement signed July 27, Abkhaz forces surprised Georgian troops guarding the city of Sukhumi early on the morning of September 16. Subsequent fighting

involved all available troops in the Georgian military and continued for twelve days until Sukhumi fell on September 27. Although some Georgian soldiers survived the battle, the fighting destroyed the organizational structure of the Army and National Guard (Fuller, 1993b p. 30; Fairbanks, 1995; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1993). Officers I interviewed who fought in Sukhumi were unable to estimate the number of Georgian soldiers who survived the fighting although they guessed that the total was quite low.

After the Army and National Guard were destroyed in Sukhumi, Gamsakhurdia's forces in western Georgia seized the city of Poti and the entire region of Megrelia without encountering any serious resistance. Shevardnadze was left without viable military forces to resist the uprising and "it seemed that Georgia might cease to exist as a state..." (Aves, 1993b p. 15; Henze, 1995). Aves says that "At the end of 1993 it was reasonable to fear that Georgia might disintegrate into a collection of ethnic enclaves and warlord fiefdoms" (1993a p. 3). When Gamsakhurdia's forces threatened to march from western Georgia toward Tbilisi, Shevardnadze decided that only Russia could save the country from collapse. The day after the fall of Sukhumi, September 28, Shevardnadze consented to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, reversing his previous efforts to pull Georgia away from Moscow's orbit. On March 1, 1994 the Georgian Parliament ratified membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States by a vote of 121 to 47 with 4 abstentions.

In exchange for its protection, Moscow forced Shevardnadze to permit Russian troops to remain on Georgian soil. At the time there were 20,000-25,000 Russian troops already deployed in Georgia but according to the terms

of a treaty signed in May, 1993, these forces were scheduled to leave by the end of 1995 (Fuller, 1993a p. 82). After joining the CIS, however, Georgia was forced to permit Russian forces to remain. These included 8,000-15,000 regular army troops as well as airborne regiments, peacekeepers, and 10,000 Russian Frontier Guards (Interview, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, July, 1997). Russian troops were deployed on four military bases including (1) the airfield at Bombora point near the town of Gudauta in Abkhazia. This base, built in the late 1930s, deployed Russian SU-27 and SU-25 fighter planes; (2) Batumi Russian Military Base 12 (formerly Motor-Rifle Division 145), which was "dispersed throughout whole Ajara Autonomous Republic" on 19 different sites (Darchiashvili, 1996a p. 14; 1996b; 1996c); (3) Akhalkalaki Military Base 137 (formerly Motor Rifle Division 147); and (4) Vaziani military airfield near Tbilisi (formerly Motor Rifle division 405). Twelve MI-24 and MI-8 helicopters and a motor rifle regiment were deployed at the Vaziani airfield, which was used to ferry supplies to Russian army deployed in the region (Georgian Military Chronicle, April, 1995 p. 1; October, 1995 p. 2). In 1995, Russian troops in Georgia deployed up to 230 T-72 tanks, 365 armored vehicles and 221 artillery systems (Darchiashvili, 1996a p. 14). However, spare parts and batteries were in short supply, many of the weapons were old, and morale and combat readiness were low (Army and Society in Georgia, March-April, 1997 p. 12). As a result, representatives of The Group of Russian Troops in Caucasia estimated that in a military conflict with Turkey, Russian forces would be overrun in several hours (Darchiashvili, 1996a p. 15).

Having lost the war with Abkhazia and then triumphed against the Zviadists, Georgia stabilized in December, 1993 for the first time in

Shevardnadze's rule. Immediately he began the process of rebuilding the shattered Georgian Army. On February 11, 1994 Shevardnadze accepted the resignation of Defense Minister Qarqarashvili and temporarily assumed the functions of Defense Minister himself (Radio Free Europe Daily Report 30, February 14, 1994). Two months later, on April 26, he appointed Lieutenant General Vardiko Nadibaidze as Defense Minister. Nadibaidze served for 35 years in the Soviet Army and he was a professional military officer capable of instilling a sense of discipline and morale. His first order of business was to establish the Unified Armed Forces of Georgia to include the Army, Border Guard, and Interior Troops (Georgian Military Chronicle, November, 1995 p. 1). In June, 1994, Shevardnadze signed decrees introducing a common uniform and insignia in the army and he formalized his right to appoint the Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Guard and Frontier Department, Commanders of brigades, military judges and the Military Procurator and his deputy. "Military formations not subordinated to the Ministry of Defense were abolished once more" (Georgian Chronicle, June, 1994 p. 3). In August, 1994 Nadibaidze announced his intention to restructure the army as a battalion system of 10,000 troops distributed over seven motorized infantry battalions, tank companies and auxiliary detachments. He planned to deploy an additional 5,000 men in the Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense Force.

As of December, 1994, the Georgian press began to report improvements in the Army's morale and fighting capacity that resulted from Minister Nadibaidze's organizational and personnel changes. He clarified the army's structure, purged some non-professionals, restored the official funding mechanism of the budget despite ongoing corruption, enforced the

draft more strictly and reduced the desertion rate to 10 -20% of the total pool of recruits. Consequently, discipline improved and the Army began to appear stronger than Ioseliani's Rescue Corps (formerly known as the Mkhedrioni). (Jones, 1996, p. 45; Georgian Military Chronicle, December, 1994 p. 3). By late 1994, it is likely that the Army consisted of about 15,000 troops (Georgian Chronicle, March, 1995 p. 3).

Although Ioseliani's Rescue Corps remained powerful, consisting of 2,000- 3,000 members, the strengthening of the Army and security agencies in 1994 and 1995 allowed Shevardnadze to disband the Corps and maneuver Ioseliani out of the government. Ioseliani's only remaining official title was head of the ad hoc Committee of the State of Emergency and in July 1994 Shevardnadze replaced this committee with the Emergency Coordinating Commission of the Head of State. He named Ioseliani a deputy of the new Commission but diluted its influence by assigning it with an unrealistically broad mandate covering political, economic, law-enforcement and defense issues. This organizational restructuring marked the beginning of the end for Ioseliani. (Georgian Chronicle, July, 1994 p. 2). When Shevardnadze ordered the new Minister of Internal Affairs Givi K'viraia to launch a campaign against organized crime, at first he directed K'viraia to avoid Ioseliani's criminal allies. Hence, the Ministry's first targets such the Tatishvili brotherhood of the Mtskheta region and the Sviri brotherhood in Zestaponi of west Georgia were not members of the Rescue Corps (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1993 p. 6). As the campaign against organized crime progressed, however, the Ministry began to arrest members of the Rescue Corps. In retaliation, about 200 armed Rescue Corps members assaulted

Shevardnadze's regional representative, Levan Mamaladze, in Rustavi on March 3, 1995 (Georgian Chronicle, March, 1995 p. 1).

In August, 1995 Shevardnadze narrowly escaped an attempted assassination and in September he took advantage of the attempt on his life to disband the Rescue Corps (Georgian Chronicle, September, 1995 p. 1). Jaba Ioseliani was accused of playing a role in the bombing and he was arrested on November 15. Minister of State Security Igor Giorgadze also was accused in the attempt and escaped to Moscow on a Russian transport plane. In the course of the investigation of the bombing, twenty officers of the Ministry of State Security as well as the commander of the "alpha" group, Gela Papuashviuli, were arrested and charged with planning the coup (Georgian Chronicle, September, 1995 p. 1; Georgian Chronicle, October, 1995 p. 12). In August, 1996 Aleksandre Bochorishvili, formerly a senior member of the Rescue Corps, was sentenced to 12 years in prison for possession and storage of weapons and drugs (Gomez, 1996). In October, former Defense Minister and Commander of the National Guard Tengiz K'it'ovani was sentenced to 8 years in prison for attempting to organize a military raid on Abkhazia in early 1995 (Fuller, 1997 p. 82). And in November, Loti Kobalia, former commander of the followers of ex-president Gamsakhurdia, was sentenced to death in Tbilisi for treason along with three of his subordinates (Fuller, 1997 p. 82; Radio Free Europe Daily Report 129 July 11, 1994). With former military opponents behind bars, Darchiashvili reports that by the end of 1995, "the government finished the process of disbanding the semi-official armed groups and creating a single command system officially subordinated to the supreme political power" (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 13).

Dependent variable: international conflict

In chapter five I specified international conflict in terms of three related phenomena: preparation for hostility such as internal balancing and the formulation of external military missions; non-violent aspects of conflict such as the invention of enemies and use of hostile rhetoric and threats; and limited uses of force such as military strikes, sabotage, troop mobilizations and blockades. In the Georgian case, my focus is the conflictual element of Georgian-Russian relations after 1993.

The conflictual aspect of Georgian-Russian relations has included hostile rhetoric, accusations and border incidents. For example, Shevardnadze has used acrimonious language to portray the Russian threat on many occasions. On October 27, 1997 he accused Russia of joining "the few countries that shelter terrorists, assiduously hiding the group that committed terrorist acts in Georgia" and "Cheat[ing] us with regard to Abkhazia" (Monitor, 30 October 1997). On December 1, 1997, representatives of the Foreign Ministry referred to two recent border incidents as "deliberate provocations" after Russian troops fired in the direction of Georgian territory from the Upper Lari border post (Monitor, 5 December 1997). In one incident, a Russian artillery shell reportedly killed three civilians. In late 1993 Shevardnadze described the Russian danger as "the imperial thinking of certain circles in the military-political establishment of Russia, especially among the opposition, who do not hide their desire of dividing Georgia or recreating the Soviet Union" (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 2). Recently, Georgian officials criticized the establishment of a Russian check-point on the Chechen border and argued that the presence of Russian border guards in Georgia is illegal (Darchiashvili, 1996b p. 3).

Georgian-Russian relations under Shevardnadze have included a violent aspect as well. In 1992, for example, there were 268 Georgian assaults on Russian installations in Georgia and during these attacks, twenty nine Russian troops died (Darchiashvili, 1996b p. 12). Between 1994 and 1997 the White Legion, a Georgian paramilitary force that probably has been trained, equipped and supported by the Shevardnadze government in Tbilisi, carried out a systematic campaign of attacks on Russian peacekeeping forces in the Gali region of Abkhazia that led to the deaths of over forty Russian troops (Walker, 1997 p. 11).

There is no doubt that the relationship between Georgia and Russia can be characterized in terms of broad trends that are punctuated by easily-identifiable junctures. David Darchiashvili, one of the most astute observers of the relationship, specifies four distinct periods of Georgian-Russian relations: (1) During the initial period under Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 1991, Gamsakhurdia poisoned relations by supporting Chechen separatist demands, using blatantly anti-Soviet rhetoric, declaring Soviet troops in Georgia as an occupying force, and refusing to criticize frequent attacks on Soviet bases; (2) Shevardnadze improved relations in 1992 and 1993 although the Georgian public resented Russian military support for Abkhazian separatists and Tbilisi attempted gently to break free of Moscow's orbit; (3) Relations warmed considerably after the Georgian surrender in Sukhumi forced Shevardnadze join the Commonwealth of Independent States in early 1994; (4) Open friction became apparent in early 1996 as Georgians tired of waiting for long-promised Russian assistance to restore territorial integrity and settle the Abkhazian conflict. However, my point is neither to periodize Georgian-Russian interactions nor to explain specific events or broad trends. Rather, I seek to

account partially for the persistence of conflict since 1993, even during the warmest periods in the relationship.

Regime vulnerability to a coup

Between 1992 and 1995 (and indeed up until the present time), the Shevardnadze regime was vulnerable to the possibility of a coup d'état. My claim is not that military conspiracy was immanent at all times. Rather, I argue that the Shevardnadze regime was structurally vulnerable. In other words, the military refrained from threatening the regime not because of the underlying, structural stability of the political system itself, but rather because Shevardnadze implemented survival strategies successfully. Consider six structural attributes of the Georgian political system, all identified by the literature on civil-military relations as important causes of coups. Each factor gestures at the vulnerability of the regime. The list includes: (1) personalistic rule; (2) low systemic legitimacy; (3) recent coups; (4) weak civil society; (5) national poverty; and (6) foreign troop presence.

First, despite sincere and ongoing efforts to institutionalize Georgian politics and the rule of law, the system has been based on one-man rule. Aves refers to "the almost total domination of the main political institutions by President Shevardnadze and his supporters...[P]olitical rule still depends to a worrying extent on the survival of Shevardnadze himself" (1996a pp. 58-59). After his election as head of the Georgian Parliament on October 11, 1992, observers witnessed "the launching by former senior communist party functionaries of a new cult of personality centered on Shevardnadze that would have been grotesque were it not so chillingly reminiscent of the veneration of his most notorious fellow countryman [Stalin]" (Fuller, 1993d

p. 23). Georgian politics were more institutionalized than highly personalistic regimes of Haiti under Duvalier, Iran under the Shah, Zaire under Mobutu, and the Philippines under Marcos (Snyder, 1992). At the same time, however, Shevardnadze retained vast powers as Parliamentary Chairman, Head of State, and then President (for a list of these powers, see Jones, 1993a p. 7; Aves, 1996a pp. 8-9). And in addition to his formal powers, structural problems in the Parliament complicated legislative opposition's ability to check the executive branch (Jones, 1993a p. 7; Aves, 1996a p. 24; Tarkhnishvili, 1996; Darchiashvili, 1995a).

Second, the legitimacy of the political system has been questionable. Although Georgian elections in 1992 and 1995 may have been freer than other elections held in the former Soviet republics (Caucasian Institute of Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996), international observers reported instances of electoral malpractice including unfair voting rules and the use of humanitarian aid to bribe voters (Aves, 1996a p. 17). In June, 1994, the Georgian newspaper Sakartvelos Respublik'a noted that out of 301 young men ordered to report to a recruiting station, only 15 people reported for duty (Georgian Chronicle, June, 1994 p. 6). Tax evasion and noncompliance with the law have been common problems (Karatnycky et. al, 1997 p. 174). Finally, Georgian courts have been only minimally capable of administering justice. According to one account, "[T]here are reports of widespread judicial incompetence and of members of the judiciary engaging in various corrupt practices, including accepting bribes, being influenced by political leaders and gangsters, excluding defendants and their lawyers simultaneously from court trials, and denying defendants and lawyers access to material connected with their cases" (Aves, 1996a; Karatnycky et. al, 1997).

Third, the government experienced several recent coup attempts. On the evening of August 29, 1995 a bomb was detonated by remote control in the courtyard of the Parliament building as Shevardnadze entered his car. Bodyguards helped Shevardnadze out of the burning car and he suffered only minor wounds (Georgian Chronicle, October, 1995 p. 1). Although he accused the Minister of State Security Igor Giorgadze of planning the attack, Giorgadze was never brought to trial as he escaped to Moscow with the help of Tbilisi-based Russian troops. Almost a year before the bombing, on November 13, 1994, armed groups and armored equipment under the command of former Minister of Defense Tengiz K'it'ovani gathered in a Tbilisi suburb and threatened to take over the government before their efforts were thwarted by loyal troops of the Ministries of State Security, Defense and Internal Affairs (Georgian Chronicle, November, 1994 pp. 1 -2). And on June 23, 1992 supporters of ex-President Gamsakhurdia attempted to unseat the new Shevardnadze regime (MacFarlane et. al., 1996 p. 5). While Gamsakhurdia's supporters were disarmed in 1993 and 1994, "there remains a small section of the Georgian population which clings to Gamsakhurdia as a symbol of Georgian independence...In a crisis...it is not the number of Zviadists that will count but the intensity of their commitment" (Aves, 1996a p. 8; Dale, 1997 p. 16).

Fourth, civil society remains weak. Jones notes that "The Soviet past has left Georgians without constituencies, institutions and practices conducive to a pluralistic power structure" (1993b p. 298). By late 1996 there were only 200 non-governmental organizations in Georgia (Nodia, 1996b) and it is likely that many of these were inactive. Even today, most Georgian NGOs are "dependent on grants from the international community or

financial support from the state" rather than financial or other contributions from their own members (Karatnycky et. al., 1997 p. 165). They tend to be based in Tbilisi and to cater to the elite and intellectuals (Nodia, 1996b). Most trade unions are "remnants of the Soviet period when unions were administrative bodies concerned with property and finance, but not workers' rights" (Karatnycky et. al., 1997 p. 166; Nodia, 1996b). Nodia says that "Community-based organizations are also a rarity" (1996b p. 11). Freedom of the press exists but it is precarious as the government continues to control the distribution of newspapers. A few months after Gamsakhurdia's 1992 ouster, supporters of the ex-President documented systematic governmental harassment of the independent media (Fuller, 1992a p. 76). While "most newspapers may print what they like, there is widespread self-censorship among journalists when expressing open opposition to the government..." (Karatnycky et. al., 1997 p. 167). In mid-1996, the government shut down Rustavi-2, considered to have been the most professional and independent television station in Georgia (Karatnycky et. al., 1997 p. 167).

Fifth, Georgia remains a poor country as gross domestic product per capita hovered around $2,000 dollars (U.S.) for the past several years. As Londregan and Poole have shown, national poverty is correlated strongly with regime vulnerability to the armed forces (1990). Huntington advances the strong claim that "countries with per-capita GNPs of $3,000 or more do not have coup attempts. The area between $1,000 and $3,000 per-capita GNP is where unsuccessful coups occur" (1995 p. 15).

Sixth, the presence of Russian troops in Georgia is a potentially destabilizing factor because the Shevardnadze regime has little if any control over them. It is true that Russian troops protected Shevardnadze on various

occasions such as late 1993 when they helped Georgian forces defeat the followers of ex-President Gamsakhurdia in western Georgia (Darchiashvili, 1996b p. 17). On the other hand, as David Sikharulidze of the Parliamentary Commission on Defence and Security notes, "the Vaziani base provides Russia with a good chance to stir up trouble in Tbilisi" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 56). In 1992 then-Soviet forces helped Ioseliani and K'it'ovani remove Gamsakhurdia from power. More recently, Russian troops were accused of helping the Ministry of State Security plant the bomb that almost killed Shevardnadze in August, 1995. Whether or not the aggregate effect of Russian troops in Georgia has been stabilizing, there is little doubt that they have had the capacity to cause a coup.

Many observers of Georgian politics would object to the notion that the Shevardnadze regime remains vulnerable to a coup (Interviews, Tbilisi, July, 1997). Indeed, the regime has disarmed paramilitary opposition and since 1995 the armed forces have appeared more loyal than at any time since Georgia declared independence. Two points should be emphasized, however. First, my intent is to show that the Shevardnadze regime was vulnerable during the period under consideration (1992-1996) rather than during the present time. Second, despite this point, I contend that the regime remains vulnerable as a result of the six factors mentioned above. Even if the military is loyal currently, all six risk factors make coups possible. The military did not issue overt threats against the regime during the past two years because Shevardnadze implemented survival strategies successfully, not because of the underlying, structural stability of the political system. As one military official told me in the summer of 1997, "after the Tbilisi war [of 1991-1992], we

don't want to kill each other. But money makes anything possible" (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997).

Counterbalancing

Shevardnadze sought to reduce the risk of a coup by establishing a network of military organizations that checked and balanced each other. He developed five ground forces and embedded them in a network of security organizations between 1992 and 1996. When he came to power in March, 1992, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni were the only major forces in Georgia. Over the next several years, Shevardnadze destroyed these two organizations as described above and built up the following ground forces: the Army, Border Guard, Government Guard, Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Special Units of the Ministry of State Security. (He developed three additional military organizations -- Air Defense Forces, Air Force, and Navy -- but these tiny forces were not cultivated to protect the regime from coups).[1]

By the end of 1995 the **Army** probably consisted of about 12,500 -14,500 troops divided into seven brigades including five mechanized infantry brigades and one ground mechanized brigade (Army and Society in Georgia, October, 1996 p. 9). Precise estimates of the Georgian Army's strength are

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[1]As of 1997 the Navy includes about 2,000 people, mostly deployed in the far west of Georgia. Ten vessels acquired from Russia are "unmanned coffins" though a few modern ships were donated by Ukraine and the U.S. Coast Guard. The Air Force and Air Defense Forces probably include 1,000 troops, but Georgia has very few trained pilots and only a handful of working SU-25 aircraft and a MI-24 and MI-8Mg helicopters. As of November, 1995, there was only a single air defense squadron (Jones, 1996 p. 37; Allison, 1993 p. 69; Interviews, Tbilisi, July, 1997; Georgian Chronicle, November, 1995 p. 4; "On the Joining of the Air Forces into the Military Air Forces of the Ministry of Defense", Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers #545, July 7, 1993).

difficult to obtain because official statistics may overstate manpower by as much as a factor of two (Georgian Military Chronicle, January-February, 1996 p. 4; Strategic Affairs Group, 1996). For example, official statistics indicate that the army's 11th brigade should include 2,000 soldiers but on a recent visit to the brigade's headquarters a researcher found only 1,200 troops on hand (Darchiashvili and Aladashvili, p. 13). Despite imprecision of government data, most Georgian scholars and experts I interviewed agreed that the actual number of troops in the Georgian Army probably grew from almost nothing after the Sukhumi collapse in 1993 to 12,500 to 14,500 in 1995 and stabilized at that level for the past two years. Almost all Army soldiers are conscripts recruited through the national draft.

The Army's equipment includes 40 Russian T-55 tanks and 30 Russian T-72 tanks as well as 80 to 100 towed artillery guns. The official 1996 budget of the Ministry of Defense was 53,693,100 lari (about $41.9 million U.S.) although a small portion of these funds were devoted to the Air Force, Air Defense Forces, and Navy, all of which are the Ministry's responsibility. Corruption is reported to be widespread as individual military commanders supplement income by using troops under their command to run tax-exempt enterprises and small-scale businesses. However it is impossible to determine the extent of these activities or the proportion of unofficial revenues controlled by the Ministry's central administrative staff as opposed to local field commanders. The Ministry also receives some NATO assistance including training, medicine, food, clothes, and heaters, as well as training and weapons from Russia ("Program of Individual Partnership Between Republic of Georgia and NATO", no date; Georgian Military Chronicle, January-February, 1996 p. 3; Mihalka, 1994).

The **Border Guard** probably consisted of about 3,000 troops by the end of 1995 and its 1996 budget was 11,339,100 lari (about $8.9 million U.S.) (Interview, Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, July, 1997). After a working group for border problems was founded in April, 1990, the State Border Defence Administration was established on October 15, 1991. The Administration was reorganized on April 1, 1992 and on April 4, 1994 Shevardnadze upgraded it to Department status ("Border Troops of Georgia Today and Tomorrow", 1994). As of 1994, the Border Guard only had 800 soldiers but 2,000 more joined the organization in 1995 (Georgian Military Chronicle, November, 1995 p. 2). Unlike the Army, the Border Guard receives all its funding from the state and has not engaged in corrupt financial practices. According to one civilian official, the Border Guard is the jewel of Georgian civil-military relations (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997). The organization's mission is to defend the Georgian border from foreign military threats as well as illegal refugees, drug trafficking, and arms smugglers. The Border Guard is equipped primarily with light weapons but on a tour of a Border Guard installation outside Tbilisi I was shown anti-tank rockets, armored personnel carriers, towed artillery pieces, and three tanks.

Shevardnadze created the **Government Guard** in 1994, probably to balance the threat posed by the Ministry of State Security, the successor of the KGB. (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997). The Government Guard is responsible for protecting the President as well as commercial structures, buildings and less senior government officials. By the end of 1995 the Guard probably consisted of 1,000 - 2,000 individuals including professional volunteers as well as recruits. It is divided into two branches: unarmed guards and body guards outfitted with pistols. The Guard is not equipped with infantry or

artillery and according to one Georgian government official, it is the least corrupt Georgian military or police organization (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997).

The **Internal Troops** of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs were created on September 12, 1991 to prevent mass disorder inside of Georgia. Since mid-1996 they have been commanded by Colonel Georgi Shervashidze, their sixth commanding officer in six years (Aladashvili, 1996). By the end of 1995 they probably included about 5,000-7,000 troops, making them the third-largest armed force in Georgia after the Russian troops and the Army. The Internal Troops include a patrol brigade, a special brigade for guarding prisons, the 1st operational motor-rifle brigade in Tbilisi, the 2nd operational motor-rifle brigade in Kutaisi, the Batumi separate battalion, and a helicopter squadron with at least 2 MI-8 helicopters. They are equipped with at least ten heavy and light tanks as well as anti-tank weapons (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997). The official 1997 budget of the Internal Troops was 5,312,000 lari (about 4.2 million U.S. dollars). Official salaries, however, have been quite low and corruption is reported to be widespread. Despite their corrupt financial practices, however, the Internal Troops have been loyal to Shevardnadze.

The **Special Units** of the Ministry of State Security include three commando battalions (known as Alpha, Omega, and Delta) and an airborne brigade of about 1,000 troops deployed in Mukhrovani. Shevardnadze created the brigade on December 18, 1993, probably with the assistance of the Russian military. The Special Units, despite their small size, probably are the most disciplined and "the most powerful and efficient subunits" in Georgia (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1994 p. 3). Their mission is to combat international drug smuggling, terrorism, and organized crime and they

possess at least seven T-72 tanks as well as mobile anti-aircraft, armored vehicles, and artillery (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997; Georgian Military Chronicle, May-June, 1996 p. 2). The official 1997 budget for the entire Ministry of State Security was 15,040,300 lari (approx. $11.8 million U.S. dollars) but the government has not disclosed the percentage of the this budget that is earmarked for the Special Units. It is not known if the Units continue to engage in corrupt financial practices, however it is likely that until September, 1995 they reaped considerable profits from involvement in the black market. In September, 1995, the Minister of State Security as well as members of the Alpha unit were accused of conspiring to kill President Shevardnadze. The Alpha unit was purged and reorganized and the Minister, Igor Giorgadze, fled to Moscow (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1995 p. 4).

The possibility of a coup was the critical, driving force that caused Shevardnadze to establish multiple, armed organizations that checked and balanced each other. Indeed, counterbalancing has been a key to the regime's survival. How is it possible to evaluate this claim? I advance six supporting arguments: (1) Counterbalancing worked; (2) Georgian officials acknowledge that they balanced armed forces against one another and that balancing was an important regime priority; (3) Security organizations reported directly to the president and rarely coordinated; (4) Deployment patterns were consistent with the idea that regime vulnerability was a determinant of counterbalancing; (5) Most of the other strategies that Shevardnadze used to minimize the risk of a coup were not important or effective; (6) Other theoretical perspectives seem insufficient for explaining why Shevardnadze established multiple, armed organizations.

Between 1992 and 1995, counterbalancing was the most important and effective strategy that Shevardnadze used to subordinate the Georgian armed forces and to protect himself from a coup. As early as 1992, the Georgian Chronicle noted that "Shevardnadze tries to expand his influence gradually, through creating new power structures and promoting new political and military figures..." (December, 1992 p. 3). Counterbalancing allowed Shevardnadze to neutralize the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni, forces under Tengiz K'it'ovani and Jaba Ioseliani that were the only significant Georgian military organizations when Shevardnadze came to power in March, 1992. Consider, for example, K'it'ovani's attempted coup on November 13, 1994. When K'it'ovani gathered armed groups and armored equipment in a Tbilisi suburb and threatened to take over the government, his forces were disarmed quickly by loyal troops of the Ministries of State Security, Defense and Internal Affairs (Georgian Chronicle, November, 1994 pp. 1-2). Long before this desperate attempt Shevardnadze was able to engineer K'it'ovani's 1993 removal as Defense Minister and to start to subsume K'it'ovani's National Guard into the Army only because he was backed by the power of armed organizations that were loyal to the regime such as the Mkhedrioni and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Interview, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy, July, 1997). As described above, when Shevardnadze turned on Ioseliani in 1994 and 1995, he relied on the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security to disarm Ioseliani's private militia, the Mkhedrioni, (then known as the Rescue Corps).

Senior Georgian officials I interviewed in Tbilisi acknowledged candidly that the regime plays various armed forces off against one another.

One parliamentary official told me that "We are trying to balance MoD [Ministry of Defense] and Border Guards" (Interview, Tbilisi, July, 1997). Below I discuss the statement of a senior advisor to President Shevardnadze who confirmed that Shevardnadze rebuilt the Army after 1993 to balance the other power ministries.

All five Georgian ground forces described above report directly to the President rather than to central coordinating agencies or joint command structures. (I provide detailed evidence of fragmentation among Georgian armed forces below). As argued elsewhere in this dissertation, the absence of coordinating structures may indicate that a regime is attempting to balance rival armed forces against one another. The claim is based on the argument that if the possibility of a coup was a critical driving force behind counterbalance, then the regime would seek to keep rival forces apart. If, on the other hand, regimes designed organizations primarily for war-waging or other functional purposes unrelated to coups, then they would attempt to coordinate military forces and to institutionalize that coordination (Godø, 1985; Ben Meir, 1995).

Deployment patterns are consistent with the notion that Shevardnadze relied on rival forces to check and balance each other and to minimize the risk of a coup. The regime deployed numerous forces in the Tbilisi area including (1) a special detachment of the Government Guard responsible for protecting the President consisting of several dozen individuals. These troops are professional and follow orders but they are not combat troops; (2) a commando unit of the Ministry of State Security, probably consisting of about 100 troops; (3) a unit of paratroopers of the Ministry of State Security consisting of about 1,000 troops and deployed 30-40 kilometers east of Tbilisi;

(4) several battalions of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs consisting of 1,000-2,000 soldiers armed with several tanks and an unknown number of anti-tank weapons and armored personnel carriers; (5) The Army's National Guard Brigade of about 2,000 - 3,000 troops; (6) a motorized unit of about 300 Border Guards deployed adjacent to the Tbilisi airport and armed with three tanks, several armored personnel carriers, and an unknown number of anti-tank weapons. It is not possible to prove that vulnerability to a coup caused the regime to deploy multiple forces in the Tbilisi area. At the same time, however, deployment patterns could constitute evidence of the causal relationship between coup-risk and counterbalancing because these patterns were consistent with the notion of balancing. For example, after the August 1995 bombing attempt on Shevardnadze's life "security forces reacted with remarkable speed and within an hour-and-a-half soldiers, tanks and armoured personnel carriers had surrounded the parliament building" (Aves, 1996a p. 12). The fact that numerous, independent armed organizations can come to the regime's immediate assistance deters potential military plotters in any one of these organizations.

Between 1992 and 1995, Shevardnadze used all of the strategies that I described in chapter two to subordinate the Georgian armed forces. Aside from counterbalancing, however, only one other strategy (patrimonialization) was important and effective. The other survival strategies were loosely implemented or minimally effective.

Professionalization: The regime attempted to enhance the professionalization of the officer corps through overseas training as well as the establishment of a small, military academy in Georgia (Strategic Affairs

Group, 1996). As of late 1995 about fifty senior officers were training outside of Georgia, mostly in Russia (Georgian Military Chronicle, November, 1995 p. 1). Despite these efforts, however, most Georgian officers were weakly professionalized between 1992 and 1995. As a result of discrimination against non-Slavs, exclusive use of the Russian language, ethnic-based hazing, better opportunities in the civilian sector, and the Soviet military's history of suppression, the former Soviet armed forces included only 1,260 Georgian officers, many of whom were Russified and unwelcome in Georgia when the Cold War ended (Jones, 1996 p. 37). In addition, many Georgians who served in the Soviet armed forces joined construction battalions and failed to obtain combat experience. Between 1985 and 1996, only 15 Georgian officers graduated from Soviet, Russian, or Georgian military schools (Army and Society in Georgia, October, 1996 p. 10). As a result, the number of professionalized officers in Georgian armed forces was extremely low between 1992 and 1995. According to one participant in a recent conference on the Georgian Army, "the deficiency of professionals is one of the most critical problems of our armed forces" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy p. 24).

Indoctrination: The regime used indoctrination to enhance the loyalty of the armed forces. The Law on Defense of Republic signed by Shevardnadze on December 22, 1992 requires the Ministry of Defense to ensure the "military-patriotic indoctrination of military personnel and civilians" (FBIS-SOV 93-015, January 26, 1993. p. 80). In 1995 Shevardnadze ordered the Ministries of Culture and Education to work out a detailed plan for involving artists and intellectuals in the process of training military personnel ("On the Complex measures for Developing of the Armed Forces

of Georgia", 1995). And the Ministry of Defense re-instituted the old Soviet system of political officers. However, the regime puts very little effort into the indoctrination of its officer corps or enlisted personnel (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 25). One official told me that the political officers do the work of chaplains and that they do not engage in political indoctrination (Interview, July, 1997). Another mentioned that there are very few political officers and that they are deployed only at the brigade level (Interview, German Embassy, July, 1997.

Promotion of corporate spirit: Shevardnadze attempted to boost military morale by praising the armed forces in public, emphasizing their importance to the state, and appearing at military parades. But military morale was low between 1992 and 1995. The armed forces were discredited after the loss of Abkhazia and the combination of low official salaries, widespread corruption, extremely high desertion rates, inhumane service conditions, and an unfair conscription system undermined military prestige in the eyes of the public as well as members of the armed forces (Pataraya, 1996 pp. 13-15).

Sell autonomy: Selling autonomy refers to the pursuit of policy preferences of foreign states in return for foreign states' willingness to protect a regime from its own armed forces. Although potential conspirators in the Georgian military may have been deterred by the presence of Russian troops, Russian did not deploy its forces in Georgia to protect the Shevardnadze regime from its own military (Darchiashvili, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c). In addition, I argued above that Russian military forces in Georgia have sabotaged Shevardnadze on several occasions. They probably used the Russian airfield in Vaziani (near Tbilisi) to control the Georgian black market in cigarettes

(Darchiashvili, 1996a p. 15) and they probably helped orchestrate the assassination and coup attempt against Shevardnadze in August, 1995.

Institutional oversight: Civilian institutions responsible for monitoring and controlling the Georgian armed forces were weak between 1992 and 1995. Shevardnadze did attempt to strengthen them and I do not claim that oversight mechanism were meaningless. In August, 1996, for example, in the first-ever ruling against a senior military official, the Vake district court in Tbilisi ordered Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze to reinstate a subordinate who he had dismissed improperly (Army and Society in Georgia, August-September, 1996 p. 10). According to some observers, the Ministry of Defense recently began to pay more attention to public opinion and to cooperate with Georgian think tanks and academics.

At the same time, however, institutions responsible for overseeing the Georgian armed forces were unable to obtain information, monitor compliance, or influence policy between 1992 and 1995. The Parliamentary Commission on Defence and Security, for example, was unable to obtain basic information about the military's mission, budget, size, or deployment. Commission chair Revaz Adamia said in April, 1996 that "To say that our commission controls law-enforcement structures would be grossly exaggerated" (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 10). Similar to the former Soviet legal system, constitutional ambiguities undermined civilian efforts to set military policy. Under the Georgian constitution adopted in 1995, for example, the President approves the structure of the armed forces while the parliament approves their number! As one analyst concluded, "There is practically no monitoring of the conscription system...Georgia's military budget is essentially still closed and the State Chamber of Control has great problems

with the inspection of financial activities of the military office" (Army and Society in Georgia, August-September, 1996 p. 9).

Civilian officials who criticize the armed forces have been subject to dismissal or violence. Vice-Premier Tamaz Nadareishvili was replaced after he criticized the close relationship between Defense Minister Nadibaidze and Moscow and charged Nadibaidze with "ruining the process of creating a united, strong Georgian army" (Georgian Military Chronicle, December, 1994 p. 3; Georgian Chronicle, November 1994 p. 3). Giorgi Chanturia, former chairman of the National Democratic Party, was assassinated four days after accusing Nadibaidze of having a pro-Russian orientation (Georgian Military Chronicle, December, 1994 p. 3).

Shevardnadze reconfigured the institutions responsible for military oversight on at least six different occasions during his first three years in office. For example, he created the National Security and Defense Council in late 1992, abolished it in May, 1993, and restored it two months later in July. Each of the reconfigurations took place in a distinct set of circumstances and it is difficult to determine if they reflected (1) sabotage designed to prevent any single institution from consolidating its authority; (2) trial and error intended to improve or replace ineffective oversight mechanisms; (3) camouflage for the shuffling of subordinates; or (4) Russian pressure. Regardless of the motives that drove reconfigurations, however, Shevardnadze undermined civilian control of the military by depriving institutions of the stability necessary for monitoring and pressuring the armed forces ("On the National Security Council", 1996; Georgian Chronicle, August, 1995 p. 2; Jones, 1996 p. 43).

The fundamental element of *remuneration* strategies is the provision of resources, whether legally or extra-legally, to purchase military loyalty. Regimes may use salary, benefits, bribery, or the tolerance of corruption for this purpose. In Georgia between 1992 and 1995, remuneration was important in various pockets of the armed forces. Aves, for example, notes that the Mkhedrioni and the National Guard were involved in "protection rackets, arms and narcotics trafficking and control over vital commodities such as petrol" (1996b p. 15). Thanks to "a large income from the control that the Ministry of State Security exerted over the port of Poti and Tbilisi airport", enlisted men in the Ministry's Special Units were paid several times more than their Army peers (Fairbanks, 1995 p. 23; Aves, 1996a, p. 56). Despite the likelihood that corrupt financial practices benefited many officers and enlisted personnel in various pockets of the armed forces, it is not clear that remuneration secured military loyalty to the regime. I noted above, for example, that troops of the Ministry of State Security were among the most well paid in the Georgian military but that these forces probably planned the bombing attempt on Shevardnadze's life in August, 1995.

Patrimonialization refers to purging, shuffling, ethnic stacking and other tactics designed to replace adversaries in the armed forces with political loyalists. Purging and shuffling often are essential strategies for keeping potential challengers off-guard and preventing them from remaining in any one position long enough to build a stable base of support (Migdal, 1988). Although most of the other survival strategies that Shevardnadze implemented were not effective, he purged and shuffled the leadership of the Georgian military on many occasions, the most important being the removal of Tengiz K'it'ovani and Jaba Ioseliani described above. Between 1992 and

1995, five ministers ran the Ministry of Defense, four ministers led various incarnations of the Ministry of State Security, and at least four officers commanded the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Army and Society in Georgia, August - September, 1996 p. 12). Purging and shuffling were widespread at the sub-ministerial level as well. In the summer of 1994 at least five hundred people left the Ministry of Defense after the appointment of Vardiko Nadibaidze as Defense Minister. According to Darchiashvili and Aladashvili, "...any change of any kind of leadership has always been followed by changes and replacements in subordinated structures" (1996, p. 12).

Based on lists of the Georgian cabinet published in 1992, 1993 and 1995, it is possible to show that Shevardnadze shuffled military subordinates more often than civilian subordinates, suggesting that patrimonialization probably was an important strategy for managing the armed forces. From December, 1992 until September, 1993 Shevardnadze replaced only four out of fifteen (27 percent) non-security ministers such as the Minister of Culture. During the same period, he replaced the heads of all three power ministries (Defense, Internal Affairs, State Security). From September, 1993 to December, 1995, Shevardnadze replaced eight out of thirteen non-security ministers (62 percent). During this time he replaced the heads of all three power ministries, including two replacements of both the Minister of Defense and the Minster of Internal Affairs (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1992; September, 1993, December, 1995).[2] At least twenty four ministers ran

[2]The current Ministry of State Security was known as the Bureau of Information and Intelligence in December, 1992. In October, 1993 the Bureau was upgraded to the status of ministry (Fuller, 1994a pp. 23-24).

thirteen non-security ministries between 1992 and 1995 (1.8 ministers per ministry; one shuffle per ministry each 20 months), while eleven ministers ran the three power ministries (3.7 ministers per ministry; one shuffle per ministry each 10 months).

Another variant of patrimonialization entails the appointment of unqualified individuals to senior military posts. According to the logic of this strategy, incompetent subordinates may be less difficult to manage and less able to orchestrate political challenges than their professional colleagues. Shevardnadze used this tactic on numerous occasions. In 1992, for example, he appointed thirty-one year old philosopher Irakli Batiashvili to head the Bureau of Information and Intelligence, the successor to the Department for National Security and the Georgian KGB (Jones, 1993a p. 5) and in May, 1993 Shevardnadze appointed 27-year-old Giorgi Qarqarashvili as Minister of Defense. As a result of their inexperience, both Ministers proved easy for Shevardnadze to manage and to replace when necessary. Patrimonialization, then, was the one strategy aside from counterbalancing that allowed Shevardnadze to avoid being overthrown by a coup between 1992 and 1995. Other survival strategies were not as effective or important.

Counterbalancing cannot be explained by other leading theories of institutional development. Perhaps, for example, Shevardnadze developed a network of military organizations for symbolic or reputational reasons or to reflect institutional structures that prevailed in other states. As Meyer argues, regimes may seek to acquire the trappings of the modern state by mimicking institutional patterns they associate with legitimate governance (Wendt and Barnett, 1993; Meyer, 1983). Eyre and Suchman claim that "modern militaries emerge as part of the...world-level cultural processes that have given rise to

the modern nation-state" (1996 p. 82). They show that many states acquire high technology air forces to enhance their reputation and legitimacy rather than to improve their ability to wage war (Eyre and Suchman, 1996). This is not a new phenomenon, as demonstrated by French officials who in 1771 organized a palace guard for Louis XV's grandson to "characterize the respect and honour due" to the royal family (Mansel, 1984 p. 157).

Many Georgians believe that symbolic factors played an important role in remilitarization. Both deliberately and unconsciously, Georgia has looked outside its own borders in recent years as it established and consolidated state institutions and practices (Nodia, 1996c). One parliamentarian, for example, noted in reference to Georgian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies that "Since our constitution is after the American model these structures are also likely to follow the American pattern" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy, 1996 p. 47).

While international symbolic pressures may be important for explaining the proliferation of advanced weapons in the developing world (Wendt and Barnett, 1993), and while many Georgians believe that reputational considerations were an important driving force behind recent militarization, two factors suggest that symbolic considerations were not a critical driving force behind the establishment of multiple military organizations. First, the symbolic argument is premised on assumptions that do not appear to hold in the Georgian case. The symbolic argument assumes that governments are sensitive to international standards of legitimacy and that they fear that failure to appear to conform to such standards would undermine their claims to legitimate state status. If these two assumptions were important driving factors in the Georgian case, however, then the

Georgian government should have been responsive to international standards of legitimacy in non-military as well as military realms. Revealingly, however, Georgia did not have its own currency in 1993. Although Tbilisi officials attempted to circulate a currency known as the "coupon", as late as May, 1995 the Georgian consumer market was still dominated by the dollar and ruble (Georgian Chronicle, May, 1995). The official Georgian currency known as the Lari was not introduced until October, 1995, two years after Shevardnadze began to remilitarize. The point is not to determine whether military networks are more likely than currency to enhance sovereign status or to mime the trappings of the modern state. Rather, I suggest that if symbolic factors were powerful enough to drive Georgian officials to build a network of armed organizations, probably they should have been powerful enough cause Georgians to establish their own currency. Not only is this not the case, however, but at exactly the same time that Shevardnadze began to rebuild the Army in late 1993, "the Georgian government put out feelers to Russia on joining the rouble zone" (Aves, 1996a p. 23; Georgian Chronicle, January, 1994 p. 2).

Second, it is hard to see how the development of multiple ground forces could have been expected to enhance the regime's international legitimacy. Meyer's institutional theory implies that accruing legitimacy tends to depend more on institutional ceremonial appearance than on actual organizational performance. Hence, states may be highly motivated to develop small air forces that have little military value but that consist of a few high performance aircraft that can be displayed prominently during air shows and military parades. Similarly, states may develop technology-intensive military forces rather than labor-intensive forces to conform with

prevalent Western patterns (Wendt and Barnett, 1993). However, all of the five armies that Shevardnadze cultivated in the mid-1990's were highly labor-intensive ground forces that seemed to bear little relation to Western military patterns. For example, the development of the Special Units of the Ministry of State Security does not seem to reflect any prevailing western pattern and therefore it is unclear how cultivation of such a force would enhance Georgia's status as a legitimate state. A related possibility is that counterbalancing was intended to replicate the institutional legacy of the former Soviet Union. As one observer suggested to me, the configuration of former Soviet forces was the critical determinant of the number of Georgian armed forces. While this argument may seem appealing, Georgia created organizations that had no institutional precedent in the Soviet Union such as the Special Units of the Ministry of State Security, the Rescue Corps, and the Rapid Reaction Corps.

Perhaps national security and territorial integrity arguments can account for counterbalancing in Georgia. International threat may cause counterbalancing if regimes anticipate involvement in a war or international dispute. Regimes may create new armed organizations that enhance fighting effectiveness by specializing in distinct aspects of war-waging. In the Georgian case, these arguments assume several straightforward variants that are not mutually exclusive. For example, counterbalancing may have been intended to protect the country from foreign threats, to defend national sovereignty, and to allow for the eventual recapture of breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Related to this point, even if Georgians had no intention of attempting military solutions to secessionist conflicts, perhaps counterbalancing was intended to strengthen Georgia's hand in negotiations

with Russian, Abkhazian and Ossetian leaders by allowing it to threaten the use of force either implicitly or explicitly.

Unlike institutional theories discussed above, all of these arguments share the premise that the Georgian armed forces, in particular the army, were cultivated to serve as fighting forces. These arguments make intuitive sense and all may have played a partial role in accounting for counterbalancing in Georgia. For example, the American Deputy Chief of Mission to Georgia said that "This is a dangerous time, the time when the army is considered to be a badly needed institution for national survival" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 22). A representative of the Foreign Ministry said that "The restoration of our territorial integrity is the principal problem among our other security problems" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 55). And a brainstorming session on developing Georgia's national security concept identified the most important Georgian interests as "preservation of independence and sovereignty of Georgia, the national defence of Georgia, and the regaining of lost territories" (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 63).

Although national security and territorial integrity arguments make intuitive sense, if fighting effectiveness was the driving force behind remilitarization, then it would have made sense to cultivate one or perhaps two different armies, but it is unclear how the development of five armies enhanced the state's war-waging capacity, especially since the regime attempts, as argued below, to keep its armies apart rather than integrating them into a coordinated fighting force. In addition, it is revealing to note that the Georgian Army was not built to be a fighting force. It is a "big, dumb"

army that has almost no fighting value. As one Georgian military expert asked, "Why do we need an army? It is not related to external threat. It...has no real mission" (Darchiashvili). An incredibly frank working group of Georgian and western officials and academics on "Building an Army in an Economically Weak Country" was premised on the assumption that development of the Army between 1994 and 1996 had been undertaken with almost no concern for fighting capacity (Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 pp. 27-34). The one-one brigade, supposedly the Army's finest elite unit, is not "able to be involved in any fighting longer than a week. 'Ours is the best brigade', sarcastically says one of the officers..." (Army and Society in Georgia, December, 1996 p. 14). Most Georgian Army generals were so Russified by their training in the Soviet military that "It is difficult to believe that these generals are even theoretically capable of working out counter-measures in the case of a possible conflict with the northern neighbor [Russia]" (Darchiashvili, 1997 p. 9). Darchiashvili says that it is "clear that the army is not created based on the principle of defense against the main danger" (Darchiashvili p. 11).

The timing of counterbalancing seems inconsistent with the notion that the government rebuilt the Army to serve as a fighting force. Georgian officials stated repeatedly after the 1993 defeat in Sukhumi that it would take ten to twelve years for the rebuilt military to become strong enough to defend Georgia's borders (Army and Society in Georgia, March-April, 1997 p. 17). Hence, Georgian officials were aware that there was no immediate military payoff from rebuilding its forces. Despite this, the development of multiple armed forces was a top priority during 1994 and 1995, a period when resources were extremely scarce and the economy was in shambles. As Aves notes, a

Georgian military campaign to retake Abkhazia would invoke Russian military and political resistance and would be very likely to fail. And, the campaign to retake Abkhazia would require naval and air forces that Georgia has not developed (Aves, 1996a p. 30). The timing of counterbalancing and the weakness of the Army do not prove, of course, that counterbalancing was not pursued for fighting purposes. At the same time, the pattern of counterbalancing seems inconsistent with the national security and territorial integrity arguments. If the Shevardnadze government intended to use the army to defend the country from foreign threats or to attack Abkhazia or South Ossetia successfully, it is hard to see why it devoted considerable resources to the immediate development of militarily ineffective ground forces while investing almost no effort into the development of or naval and air forces.

Counterbalancing and international conflict

There are many important determinants of the relationship between Georgia and Russia including memories of Russian and Soviet imperial legacies as well as Moscow's military intervention in support of Abkhazian separatists in 1992 and 1993. This discussion is not intended to minimize the importance of these or other factors. Rather, my argument is that even though different considerations influence bilateral relations, the persistence of Georgian-Russian conflict since 1993 has served a critical domestic function in Tbilisi. In particular, conflict made counterbalancing possible by allowing Shevardnadze to create and reinforce inter-service rivalries and to naturalize the cleavage between military forces on the one hand and domestic paramilitary organizations on the other hand.

Above I showed that the Shevardnadze regime was highly vulnerable to the possibility of a coup and that its survival should be attributed to counterbalancing. Recall, however, that for counterbalancing to be successful, regimes need to promote jealousy among their forces to obstruct collusion and keep them apart. Otherwise, the balancing act can topple. In the case at hand, Gamsakhurdia's failure to promote conflict among Georgian forces led directly to his downfall when the Mkhedrioni and National Guard colluded to oust him from office in December, 1991.

Here I want to argue that Georgian-Russian conflict has allowed Shevardnadze to drive a wedge between the Ministry of Defense and the Border Guard. While there are several causes of inter-service rivalries in Georgia, one of the most important is that the Ministry of Defense has been allied closely with Moscow while the Border Guard has been oriented toward the West. By using conflict with Russia to exploit these divergent orientations, Shevardnadze has promoted inter-service rivalries among his own forces.

Relations between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the Russian Army are so tight that Georgian journalists refer to Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze as a borrowed minister and a foreign agent. Nadibaidze barely speaks Georgian and before his appointment as Georgian Defense Minister in 1994 he served for 35 years in the Soviet military, most recently as Deputy Commander of the Group of Russian Troops in Caucasia. He begins each day with a visit to the Tbilisi headquarters of the Russian Army and he is known among Georgians as "a stooge of Moscow". In 1995, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was baptized by the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church while Nadibaidze was christened as Grachev's godfather (Radio Free Europe

80, April 27, 1994; Darchiashvili 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Army and Society in Georgia, August-September, 1996 p. 6).

Soon after his appointment as Defense Minister, Nadibaidze and his assistants "cut down contacts with the military circles in the Western World and...[pursued] a policy of co-operation exclusively with the armed forces of Russia" (Georgian Military Chronicle, December, 1994 p. 1). Nadibaidze has stated on many occasions that the deployment of Russian troops in Georgia serves Georgian national interests and the Ministry of Defense has received almost all of its equipment from Russia. According to Nadibaidze, the Ministry was designed explicitly on "the former Soviet army model" (Georgian Military Chronicle, December, 1996 p. 3). Nadibaidze has rejected numerous opportunities to cooperate with NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative and he does not represent Georgia at important PFP summits. The Ministry's training exercises are undertaken in coordination with Russian forces. And, despite healthy Georgian-Turkish relations as well as protests from Ankara, field exercises continue the Cold War practice of using Turkey as the imagined enemy. Finally, according to some observers, much of the Ministry's doctrinal and planning documentation was translated from Russian templates with few if any modifications to reflect particularities of Georgia's security requirements.

Unlike the Ministry of Defense, the Border Guard rejects Russian influence over Georgian security affairs. The Border Guard has received naval vessels from the United States Coast Guard, Germany, and Ukraine and its leaders have sought and embraced opportunities to cooperate with the West and the Partnership for Peace. On October 2, 1996, for example, Border Guard Commander Valerie Chkheidze greeted two Ukrainian warships in

Poti during an official PFP visit and he used the occasion to criticize the deployment of Russian frontier troops in Georgia as illegal. Chkheidze has denounced Russia many times and accused Moscow of ignoring Georgian interests. In September, 1996 at a meeting of the Commanders of Frontier Troops of the CIS, Chkheidze refused to sign six documents on military and financial cooperation. While the Ministry of Defense was unwilling to allow soldiers or officers to conduct interviews with journalists, Border Guard representatives participated in conferences, spoke with the press on a regular basis, and allowed outsiders to inspect their facilities. Whereas the Ministry of Defense intentionally models itself on the Russian Army, the Border Guard explicitly differentiates itself from Russian border troops. As one senior official told me after explaining the Border Guard's mission, "Russian border troops never did these functions that we perform now" (Interview, Tbilisi, 1997).

By engaging in disputes with Moscow, Shevardnadze has been able to exploit divergent orientations and create bitter disagreements as to the management of Georgian-Russian relations. For example, after Russian forces detained the Ukrainian ship "Almaz" on December 4, 1996 near the Georgian city of Batumi, Shevardnadze responded by protesting to Moscow, declaring the action to be an act of piracy that undermined Georgian sovereignty, and noting that the presence of Russian frontier troops in Georgia was illegal. The Border Guard reacted by affirming the illegality of the Russian presence in Georgia. However, Defense Minister Nadibaidze said that "If the ship has violated law it must be detained and, generally speaking, I am not interested in the case. I have too many problems on myself...and,

actually, frontier troops are beyond our competence" (The Military Chronicle, December, 1996 p. 4).

Because conflict with Russia embarrasses the Ministry of Defense, Shevardnadze has been able to promote inter-service rivalry by manipulating the tenor of Georgian-Russian relations and engaging in low-level conflict even during the warmest periods of the relationship. Consequent inter-service rivalries have kept different branches of the Georgian armed forces apart and prevented them from coordinating their efforts. Senior officials in the Ministry of Defense, Border Guard, and Parliament as well as less senior officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs told me that Georgian armed organizations are quite jealous of each other, that they report directly to President Shevardnadze, and that cooperation among them is rare and marginal (also see Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 1996 p. 47). The forces prepare their own budgets without coordinating with one another and they almost never hold joint tactical exercises (Interviews, Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, Ministry of Defense, State Department of the State Frontier Guard, July, 1997).

The Ministry of Defense and Border Guards, both responsible for protecting the Black Sea border, do not train together. An officer in the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs told me that the Internal Troops do not conduct regular joint field exercises with the Ministry of Defense (Interview, Ministry of Internal Affairs, July, 1997). The commander of a Border Guard base near Tbilisi told me that he has no contact with a neighboring Ministry of Defense outpost located just a few meters away. A senior Defense Ministry official said that the different ministries train

together once per year but that these joint exercises involve only one company per ministry.

Jealousy that has characterized the relationships among most ministries has flared into violence from time to time. A few hours after Defense Minister Giorgi Qarqarashvili and Minister of State Security Minister Igor Giorgadze engaged in a public fist-fight at the Tbilisi airport in December, 1993, the Ministry of State Security was seriously damaged by a bomb (Georgian Chronicle, December, 1993 p. 1; Fuller, 1994a p. 24). When a bomb exploded in the apartment of former Defense Minister Qarqarashvili in early February, 1994, "the army officers showed their mistrust of the police and the Ministry of Security by refusing to admit them to the scene of the crime for several hours after the accident" (Georgian Chronicle, February - March, 1994 p. 1).

Cooperation among ministries is not institutionalized. For example, a joint task force on the Georgian-Chechen border entailed only very limited and temporary contact among power ministries (Interview, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, July, 1997). A senior Defense Ministry official told me that there was no department in the entire ministry structure responsible for coordinating with other Georgian forces. Rather, responsibility for coordination was delegated to a single officer! As described at greater length above, oversight and coordinating agencies were unable to monitor compliance or obtain basic information about the budget, size, or deployment of various forces. A senior official in Parliament told me that the National Security Council has not been able to coordinate the efforts of different branches of the Georgian armed forces. Rather, he said, the NSC served as a fig leaf to conceal the fact that ministers report directly to the

President and that their efforts are not integrated (Interviews, Tbilisi, July, 1997).

Georgians claim that functional differentiation prevents their forces from coordinating. During interviews in Tbilisi in July, 1997, I asked officers in the Ministry of Defense, Border Guard and Internal Troops as well as officials in the President's office and Parliamentary Commission on Defense and Security why the Ministry of Defense does not cooperate with other Georgian armed organizations. Most explained that the forces do not cooperate because they have different missions. A senior Ministry of Defense official explained that "All ministries work separately and have our own tasks". This official also noted that the Ministry of Defense prepares its budget without consulting other Georgian armed forces because "[we have] separate tasks and we need to budget ourselves".

The comments of one senior official in the Border Guard were typical: "We have nothing to do with the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense defends threats from outside the country and every day they train for this. We, the Border Guard, actually stand on the border. Only on the border". Another senior Border Guard official explained that his organization does not cooperate with the Ministry of Defense because the Ministry "has different functions compared to the structure of the Border Guard. The Border Guard are not a defense structure." An official of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and Security said that "We need the Border Guard to defend the border. That is their only peacetime mission...The Ministry of Defense has a different mission, to protect Georgia's sovereignty, not its borders". A Tbilisi-based western expert on the Georgian Ministry of Defense told me that it "does not make sense for the Border

Guard to train with the Ministry of Defense because they have different missions".

In one sense, functional differentiation does offer a plausible explanation of the absence of coordination. In particular, functional differentiation makes the cleavage between domestic, paramilitary forces (Internal Troops and Special Units of the Ministry of State Security) and military organizations (Ministry of Defense and Border Guard) seem normal. A senior Ministry of Defense official explained that "All ministries work separately and have our own tasks...If the Ministry of Defense has training, we have just MoD field exercises because our task is the enemy from outside...The Internal Troops are for interior defense inside the state. The Ministry of State Security works on criminals..." (Interview, Tbilisi, 1997). Even though, as one senior official acknowledged to me, the Ministry of Defense was cultivated partially in order to balance the Internal Troops and the Special Units, distinct missions prevent these organizations from recognizing their counterbalancing role (Interview, Tbilisi, 1997; Aves, 1996b p. 15). With regard to the Internal Troops, one official told me that soldiers are not aware of the organization's balancing function (Interview, Tbilisi, 1997). Concerning the Ministry of Defense, I did not find any indication in interviews or Ministry documents that the organization conceives of its role in terms of balancing other armed forces. In this sense, the external defense mission of the Ministry of Defense serves to naturalize the cleavage that separates military from domestic, paramilitary organizations.

Functional differentiation cannot, however, explain the cleavage that prevents Georgian military forces (the Ministry of Defense and Border Guard) from cooperating because the missions of these two organizations overlap

considerably. Both organizations mention frontier defense explicitly in their statements of mission and, as noted above, both are responsible for defending the Black Sea coast. If the cleavage between the Ministry of Defense and Border Guard cannot be explained by functional differentiation, perhaps the division was unintended or reflected the nascence of Georgian state-building and the weakness of the Georgian state.

These explanations, however, founder on the point that inter-service coordination is an option that was actively considered and rejected by the Ministry of Defense. In a 25-page document provided to me by officials in Tbilisi, representatives of the President's office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed 124 options for collaboration between Georgian agencies and NATO's Partnership for Peace. Of these 124 options, 64 consisted of activities that implied the possibility of coordination among Georgian military forces. Examples included seminars on authority, control and communication, consultations with NATO experts on democratic control of the armed forces, participation in joint operations with NATO forces, and exchanges of information on defense structures. However, according to one official, Defense Minister Nadibaidze did not want to participate and most of the activities on the list that involved the Ministry of Defense remained unfulfilled. This evidence suggests that institutionalized, inter-service coordination was a real possibility despite the weakness of the state and that it was not unintended. Rather, the absence of inter-service coordination among military organizations reflected divergent orientations toward Russia that Shevardnadze exploited and reinforced through international conflict.

Conclusion

One objection to this discussion of Georgian civil-military relations may be my narrow conceptualization of Shevardnadze's agenda in terms of subordination of the armed forces and reduction of the risk of a coup. Perhaps I should conceptualize his agenda more broadly as a "a three-and-a-half year gradual consolidation of power" (Tsereteli, 1996). Shevardnadze's agenda did include goals that were not related directly to minimizing the risk of a coup such as restoring law and order, securing reliable energy sources, and reversing Georgia's economic decline. At the same time, however, I attempted to show above that subordinating the armed forces was a critical element of the agenda. This discussion isolates civil-military relations as an important driving force behind many of Shevardnadze's actions and then explores foreign policy implications of the politics of survival.

The conflict between Russia and Georgia is unsurprising and consistent with basic historical expectations given the legacy of Soviet imperialism as well as Russia's more recent provocative role in the Abkhazian conflict. While history might seem sufficient for explaining the conflict between Georgia and Russia, I argue in this paper that international hostilities also served a critical domestic function. The regime of Eduard Shevardnadze cultivated a network of five different armies after 1993 to protect itself from a coup and then manipulated relations with Russia to drive wedges between its own armed forces. International conflict created inter-service rivalries and "masked social reality" from soldiers and officers by deflecting their attention away from their own organizations' counterbalancing roles. Although it will never be possible to re-run history, my argument is that even if there had been no historical reason for Georgian-Russian hostilities, it is possible that

the imperatives of civil-military relations may have been sufficient for causing Shevardnadze to invent a conflict with Russia. In other words, the imperatives of civil-military relations may have been sufficient for causing Shevardnadze to perform the national security state.

Chapter seven: Counterbalancing as a cause of international conflict during the Cold War -- a quantitative analysis

What, if any, is the relationship between and counterbalancing and international conflict? In the previous chapter, I outlined a theory that attempted to link these two factors. In this chapter I submit the theory to a hard test by deriving implications that should be true if the theory is well-founded and then by verifying whether or not those expected implications obtain. Specifically, I suggest that if my theory is sound then it should also be true that when coups are possible, counterbalancing regimes should be more likely to become involved in low-level international conflicts than regimes that do not counterbalance. Counterbalancing, in other words, should be associated positively with dispute involvement when coups are possible. In this chapter, I verify this expectation during one important period, the second half of the Cold War.

This prediction is counterintuitive because fragmented military structures may undermine fighting capacity and prompt regimes to seek to avoid international conflicts. Dassel, for example, argues that when the military is divided and when political institutions are unstable, leaders may tend to avoid international conflict (1996). Along similar lines, other scholars suggest that regimes invent international threats to unify the armed forces (Desch, 1996). Finally, most counterbalancing regimes are located in the developing world and scholars often claim that interstate conflict is rare there (Herbst 1990). Counterbalancing, of course, might be expected to result in conflict in some cases. For example, dividing the armed forces might weaken the state militarily and increase the likelihood of its becoming a target of

violence. At the same time, if regimes invent international threats to unify their armed forces and if international disputes occur rarely in the developing world, then on average we should expect divided militaries to be related inversely to dispute-involvement.

Empirical domain

To assess the relationship between counterbalancing and conflict, I concentrate on the same period of time that was the focus of chapter four, 1966-1986, roughly the second half of the Cold War. Similar to chapter four, this analysis includes all countries of the world whose populations exceed one million. However, unlike chapter four, in which the data set consisted of 2,757 regime-years (such as Spain-1966), this analysis uses dyad-years as the unit of analysis to attempt to capture partially the interactive nature of conflict. It would be inappropriate to use regime-years as the unit of analysis in this chapter because the dependent variable, international conflict, is an interactive phenomenon. While domestic outcomes such as counterbalancing can be measured in terms of regime-years, interactive outcomes such as conflict are best measured in terms of pairs of countries (Spain-Portugal-1966 is an example of a dyad-year).

Because conflict is extremely unlikely in some country-pairs, however, dyads that consist of weak countries located at great distances from one another were removed from the data set. Excluding dyads in which there is almost no possibility of a dispute eliminates a potential source of bias (For details on the procedure used to identify politically relevant dyads see Russett, 1993 p. 74). For example, geographic distance and low military capacity nearly eliminate the possibility of conflict between Gabon and Costa Rica. Including

this dyads would bias results because the value of the dependent variable (conflict) is likely to be constrained to be zero. Given the approximate average of 130 countries in the system during the second half of the Cold War, the study would include approximately 70,000 observations if all dyad-years were retained. Removing politically irrelevant dyads from the data set reduces the number of observations in the second part of the study to 21,386. Even after dropping 69 percent of all observations from the analysis, about 75 percent of disputes are retained in the data set (Russett, 1993 p. 74).

Dependent variable: international conflict

The dependent variable in this chapter is low-level international conflict. As discussed in chapter five, my conceptualization of conflict includes preparation for war such as army-building and formulation of external military doctrines, non-violent behavior such as hostile rhetoric and threats, and actual dispute-involvement such as mobilizations and limited strikes. Because my specification of conflict is somewhat broad, this analysis depends on indicators (discussed below) that do not quite capture all aspects of conflict that I include in the definition.

Conflict data are provided by Maoz and Russett from two separate data sets, the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data compiled by Gochman and Maoz (1984) and the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data compiled by Brecher et. al. (1988). The MID data identifies "interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual use of force. To be included, these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned" (Gochman and Maoz, 1984 p. 586 quoted in Russett, 1993 p. 75). The ICB data define crises in terms of "an

increase in the intensity of disruptive interaction between two or more adversaries, with a high probability of military hostilities" (Brecher et. al., 1989 p. 5 quoted in Russett, 1993 p. 75). As Russett (1993 p. 74) notes, because only 27 percent of the MID disputes are identified by the ICB data set and 72 percent of ICB disputes are included in the MID data, "the use of both sets allows us to establish whether the conclusions we draw about the causes of conflict are robust".

Both data sets rank each dyad-year according to a five point scale that indicates the highest level of dyadic hostility reached during the given year. The levels are "(1) no military confrontation, (2) verbal threat to use force, (3) display of force, as by mobilization or troop or naval movements; (4) limited use of force, including blockade, seizure of persons or territory, and clashes with some casualties, (5) interstate war with a minimum of one thousand battle-related fatalities and, for each participant, at least one hundred such fatalities or commitment of at least one thousand troops" (Gochman and Maoz, 1984, cited in Russett, 1993 p. 144). Because my theory attempts to account for the presence or absence or low-level conflict rather than the degree of low-level escalation, I collapse the second through fourth categories and assign a one to any dyad-year in which low-level conflict occurs and a zero to all other dyad-years. When wars as well as all years of multi-year disputes are included, the ICB data set identifies 224 conflict-years the MID data set identifies 625 conflict-years between 1966 and 1986. However, to correct partially for the possibility that the presence or absence of conflict in one year may not be independent of the level of past hostilities, I recode all but the first year in any dispute as zero. This reduces the total number of low-

level conflict dyad-years to 125 in the ICB data set and to 457 in the MID data set.

Independent variable: counterbalancing x coup-risk

Is counterbalancing related positively to international conflict? In chapter four I described my operationalization of counterbalancing in terms of two dimensions, the number of military organizations and the relative size of the paramilitary compared to the overall size of the armed forces. Two specifications of counterbalancing were presented, counterbalancing I and counterbalancing II. In the first specification, the cut-point separating high from low counterbalancers was determined by the same procedure that Russett (1993) used to distinguish democracies from non-democracies and in the second specification the cut-point was determined by dividing the continuos counterbalancing score at its median value.

Militaries may be divided for many reasons but the theoretical argument elaborated in the chapter five links counterbalancing to conflict only when coups are possible. When alternative factors such as domestic unrest cause leaders to divide their armed forces, I make no claims about the relationship between counterbalancing and conflict. In this section of the analysis I test a series of models with international conflict as dependent variable and counterbalancing when coups are possible as independent variable.

To ensure that results are not sensitive to particular coding procedures, I specify eight versions of the interaction term by combining different measures of regime vulnerability and counterbalancing and by calculating dichotomous as well trichotomous formulations. For example, in the first of

the eight specifications I use coup-risk I and counterbalancing I to calculate a trichotomous score for each dyad-year. A score of zero indicates that neither regime in the dyad is a counterbalancer in which coups are possible; a score of one indicates that one regime is a counterbalancer in which coups are possible; and a score of two indicates that both regimes are counterbalancers at in which coups are possible. The second specification is the same as the first except that coup-risk II is used in place of coup-risk I to determine which regimes are vulnerable to the possibility of a coup. For summary scores of the eight specifications of the independent variable, see appendix 3.

Control variables

I use dichotomous, dyadic versions of all control variables to account for alternative explanations of international conflict (Russett, 1993 pp. 82-3). Alliance is set to zero in the case of no alliance and one if the regimes are connected by indirect or direct alliance. Capability ratio is coded as zero if the regimes possess roughly equal power and one if the stronger country is more than one and one half times as powerful than the weaker country. Regime Type as measured by Russett (1993) is coded as zero if neither regime in the dyad is democratic and one if one or both regimes are democratic. Correlations among the control variables and one of the eight specifications of the independent variable are reported in the second table of appendix 6.

Statistical analysis

As a first step in attempting to determine whether and in what direction the variables are related, I begin with a simple variant of the following model: Pr(**conflict** = 1) = F(β_0 + β_1[**coup-risk x counterbalancing**]).

The models in table 5 include international conflict as measured by the MID data set (Brecher et. al., 1988) and two of the eight specifications of the independent variable (coup-risk x counterbalancing). As can be seen from the table, coefficients are positive and statistically significant. All other combinations of the variables, not reported here, yield similar results although one qualification should be noted. While all versions of the independent variable are related positively to MID and ICB measures of international conflict, coefficients in the ICB models tend to fall short of statistical significance. This may be due to the extremely low incidence of ICB conflict-years in the data set (only 125 conflicts in 21,105 observations).

Tables 7.1 - Probit Analysis

(EFFECT OF COUP-RISK x COUNTERBALANCING I (TRICHOTOMOUS) ON LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT AS MEASURED BY MID)

Independent Variable	*Low-Level Conflict*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*
COUP-RISK I x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.188***	.034	5.59
Number of Observations = 13,032			
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.228***	.034	6.78
Number of Observations = 13,698			

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed). T = trichotomous.

Although the first set of tests reported above is consistent with expectations, it is possible that the positive, statistically significant relationship between the variables is spurious. To determine if the

relationship is accounted for by other factors such as regime type and wealth, I specify a series of models in which the occurrence of international conflict depends on the interaction term in combination with one other control variable: Pr(**conflict = 1**) = F($ß_0$ + $ß_1$**[coup-risk x counterbalancing]** + $ß_2$**control variable**). Table 6 reports parameter coefficients for five different variants of this model, all of which use conflict as measured by MID as dependent variable and one specification of the interaction term as independent variable. The interaction term is positively and significantly related to conflict in each of the models regardless of which control is introduced. Except for the qualification mentioned above, the point that coefficients in the ICB models tend to fall short of statistical significance possibly due to the extremely low incidence of ICB conflict-years in the data set, all other combinations of the variables, not reported here, yield similar results.

Table 7.2
Probit Analysis

(PAIRWISE EFFECT OF COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T) ON CONFLICT AS MEASURED BY MID)

Independent Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*	*Number of Observations*
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.195***	.035	5.576	13,698
REGIME TYPE	-.124***	.040	-3.099	
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.214***	.033	6.384	13,698
ALLIANCE	.244***	.051	4.766	
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.254***	.036	7.149	11,617
CAPABILITY RATIO	-.201	.139	-1.441	
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.228***	.034	6.782	13,698
GROWTH	-.042	.070	-.604	
COUP-RISK II x COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.160***	.044	3.663	7,786
WEALTH	-.106	.088	-1.206	

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed). T = trichotomous.

Finally, I test a more completely specified model: Pr(**conflict = 1**) = F($ß_0$ + $ß_1$**[coup-risk x counterbalancing]** + $ß_2$**regime type** + $ß_3$**wealth** +$ß_4$**alliance** + $ß_5$**growth** + $ß_6$**capability ratio**). Results are presented in tables 7 and 8. Recall that to correct for the likelihood that conflict in one year is not independent of the level of past hostilities, I recoded all but the first year in any dispute as zero. In addition, I ran the completely specified models with lagged conflict as an independent variable. Previous conflict does have a positive impact on the outcome, but the direction and significance of the other coefficients does

not change considerably. Russett notes that this procedure indicates "that autocorrelation, though present, does not seriously bias the results" (1993 p. 147).

Tables 7.3 - Probit Analysis

(COUP-RISK I x COUNTERBALANCING I AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE; CONFLICT AS MEASURED BY MID AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE)

Independent Variable	*Estimated Coefficient*	*Standard Error*	*Coeff./S.E.*
COUP-RISK II			
COUNTERBALANCING I (T)	.135**	.046	2.96
REGIME TYPE	-.099	.058	-1.72
ALLIANCE	.159*	.069	2.33
CAPABILITY	-.232	.166	-1.40
GROWTH	-.016	.075	-.214
WEALTH	.004	.069	.042
INTERCEPT	-2.038***	.068	-29.912

Number of observations = 7,392
Pseudo - R^2 = .515

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed). T = trichotomous.

Table 7.4
Marginal Impact of Independent
Variable on the Probability of Low-Level Conflict

Change in Value of the Independent Variable	*Percent Change in the Probability of Conflict*
Counterbalancing x Coup-risk	
Neither regime counterbalances & neither at-risk (=0) to one regime counterbalances & at-risk (=1)	+38%
One regime counterbalances & at-risk (=1) to both regimes counterbalance & at-risk (=2)	+34%

Changes in the likelihood of conflict are calculated according to the procedure explained by Huth and Russett (1993 p. 169).

Conclusion

The combined analyses in chapters four and in this chapter suggest that during the second half of the Cold War, regimes that were vulnerable to their own armed forces were more prone to use counterbalancing strategies than invulnerable regimes. And counterbalancing, in turn, was positively related to low-level conflict involvement when coups were possible. How meaningful are these findings? To answer the question, I address two related issues: First, are the findings valid? And second, even if the findings are valid, do they lend support to my theory?

The results, of course, do not constitute positive proof of my argument. Several common sense qualifications need to be recognized. First, my measure of some of the variables may be open to questions. Consider, for example, my operationalization of regime vulnerability. Although I presented theoretical reasoning, anecdotal evidence and large-N correlational data in chapter four to support the idea that legitimacy and strength of non-state organizations were good indicators for the possibility of a coup, it is still possible to take issue with the construct. Perhaps telephones, university students and newspaper subscriptions do not capture the strength of non-state organizations. And perhaps age is a better indicator of stability than legitimacy. I addressed these issues by reporting the correlation between number of non-state organizations and phones, students and newspapers, by drawing on Jackman's careful (1993) argument about the relationship between age and legitimacy and by specifying the independent variable in two different ways. But my operationalization still may be open to challenge.

Second, the approach advocated by King et. al. (1994) for theory evaluation is incapable of providing absolute confirmation of social scientific arguments because of the absence of law-like generalizations in the social and political worlds. As O'Neill notes, "To yield an observable prediction,...theory...must be supplemented with... correspondence rules linking theoretical and observational concepts" (1995 p. 739). In axiomatic systems such as mathematics, the law-like nature of correspondence rules make it possible to articulate implications of a theory that must be true if a theory is true. For example, Tetlock and Belkin (1996a) note that "if and only if the number of prime numbers were finite, then there would exist a nonprime number x such that x equals the product of all primes plus 1 ($x = (p_1p_2...p_n) + 1$)". In non-axiomatic systems that are the focus of the social sciences, however, the probabilistic nature of correspondence rules means that it is rarely if ever possible to claim that implications a, b and c must be true if a theory is true. Correspondence rules that link the theoretical and the observational in social scientific theories consist of tendencies rather than law-like statements. And as a result, the King-Keohane-Verba approach to theory testing is rarely if ever conclusive. Typically the best that we can do is to argue that certain implications should be true if a theory is true. Hence while regime vulnerability should be associated positively with counterbalancing and counterbalancing should be related positively to conflict involvement if my theory is sound, failure to confirm these relationships would not falsify the theory automatically. Rather, it might be possible to spin a post-hoc rationalization to explain why the positive relationships were not apparent in this particular period, the second half of

the Cold War. Due to the ease of such rationalization, we must supplement the King-Keohane-Verba approach with other types of tests.

Third, selection bias, endogeneity (reverse causation), and a variety of other methodological pitfalls may have crept into the analysis. For example, the "treatment" in this chapter (counterbalancing), may have been caused by the factor that ultimately I seek to explain, low-level conflict behavior. Although my selection rule (every country in the world whose population exceeds one million) is independent of the treatment variable, my findings still may be distorted by selection bias if reverse causality is present. As King et. al. note, "endogeneity...is often an integral part of the process by which the world produces our observations" (1994 p. 198). And Przeworski argues that "the observable world is not a random sample of the possible underlying conditions" (1995 p. 18; King et. al., 1994 p. 135).

Consider the possibility that the following three statements are true: (1) counterbalancing does not cause low-level conflict; (2) involvement in low-level conflict causes regimes to fragment their militaries; (3) past aggression is a cause of future aggression. Note that all three statements are plausible: the first statement is one variant of the null hypothesis of this chapter; the second repeats an argument I advanced in an earlier discussion of control variables, the notion that regimes may divide their forces to increase fighting capacity by specializing in various aspects of war-waging; and the third may reflect the fact that enduring rivalries tend to persist over long periods of time. If all three statements are true, then we should observe a positive relationship between divided militaries and low-level disputes not because counterbalancing causes conflict, but because both counterbalancing and conflict are caused by past conflict.

Although it is possible that selection bias and endogeneity undermine the validity of my results, several points should be mentioned. First, although statisticians have developed procedures to correct for bias that results when the dependent variable causes the treatment variable (Lee, 1978), these procedures are unreliable. When observations are not produced randomly and are a function of the dependent variable, elimination of bias requires "model[ing] explicitly the way in which observations are produced". Then, hypothetical values of the dependent variable that would have obtained if the treatment were not produced by the outcome must be compared with the actual values of the dependent variable (Przeworski, 1995 p. 21). However, statistical procedures designed for this purpose are not robust. As Przeworski and Limongi (1993 p. 64) note, "Selection models turn out to be exceedingly sensitive: minor modifications...can affect the signs in the equations that explain [the dependent variable]."

Second, it is impossible to determine the direction of reverse causation. Consider the claim that international conflict is a cause of regime vulnerability. Although careful analysis suggests that conflict does in fact increase the possiblity of a coup (Bueno de Mesquita et. al., 1992), equally careful scholarship suggests that conflict decreases the possiblity of a coup (Frazer, 1994). Since the debate is not settled and we do not know whether international conflict increases or decreases the level of regime vulnerability, it is also possible that conflict may not influence the risk of coup d'état. Reverse causation, in other words, may not bias my findings. And if it does bias my findings, it is impossible to determine if I have overestimated or underestimated my results given the current state of knowledge about the impact of international conflict on regime vulnerability.

Third, "perfect designs are unattainable" (King et. al., 1994 p. 149) and I have followed an optimal selection strategy for minimizing bias when laboratory control is not possible (King et. al., 1994 p. 149). King et. al. note that "the best 'intentional' design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable...without regard to the values of the dependent variables" (1994 p. 140). Hence, my selection rule (all countries whose populations exceed one million) is consistent with guidelines for optimal selection strategies when laboratory control is not possible (King et. al., 1994 p. 138).

Fourth, in addition to optimal selection in this chapter and in chapter four, I use a multi-method research design in the dissertation to attempt to correct for the possible influence of endogeneity (King et. al., 1994 pp. 189-193). In particular, Syria and Georgia are cases in which the dependent variable did not cause the independent variable.

Having advanced the qualifications mentioned above, I conclude this chapter by raising four points that lend support to the validity of the results and their importance for confirmation of my theory. First, while measurement problems often constitute threats to valid inference in social scientific studies, the large sample size in this study may diminish the influence of noisy data.

Second, results appear to be robust. The positive, statistically significant relationships between the variables obtain for the most part regardless of the specification of the variables or the statistical technique used. While every statistical procedure requires assumptions of the data that may or may not be realistic, it is reassuring to know that the results appear robust

enough to be captured by different estimation techniques regardless of the specification of the variables.

Third, despite the possibility of selection bias, it is important to note that the results do not disappear when control variables are introduced into the models. There are numerous causes of counterbalancing and of conflict and I do not claim that my findings would obtain in every possible specification of the models. It is possible that some unidentified variable or variables may cause regime vulnerability and counterbalancing and_conflict. And if these variables were specified and included in the models, then perhaps the results reported in this chapter would disappear. However, when I include available factors such as regime type, previous conflict, domestic unrest, alliance, relative power, wealth and growth, all of which have been identified by the international relations and civil military relations literatures as important causal factors, I find that the possiblity of a coup is still positively and significantly related to counterbalancing and counterbalancing is still positively and significantly related to conflict involvement in pairwise combination with each individual control as well as in completely specified models.

Finally, fourth, the tests in this chapter and in chapter four are difficult because of the counterintuitive nature of the predictions that I examine. As O'Neill notes, hard tests involve confirmation of expectations that are "highly unlikely without one's hypothesis" (1995 p. 738). And Caporaso (1995 p. 458) argues that testing of risky, counterintuitive implications provides more confidence in the validity of a parent theory than confirmation of unsurprising implications. Hence, while the results of this chapter and of

chapter four must be interpreted with caution, I argue that the theory appears to have passed a hard test.

Chapter eight: Conclusion

In this dissertation I argue that when coups are possible, leaders usually create rival military organizations that they intend to check and balance each other and protect the regime as a byproduct of independent coercive capacity. (I label this strategy counterbalancing). Even though leaders may divide their armed forces for domestic reasons, counterbalancing can have international effects. In particular, regimes may engage in or prepare for international conflict in order to keep their forces apart.

Summary of the argument and findings

I argue that the possibility a coup should almost always prompt leaders to divide their armed forces. Vulnerable regimes usually are willing to pay high costs to subordinate their militaries because the possibility of a coup is too important a problem to ignore. In addition, while other strategies are available for subordinating the military, for the most part these strategies rely on manipulating officers' preferences. However, preferences can be bought and sold, difficult to monitor, and subject to rapid change. As a result, strategies such as indoctrination and professionalization that target loyalties and attitudes usually are insufficient for subordinating the military. Unlike other survival strategies, counterbalancing is the only strategy that pits forces against force.

Some typologies of civil-military strategies do not include counterbalancing and others list counterbalancing as one of many available strategies. My argument predicts that almost all vulnerable leaders will choose counterbalancing as the foundational strategy they rely on to protect

themselves from their own armed forces. The difference between this claim and conventional wisdom in the literature, then, is the difference between a medical theory that predicts that "there are many different drugs that can treat a particular disease and doctors might select any combination of them in treatment programs" versus a theory that predicts that "there are many different drugs available for treating a particular disease and because most of the drugs are unlikely to work well in isolation, doctors usually select one particular drug as a necessary component of any treatment therapy".

Statistical evidence presented in chapter four indicates that the possibility of a coup d'état is strongly and positively related to counterbalancing regardless of the specification of the variables or the statistical technique used, even after correcting for the non-independence of the dependent variable over time. Vulnerable regimes are 87.7% more likely to counterbalance in any given year than regimes that are not vulnerable to their own forces.

In addition to statistical methods, I use a historical case study to determine whether the possibility of a coup might lead to counterbalancing in a somewhat difficult test. When Hafiz al-Asad became Syrian President in February, 1971, Syria's ground forces included just a single army and a few lightly-equipped militias. By 1976, five years later, Syrian ground forces consisted of six fully-equipped armies including Brigades for the Defense of the Revolution, Struggle Companies, Presidential Guard, Third Armored Division and Special Forces. I argue in chapter three that the possibility of a coup was an important driving force behind Asad's creation of rival forces. Alternative explanations that might account for the creation of rival armies in Syria such as institutional and neorealist theory yield expectations that are

not confirmed while counterbalancing theory outlined in this dissertation yields predictions that are confirmed in the Syrian case.

After identifying counterbalancing as a critical domestic process that most leaders should be expected to pursue when coups are possible, I argue that dividing the military can be a cause of international conflict. My argument is that counterbalancing strategies cannot succeed when rivals collude. Hence, counterbalancing depends on leaders' ability to keep rival forces apart by promoting conflict among them. In turn, promoting conflict among rival forces requires leaders to conceal their motives. When rivals understand how brokers profit from conflict among them, they may come to realize that their mutual antagonism is unnecessary and they may become strongly motivated to rebel. Finally, I argue that international conflict conceals how leaders obtain control benefits when they promote hostility among their own forces. International conflict generates inter-service rivalries among military forces as well as organizational denial that makes the distinction between military and domestic forces seem natural. Hence, leaders may prepare for war, invent enemies, and engage in low-level international disputes when their foundational objective is to use counterbalancing to subordinate their own forces.

Statistical evidence presented in chapter seven indicates that counterbalancing is strongly and positively associated with international conflict. In particular, counterbalancing regimes are 72% more likely to become involved in international conflicts in any given year than regimes that do not counterbalance. While measurement problems often constitute threats to valid inference in social scientific studies, the large sample size in this study may diminish the influence of noisy data.

Research in Tbilisi, Georgia indicated that counterbalancing depended on President Eduard Shevardnadze's ability to use the Russian threat as a wedge to promote jealousy and competition among his own forces. Shevardnadze built the Georgian army not in response to foreign policy threats, but rather to balance other "power" ministries in order to lower the risk of a coup. Then he used international conflict to keep his forces apart. To justify separation of the army from the police and to conceal control benefits that the regime accrued by promoting inter-service rivalries, Shevardnadze arrogated responsibility for defending the country from foreign threats to the army and then he manipulated Georgia's relationship with Russia partially in order to play divide-and conquer politics with his own armed forces.

Implications for theory

This dissertation is not intended to disprove any prevailing theories or theoretical traditions. Rather, my primary purpose is to shine a spotlight on one, understudied path to international conflict. That having been said, however, the identification and specification of the mechanism developed in this dissertation may entail implications for other theoretical approaches.

First, analysis of domestic-international linkages may profit by addressing dynamic processes at the domestic level and then tracing the international implications of those processes. As noted at the outset of this study, there is little scholarship that links generalizable theories of domestic political process to international outcomes. Scholars have studied the international consequences of domestic events such as riots, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, assassinations, government crises, purges, revolutions,

antigovernmental demonstrations, and people killed in domestic violence (Stohl, 1980 pp. 300-301). However, much of this work is correlational and fails to spell out generalizable theories of domestic politics. As Robert Keohane noted ten years ago, scholars should seek "better theories of domestic politics...so that the gap between the external and internal environments can be bridged in a systematic way..." (1986 p. 191). This dissertation seeks to address the gap by articulating a generalizable theory about an important aspect of domestic politics and then using that theory as an independent variable for linking domestic and international factors.

Second, scholars of civil-military relations might sometimes benefit by conceptualizing the military as a network rather than an organization. Focusing on the armed forces as a network leads to preoccupation with questions about the emergence and maintenance of structural holes that have become central to network analysis (Burt, 1992). How, in other words, do leaders broker relations among their own military forces? Additional implications for scholarship on civil-military relations include the possibility that normative biases might be reduced if scholars emphasized how all different types of regimes draw on all different civil-military strategies rather than attempting to match various regime-types to particular control mechanisms. While regime-type might influence the choice of control mechanism, other critical determinants also deserve consideration. Finally, despite the literature's focus on the armed forces, there has been little effort to link insights about civil-military relations to international outcomes. Additional attention to such implications may yield interesting results.

Third, attention to the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis may have led scholars to ignore or underemphasize the importance of divide-and-conquer

strategies and the role of international conflict in pursuing those strategies. As noted in chapter one, much of the scholarship on regime vulnerability and international conflict depends at least partially on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis as an important driving force for linking domestic causes to international outcomes (Levy, 1989b; Stohl, 1980). However, the hypothesis may be ill-suited for sustaining the link between domestic and international politics because international conflict often leads to domestic dissent (Bueno de Mesquita, 1980). This dissertation attempts to correct for the literature's over-reliance on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis by directing attention to another possibility, that leaders might in some cases use international conflict to cement domestic institutional division rather than popular cohesion.

Fourth, this dissertation casts some suspicion on the claim that anarchy may be what states make of it (Wendt, 1992). Wendt argues that in the state of nature, whether states choose to participate in collective security arrangements or to view security in zero-sum terms depends on "[interactive] processes by which conceptions of self evolve" (Wendt, 1992 p. 402). Because "security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature", Wendt argues that states can choose to define their security and interests collectively in terms of a broad international community (1992 p. 407). While this dissertation does not focus on the state of nature, I suggest that counterbalancing might be essential to the consolidation of political order and might constitute a fundamental developmental process in some hypothetical state of nature. If institutional arrangements that leaders use to protect themselves from their own armed forces are built into early stages of political development, and if these arrangements lead to international hostility, then the imperatives of civil-military relations may be sufficient for predisposing states toward

conflict. Even if there were no pressures toward conflict generated by psychological misperception, entrenched bureaucratic interests, or Waltzian structure, the result of civil-military relations might still be that anarchy is not what states make of it.

Status of claims

This dissertation advances two distinct claims. Although it would be conceptually elegant to attribute equal plausibility to both claims, it is not possible to do so. Despite the use of statistical as well as historical evidence to assess both claims, more confidence should be attributed to the plausibility of the causal relationship between the possibility of a coup and counterbalancing than the relationship between counterbalancing and international conflict. First, statistical evidence in support of the first claim is more robust than for the second claim. Both sets of correlations hold under a large variety of statistical conditions (different estimation techniques, different specifications of variables, different control variables), but the correlation between coup risk and counterbalancing in general yields bigger regression coefficients and higher statistical significance. This does not necessarily indicate that the first set of correlations more accurately captures some empirical truth. However, given the possibility if not likelihood of omitted variables, measurement error, and reverse causation, the slightly more robust results that the first set of correlations yield should provide at least an added degree of confidence in their accuracy when compared to the second set of correlations.

Second, Syria posed a harder test for the first claim than did Georgia for the second claim. Previous attempts at counterbalancing failed to stem the tide of military conspiracies in Syria and the Asad regime relied on other

strategies to subordinate the armed forces. In addition, counterbalancing should have been expected to require extremely high financial and organizational costs in Syria during a period when the regime had limited financial resources and when the army's national security performance was critical. For these reasons, it should have been at least somewhat unexpected for the regime to rely so heavily on counterbalancing. In Georgia, there were many possible causes of international conflict in the early 1990's and as a result it is not possible to argue that hostilities should have been unexpected. Therefore, Georgia in the early 1990's does not constitute a hard test for any theory of international hostility and it is best conceived as a plausibility probe.

Finally, third, the second claim in this dissertation is more counterintuitive than the first claim, in large part because of the traditional scholarly reliance on the ingroup-outgroup hypothesis. Although I have not been able to find a single generalizable theory of civil-military relations that argues that vulnerable regimes should almost always rely on counterbalancing to subordinate their armed forces, some theories list counterbalancing as a possible approach. And, considerable anecdotal evidence indicates the widespread use of counterbalancing in different historical contexts. Hence, my first claim constitutes a (hopefully useful) twist on conventional wisdom rather than a radical departure from what we already know. My second claim, however, does constitute a departure from available theories of international conflict. As noted above, much of the literature on domestic and international conflict traces international hostility to leadership attempts to promote domestic unity. Few scholars have examined the international impact of leaders' attempts to cement domestic institutional divisions. For these three reasons, then, I believe it is

appropriate to be somewhat confident in the plausibility of my first claim and simultaneously somewhat confident in the *possible* plausibility of my second claim.

Unanswered questions

This dissertation attempts to provide preliminary answers to two questions. First, what do leaders do to subordinate their own armed forces when coups d'état are possible? Second, do the steps that leaders take to reduce the probability of a coup increase or decrease the likelihood of international conflict? Despite my attempt to address these questions, related and important questions remain unanswered.

First, what factors might influence the likely success or failure of counterbalancing? Although I have suggested that almost all vulnerable leaders should be expected to divide their armed forces into rival factions that check and balance one another, my theory does not address the question of why counterbalancing might lower or eliminate the risk of a coup in some cases while failing to remove that risk (or even increasing it) in other cases. Answering this question requires moving beyond the focus of this project into the realm of speculation, and no answers are apparent from the research I have conducted. The Georgian case, for example, indicates that development of civil society, strong political institutions and the rule of law may be important for the long-term "locking-in" of counterbalancing strategies while the Syrian case demonstrates that counterbalancing can in some cases minimize the risk of a coup over the long term even in the absence of strong, representative political institutions capable of monitoring the armed forces. Statistical evidence indicates that vulnerable regimes are

very likely to employ counterbalancing strategies, but I did not use quantitative evidence to attempt to determine why counterbalancing might work in some cases and fail in others. Answering this question would require focused comparative case histories of successful and unsuccessful attempts at counterbalancing as well as statistical analysis of the relationship between counterbalancing and subsequent coup attempts.

Second, this dissertation does not specify the relationship among various strategies of civil-military relations. Which strategies do leaders implement when the risk of coup is high and how might implementation of some strategies influence the likely impact of other strategies? I provide a partial answer by suggesting that counterbalancing is the most important strategy because other strategies tend to focus on manipulating offers' preferences while counterbalancing is the only approach that pits force against force. But I do not intend to imply that other strategies are irrelevant. Indeed, in both the Syrian and Georgian cases, patrimonialization (stacking the armed forces with political loyalists) was a very significant ingredient in the subordination of the military. This analysis claims that counterbalancing is the only strategy that vulnerable leaders should be expected to pursue on a regular basis and that the implementation of other strategies is indeterminate. But there my be patterns of implementation concerning alternative strategies that merit consideration. I am not calling for renewed attention to the question of which types of regimes should be expected to select particular strategies. Rather, my suspicion is that other variables such as degree of coup-risk, resource availability, and great-power influence might effect the selection of various strategies.

Finally, third, does path-dependence predispose states toward international conflict even after coups are no longer possible and leaders cease to rely on counterbalancing strategies? This dissertation concentrates on regimes that are structurally vulnerable to the possibility of a coup. If leaders eliminate the possibility of a coup by allowing the rule of law, civil society, and political institutions to flourish, and if they no longer rely on counterbalancing to protect themselves from their own armed forces, do international conflicts that emerged during early stages of the consolidation of political order persist? This project does not address the question of path-dependence and enduring disputes, but it would be interesting to trace the evolution of conflicts that emerged during early periods of state-building to determine if they disappear if and when leaders become invulnerable to their own militaries.

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Interviews and site visits:

I interviewed 17 officials in Tbilisi, Georgia in June and July, 1997. Interviews ranged from 20 minutes to one hour. I interviewed officials of the following institutions:

German Embassy

Ministry of Defense

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Internal Affairs

Office of the President

Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security

State Department of the State Frontier Guard

U.S. Embassy

In addition, I conducted two visits to military bases near Tbilisi and consulted with scholars in two non-governmental organizations in Tbilisi:

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Appendix 1
Summary of regime vulnerability scores

First specification: coup-risk I

Value	*Frequency (units are country-years)*	*Percent*
regime is not at-risk	703	26.6
regime is at-risk	1,941	73.4

113 missing observations

Second specification: coup-risk II

Value	*Frequency (units are country-years)*	*Percent*
regime is not at-risk	1,218	46.1
regime is at-risk	1,426	53.9

113 missing observations

Coup-risk scores and actual coup and coup-attempts by region

Region	Percent observations scored as at-risk for a coup by coup-risk I	Percent observations scored as at-risk for a coup by coup-risk II	% observations in which coup or attempt took place
Latin and S. America	86.3	51.9	7.9
East and S. Asia	83.0	58.0	4.4
Middle East	90.4	75.5	8.1
Africa	100.0	82.7	10.1
North America	0.0	0.0	0.0
Europe and Oceania	20.8	7.7	1.5

Appendix 2
Summary of dichotomous counterbalancing measures

First specification: counterbalancing I (using Russett 1993 procedure to identify cut-point)

Value	*Frequency (units are country-years)*	*Percent*
not counterbalancing	400	20.6
regime is at-risk	1,540	79.4

817 missing observations

Second specification: counterbalancing II (median value of continuous score as cut-point)

Value	*Frequency (units are country-years)*	*Percent*
not counterbalancing	970	50.0
regime is at-risk	970	50.0

817 missing observations

Appendix 3
Summary of interaction terms: coup-risk x counterbalancing

First specification: coup-risk I / counterbalancing I / trichotomous:

Value	*Frequency (units are dyad-years)*	*Percent*
neither regime at-risk and counterbalances	3,642	27.9
one regime at-risk and counterbalances	6,205	47.6
both regimes at risk and counterbalance	3,185	24.4

8,354 missing observations

Second specification: coup-risk II / counterbalancing I / trichotomous:

Value	*Frequency (units are dyad-years)*	*Percent*
neither regime at-risk and counterbalances	7,342	53.6
one regime at-risk and counterbalances	5,061	36.9
both regimes at risk and counterbalance	1,295	9.5

7,688 missing observations

For the remaining six specifications of the interaction term, summary statistics are below:

	Mean	S.D.	N
Third spec: coup-risk I / counterbalancing I / dichot:	.72	.45	13,032
Fourth spec: coup-risk II / counterbalancing I / dichot:	.46	.66	13,698
Fifth spec: coup-risk I / counterbalancing II / trichot.	.60	.66	13,168
Sixth spec: coup-risk II / counterbalancing II / trichot:	.37	.57	13,835
Seventh spec: coup-risk I / counterbalancing II / dichot:	.60	.66	13,168
Eighth spec: coup-risk II / counterbalancing II / dichot:	.33	.47	13,835

Appendix 4
Summary of international conflict measures

Low-level conflict as measured ICB, 1966-1986

Value	*Frequency (units are dyad-years)*	*Percent*
no conflict	21,105	99.4
low-level conflict	125	.6

156 missing observations

Low-level conflict as measured by MID, 1966-1986

Value	*Frequency (units are dyad-years)*	*Percent*
no conflict	20,773	97.8
low-level conflict	457	2.2

156 missing observations

Frequencies are lower than reported by Russett (1993) because I count only low-level conflict, not war, because I reset all but the first year of every conflict to zero to attempt to correct for the non-independence of disputes over time, and because I focus on only the second half of the Cold War, 1966-1986.

IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)













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